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Abstract
Sakakibara and Yamakawa analyze the patterns of East Mai Initiative. (The Association of Southeast Asian
Asia's trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) from a Nations plus China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan
global and intraregional perspective, taking into account decided at their meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in
the importance of trade and FDI interlinkages. They May 2000, to establish a regional network of swap
propose two regionally-focused approaches to promoting arrangements.) While opening of the capital account is
trade and FDI in East Asia-regional agreements and considered desirable in the long run, it is associated with
regional production networks. considerable risk, particularly if macroeconomic policies
The East Asia crisis strengthened appeals for regional are not sound and financial supervision and regulation is
cooperation in the financial area. As a result, a number weak. Because of the potential volatility associated with
of financial arrangements and initiatives have emerged floating regimes and the desire to avoid another crisis in
since the crisis, the most prominent of these, the Chiang the region, the authors discuss a number of options.
This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region-
is part of a larger effort in the region to analyze integration through trade. Policy Research Working Paper 3078 on History
and Institutions is part I of this paper. Copies of this paper are available free from' the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact ShahidYusuf, room MC2-509, telephone 202-458-2339, fax 202-522-1150, email
address syusuf@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.
Sharon Yamakawa may be contacted at yamakawa@gsec.keio.ac.jp. June 2003. (149 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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Introduction to Part Two
As stated in the "Overview" presented in Part One, the purpose of this study is to
evaluate the pattern and gauge the progress of regional integration in East Asia from a
political-economic viewpoint. The focus is on the trade, investment, and
financial/monetary aspects of regional cooperation in projecting a viable framework for
integration in the coming decade and assessing the prospects for its success in bringing
prosperity to East Asia. The study examines the causal factors of regionalism in East
Asia and the underlying dynamics of the movement. In this process, differences between
Asia's type of regionalism and that of other regions of the world, in particular Europe and
North America, will become apparent.
Part One set the stage for a discussion of regional integration in East Asia (1) by
reviewing Asia's historical trade and economic presence in the world, (2) by assessing its
current degree of openness to, and integration with, the global economy, and (3) by
evaluating the status and performance of regional institutions in the region in the post-
World War II era. The review of Asian economic history in Chapter I revealed two
aspects of trade in the region (i.e., intraregional and global) that overlapped and
interacted in such a way as to have effectively functioned as one system. This, in
addition to the evidence of Asia's prominent role in the global economy at that time,
supports the argument that Asian trade has been open and global for centuries.
A look at East Asia's social, economic and political structures in Chapter II
revealed a region of enormous diversity, particularly when compared with other regions
of the world. The characteristics of various regional groupings (e.g., ASEAN and APEC)
were examined in an effort to determine if one or another of these institutions brings
greater benefit to the region and the economies therein. While a group comprising
developmentally similar economies could be a more workable arrangement in which
smaller members would have more influence, there is a slightly more compelling
argument in favor of agreements between industrial and developing economies in that
they can bring significant benefits to the developing partners.
Chapter III pointed out that the development of regional institutions was not an
initial goal of East Asian integration; however, most East Asians would now like to see a
strong regional institution in place to lead the region toward closer cooperation and
deeper integration. Regional cooperation has reached the stage in East Asia where more
structure and leadership is needed. However, most find the current condition of regional
institutions in East Asia to be discouraging. The ASEAN-Plus-Three grouping, although
currently operating on the sidelines of ASEAN and having no secretariat of its own, is
perceived by many to be the most workable and potentially beneficial grouping for the
region.
Part Two of the study, "Trade, Finance and Integration," includes Chapters IV
through VII. Chapter IV analyzes the patterns of East Asia's trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI) from a global/intraregional perspective, taking into consideration the
importance of trade and FDI interlinkages. In this context, we propose two regionally
focused approaches to the promotion of trade and FDI in East Asia: regional agreements
and regional production networks.
Taking the East Asian crisis as the point of departure, Chapter V looks at
monetary and financial cooperation in the region. Prior to the crisis, economic
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cooperation efforts in East Asia were focused on trade and investment. The occurrence
of the crisis strengthened appeals for regional cooperation in the financial area. As a
result, a number of financial arrangements and initiatives have emerged since the crisis.
These are discussed in some detail with special attention paid to the most prominent of
these, the Chiang Mai Initiative.
This chapter then reviews financial development in the region. In conjunction
with this, financial structure (bank-based versus capital market-based systems) is
examined in an effort to determine its effect, if any, on financial development.
Chapter V also addresses the issue of capital account liberalization and its
advisability for emerging markets. While opening of the capital account is considered
desirable in the long run, it is associated with considerable risk, particularly if
macroeconomic policies are not sound and financial supervision and regulation is weak.
Many factors related to an individual country's stage of development and current level of
involvement in global capital markets need to be considered in setting realistic goals and
objectives in this area.
Also, arising out of the Asian crisis and related to the issue of financial system
reform is an ongoing debate on the appropriate currency regime for East Asian
economies, extending to the suitability of a regional monetary arrangement for the region.
Prior to the crisis, currencies of the crisis-affected countries were "effectively" pegged to
the U.S. dollar. During the crisis, many of these countries switched to a floating rate
regime. Because of the potential volatility associated with floating regimes and the desire
to avoid another crisis in the region, a number of options are being discussed. This
chapter discusses the pros and cons of these options.
Chapter VI summarizes the whole study (Parts One and Two) and concludes by
providing some perspective on the current state of cooperation and integration in the
region.
Chapter VII looks at regional integration from a future perspective. This chapter
endorses the establishment of a genuine regional institution in East Asia. In addition, it
takes a look (both short- and long-term) at what type of currency arrangements might be
suitable for the region.
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Chapter IV - Trade and FDI: A Role for Regionalism
Trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have played a role, indeed a major role,
in the development of East Asia. The phenomenal growth of the 1 980s and early 1 990s
has been attributed to East Asia's liberalization in these two areas. Trade and FDI
interact in such a way as to be mutually promoting. The importance of this linkage has
grown along with the increased integration of the international production network.
Together, they facilitate the efficient functioning of this system. Furthermore, the
potential for growth is enhanced when there is coordination in the formulation of trade
and FDI policies.
In this chapter we will look at regionalism in East Asia from the perspective of
trade and FDI, the objective being to determine if regional cooperation has a role to play
in their promotion. In this process we will show that East Asia's trade and FDI have both
global and intraregional elements that are essential to the continued development of the
region. Given that and the trend in the region to seek regional solutions to common
issues, we will suggest two regionally focused approaches to the promotion of trade and
FDI in East Asia: regional agreements and regional production networks.
Trade and FDI Linkages
In recent years, the topic of trade and FDI linkage has generated intense interest in
the international community and has been discussed at length in major reports produced
by international organizations such as UNCTAD, the WTO, and the OECD, as well as
being addressed in smaller studies.' The common debate on this issue centers mainly on
whether trade leads to FDI or vice versa and whether they are substitutes or
complements. In fact, the interrelationship between them is quite complex. It may vary
by product, economic sector, and across countries. In other words, it depends upon the
type of FDI and the location and developmental level of the countries concerned.
For example, in the case of natural resources (resource-seeking FDI), trade often
leads to FDI, which in turn supports (and/or creates) trade. If this type of FDI exploits
the same competitive advantages as firms in the host economy it will most likely
reinforce existing export patterns of that economy, but if it exploits different resources, it
can change export patterns. In manufacturing (export-oriented manufacturing FDI),
existing advantages can be reinforced (e.g., low-cost labor used to make clothing for
export) or changed through the introduction of technologies, skills, brand names and
networks that do not exist in the host country.2 In the final analysis, it appears that first,
trade leads to FDI, and then, FDI leads to more trade.3
However, the accuracy of this assessment seems to be in doubt because of the
evolution of the international production network. It is now less an issue of whether trade
leads to FDI or FDI to trade, or whether FDI substitutes for, or complements, trade or the
other way around. "Rather, it is: how do firms access resources - wherever they are
located - in the interest of organizing production as profitably as possible for the
national, regional or global markets they wish to serve? In other words, the issue
becomes: where do firms locate their value-added activities? In these circumstances, the
decision where to locate is a decision where to invest and from where to trade. And it
becomes a FDI decision, if a foreign location is chosen. It follows that, increasingly,
what matters are the factors that make particular locations advantageous for particular
activities, for both, domestic and foreign investors."4
Trade and FDI are becoming more tightly linked in today's international
production system and they function together as the machinery that enables the system to
operate. And, increasingly, TNCs are the facilitators of this process. Their growth in
size and function has been phenomenal. The estimated 850,000 foreign affiliates of
65,000 TNCs worldwide today account for one-tenth of world GDP and one-third of
world exports.5 Their coverage has also broadened to include the whole range of
manufactured exports from low- to high-technology goods, as well as services. TNCs in
their integrated international and regional production strategies can locate production
largely wherever they choose. Different activities of the production process can be
located in different countries or regions in order to take advantage of lower costs, better
resources, transport facilities and markets.6 Thus the connection between trade and FDI
is intensified and for countries where this production is located, opportunities for trade
based on comparative advantage can increase. Of course, countries must first be a part of
the TNC's organizational structure in order to have the opportunity to benefit from these
closer trade-FDI linkages.7
Both trade and FDI are well recognized today as facilitators of growth and
development. They impact development separately and directly, as well as indirectly
through their linkages. Capital, technology, management expertise, training for the local
workforce and access to wider markets are some of the benefits that FDI can bring to host
countries. These can complement the resources and capabilities of the host country and,
thus, increase its export competitiveness.8 Export competitiveness is a key element in the
promotion of economic development as it can result in (1) increased foreign exchange
earnings, which can be used for the import of products, services and technologies
necessary for increasing productivity and living standards; (2) diversification away from
primary commodity exports to higher technology exports; (3) better realization of
economies of scale through larger and more diverse markets; (4) exposure to higher
standards; and (5) easier access to information. 9
There are, of course, situations where these potential benefits are not realized in
the host country because TNCs: (1) may concentrate solely on a host country's static
comparative advantages and never develop the dynamic ones, (2) may fail to build
linkages to the domestic business community, (3) may fail to bring high level
technologies or training to local labor, and (4) may suddenly depart if conditions in the
host country are perceived to have changed so they no longer meet the TNC's criteria for
operating there.'
Still, the relationship between global FDI flows and the growth of world GDP can
be characterized as a "stable and positive relationship."' The overall conclusion of
recent studies12 is that FDI in general does contribute positively to both income growth
and factor productivity in host countries although the precise magnitude of the impact is
difficult to determine. Growth is affected by an increase in total factor productivity or an
increase in efficiency in the usage of resources in the host country.' 3 This occurs through
"the linkages between FDI and foreign trade flows; the spillovers and other externalities
vis-a-vis the host country's business sector; and the direct impact on structural factors in
the host economy."' 4 Although some of these studies found that FDI "crowds out"
domestic investment, others found the opposite to be true. Some even found that
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"crowding out" can have an overall beneficial effect if scarce domestic funds are
released.
In order to attract and reap the benefits of FDI, a certain level of development in
education, technology and infrastructure, as well as financial markets, is necessary. More
specifically, macroeconomic stability, institutional predictability, fiscal discipline,
efficient and equitable tax systems, prudent public-sector debt management, strong
domestic financial systems, developed capital markets, transparency, openness to foreign
trade, and an educated workforce are important in this regard. Creating this enabling
environment, in many cases, requires policy changes on the part of national
governments. 15
The interlinkages between trade and FDI and their combined effect on growth and
development make it necessary for policies in these two areas to support one another in
terms of objectives and efficient implementation, because ignoring them can lead to
weakening of the developmental contribution of each, whereas acting on them can lead to
synergies that can promote growth and development further than if they were dealt with
autonomously.' 6 The importance of this coordination increases as the intemational
production system becomes more integrated, as is now taking place.
Many policies for the promotion of trade and, particularly, FDI are currently
developed and implemented at the national level. 7 However, for some countries,
particularly lesser developed countries, a national approach can be difficult because of
the lack of knowledge and skills in foreign investment related policymaking and in the
negotiation and implementation of treaties and agreements.' 8 In such cases, a regional or
multilateral approach may work better.
Patterns of Trade and FDI: Global and Intraregional
As revealed in Part One of this study, East Asia has a historical legacy of
openness and global integration that continues today. However, the data and discussion
presented in Part One do not tell us anything about the current intraregionallglobal mix of
trade and FDI in the region. In this section, we will make that assessment by examining
trading and investment patterns in East Asia over the last decade or so.
Trading Patterns
East Asia has experienced tremendous growth in trade over the last two decades
with imports increasing fivefold and exports sixfold between 1980 and 2000 reaching a
level of $1,349 billion and $1,589 billion, respectively, in the latter year. Between 1990
and 2000, growth was slower but still both imports and exports roughly doubled over
those 10 years. The growth rate in imports and exports for both ASEAN and ASEAN-
Plus-Three mirrors the regionwide rate for both time periods. 19
Trade can be measured in several ways. In our analysis we will use two
measures: (1) trade share is a simple measure that indicates the magnitude of trade of one
country with another. It is easy to calculate and commonly used in general discussions of
trading affiliations but has a number of shortcomings that will be discussed later. (2) The
trade intensity index is a more complex measure in terms of its calculation as well as the
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information it provides. It gives a clearer, more accurate picture of the trading patterns of
countries and, especially of regions, than does the trade share measure. Using these two
indices, we will take a look at current trading patterns and how they have evolved over
the last two decades with the focus on regional/multilateral patterns and shifts.
Trade Measured in Shares
A snapshot of East Asia's average trade shares for 1998-2000 (Table 4.1), reflects
both the global and intraregional nature of East Asia's trade. (See Table S.6 in
appendix for separate import and export shares.) All but the smallest nations conduct a
significant amount of trade with the EU and the U.S. (between 10 and 30 percent share of
their total trade). But intraregionally, the trade shares of individual countries are even
larger with ASEAN; in this case, it is the smaller countries that have the larger share. If
the expanded ASEAN-Plus-Three (APT)21 is considered, the shares rise significantly for
all countries, primarily because of the high level of trade with Japan (representing 10 to
28 percent for most countries), except for Hong Kong in which case it is trade with China
that pushes up the share with APT.
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Table 4.1
Total Trade' Shares (%)
1998-2000
BRU CAM CHN HKG ION I JPN KOR LAO MLS MYN PHL SGP I TWN THA VNM
Japan 27.6 3.2 16.8 8.8 19.9 _ 15.0 20.9 12.1 7.9 18.2 11.91 18.2 19.3 15.2
Korea 7.6 2.9 6.3 3.2 6.9 5.2 - 0.8 3.9 5.7 5.6 3.2 4.1 2.5 7.6
China 0.7 4.1 - 38.5 5.2 9.2 8.6 2.7 3.0 15.6 2.5 4.3 0.0 3.8 6.1
Hong Kong 1.2 8.3 16.3 - 2.6 3.5 4.1 0.9 3.6 2.9 4.8 5.4 12.0 4.2 3.0
Taiwan 0.7 5.5 5.5 6.1 4.1 5.9 3.6 0.8 4.7 3.5 7.2 4.1 - 4.2 7.6
Brunei - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0
Cambodia 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.3
Indonesia .2.4 1.7 12 0.7 2.5 2.4 0.2 2.0 5.4 1.3 3.8 1.6 2.0 3.3
Laos 0.0 0.0 00 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 OA 0.4
Malaysia 7.5 2.3 1.3 1.6 3.3 3.1 2.5 0.1 - 9.0 3.8 16.3 2.9 4.5 2.7
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 - 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Philippines 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.9 1.6 0.0 1.9 0.2 2.4 2.1 1.6 1.2
Singapore 16.2 12.3_ 2.3 3.4 10.2 3.1 2.8 3.1 16.9 15.3 6.9 - 3.2 8.5 9.7
Thailand 7.3 i1021 1.1 1.3 2.5. 2.8 1.0 4`1.8 3.5 0.0 2.6 4.4. 1.9 4.1
Vietnam 0.0 10.9 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.6 2.7 0.4 O.0 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.9 -
ASEAN 33.5 33.9 7.0 81 18.1 14.0 11.2 48.0 25.2 29.8 15.2 28.7 12.4 18.2 22.2
ASEAN+ 3 69.4 44.0 30.1 58.6 50.1 28.5 34.9 72.4 44.1 59.0 41.5 48.2 34.6 43.9 51.0
APEC 85.6 76.0 75.1 82.5 75.6 71.7 69.7 76.6 75.9 74.1 84.5 78.4 76.3 73.4 71.2
CER 2.9 0.4 1.9 13 4.0 3.3 3.1 0.2 2.6 0.3 1.8 2.3 2.2 2.4 4.9
EU 12.9, 9.7 14.4 12.5 14.9 15.7 12.4 11.7 13.3 9.2 14.6 13.6 14.6 14.4 17.5
U.S. 11.3 17.4 17.8 14.9 13. 26.6 20.4 1.7 19.7 7.8 27.4 17.7 21.7 17.6 4.0
NAFTA 11.3 17.6 19. 16 14.5 29.5 22.8 2.0 20.7 8.5 28.7 18.61 23.4 18.9 4.6
Total Trade = sum of imports and exports
Table reads as total trade share of a country in the top row with a partner country in the left-hand column; e.g. starting top left -.
Bunei's exports to and imports from Japan as percentage of Brunel's total trade.
Some data for the year 2000 was esUmated, Including all countries' trade with Taiwan and some countries' trade with Vietnam.
Singapore does not report its trade with Indonesia to the IMF; therefore, Singapore's trade with Indonesia is esUmated using data
from Indonesia.
Source: Author's calculations based on data from IMF, Direction of Trade Stastcs
The trading patterns of East Asian countries, however, have shifted over time. A
review of these shifts can reveal regional/global trends in the trade of these countries.
The following three figures (six graphs) reveal how the trade shares of selected
economies (i.e., ASEAN, Japan and China)22 with some of their major trading partners
have changed between 1980 and 2000.
ASEAN - The graphs in Figure 4.1 reveal changes in the shares of ASEAN's trade with
its major partners between 1980 and 2000. (See Table S.7 in appendix for data table for
this figure.)
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Figure 4.1
ASEAN Import Shares
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Source: Authors' calculations using IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
Japan was ASEAN's primary trading partner in both imports and exports in the
1980s. However, this relationship had declined significantly by 2000 with the share of
imports from Japan dropping from 23 to 16 percent between 1990 and 2000 and export
share declining from 30 to 13 percent between 1980 and 2000. ASEAN's imnports were,
of course, negatively impacted by the East Asian crisis; however, the post-crisis decline
in the level of imports from Japan (37 percent between 1996 and 1998) was greater than
the decline in ASEAN's total imports (26 percent for the same period). The dollar value
of exports to Japan increased between 1980 and 2000 (to above pre-crisis levels), but this
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did not keep pace with the growth rate of ASEAN's total exports, which increased sixfold
over the 20 years to reach $432 billion in 2000.
By 2000, this decline in share of exports dropped Japan's position below that of
the U.S. and the EU, for which the share has remained virtually unchanged since 1990.
Shares of imports from the U.S. and EU, like that from Japan, have fallen off somewhat.
While the importance of Japan, the U.S. and the EU in ASEAN's trade
deteriorated, that of China and South Korea appreciated. The shares of both imports from
and exports to these two countries increased fairly steadily between 1980 and 2000.
Figure 4.1 also shows that intra-ASEAN trade has appreciated quite considerably.
There was an increase in the share of intra-ASEAN imports of ten percentage points
between 1990 and 2000, from 16.4 percent to 26.5 percent placing it well above that of
Japan (16 percent), the U.S. (14 percent) and the EU (11 percent). The share of intra-
ASEAN exports rose a bit more slowly, by three percentage points to 23 percent in 2000,
but still ended up being a larger proportion than that of the U.S. (20 percent), the EU (15
percent) and Japan (13 percent).2 3
JAPAN - Japan's pattern of trade shares has shifted noticeably (and similarly for both
imports and exports) over the last 20 years. (See Figure 4.2.)
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Figure 4.2
Japan's Import Shares
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The proportion of trade with the U.S. and the EU, although still prominent, is on a
downward trend while that with ASEAN and China is sloping upward. The U.S. remains
Japan's most prominent trading partner with imports from that country making up 19
percent of Japan's total imports, 30 percent in the case of exports. More remarkable,
however, is that since 1990, Japan's imports from China have more than tripled in value
8
to $54 billion in 2000 and now make up 14 percent of Japan's total imports, surpassing
the share of imports from the EU (12 percent) and coming close to that of ASEAN (16
percent). On the other hand, Japan's exports to China, although having increased
somewhat since 1990, are still only 6 percent of total exports, the same as that of South
Korea.
CHINA -Between 1996 and 2000, China's imports grew 70 percent to $236 billion and
exports doubled to $311 billion. Although still supplying the largest share of China's
imports, the share from Japan has dropped from 27 percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 1990
but rose 2 percentage points by 2000. (See Figure 4.3.) The shares of imports from the
EU and U.S. also declined between 1980 and 2000 to 12 and 8 percent, respectively. The
shares of imports from ASEAN and South Korea have risen over the last 10 to 20 years
to reach the same level as that of the U.S. in 2000.
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Figure 4.3
China Import Shares
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In exports, the U.S. share has risen dramatically since 1980 to reach 27 percent in
2000, far surpassing that of Japan and the EU (14 percent for both). This is a complete
reversal of the share pattern in 1980 when exports to the U.S. made up the smallest share
(5 percent) and the share for Japan was the largest (22 percent). This reflects improved
relations between the U.S. and China over the last 20 years, as well as the fact that U.S.
and EU TNCs are moving production to China and exporting from there.
Intrareglonal Trade Shares
Figure 4.1 revealed that during the 1 990s the gap between the share of intra-
ASEAN trade and the share of ASEAN's trade with its major non-Asian partners, the
U.S. and the EU, had progressively widened. Does this mean that East Asia's trade is
becoming more intraregional as opposed to global? Examining the intraregional trade of
the entire region (not just ASEAN) in comparison with that of other regions over a longer
period of time and in relation to (1) world trade as a whole and (2) East Asia's total trade
(intraregional and extraregional) will help to answer that question.
The tables below present two measures based on trade shares for major Asian and
non-Asian groups.
Table 4.2
Intraregional Trade
Merchandise Exports Within Regional Group (as share of world exports)
Absolute Measure
(% ofwad1d aests) 1970 1980 1990 1996 1998 1999 2000
APEC 20.9 19.1 27.1 33.2 32.2 33.5 35.6
ASEAN 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.6
ASEAN Plus Three n.a. 3.7 4.6 7.2 5.5 6.2 7.0
All EastAsia n.a. 4.6 7.8 12.7 10.5 11.2 12.7
European Union 27.31 24.4 29.5 24.1 22.7 24.8 22.3
NAFTA 7.91 5.5 6.8 8.3 9.71 10.3 10.7
NOTE: Table shows sum of exports by members of a group to other members of the group as a percent f woild eports.
Service spofts are excluded. AJthough data has been calculated back to 1970 or 1980 on the basis of current group membership, mcet of the groups
came Into existence In later years and their membership may have changed over lime. Intratrade In earlier years may not have been affected by the
same preferences (as set forth In preferential arrangements) as In rerent years.
I All East Asia includes ASEAN plus Japan, Korea, China. Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Tawan not Included In 1980 and 1990 data.
Source: For APEC, EU, and NAFTA: calculted using World Bank, World Deveiopment Indicators 2002; for all others: calculated using
IMF, Directin of Trade Statistics
Table 4.3
Intraregional Trade
Merchandise Exports Within Regional Group (as share of group's total exports)
Relative Measure
(% of total exports) 1970 1980 1990 1996 1998 1999 | 2000
APEC 57.8 57.9 68.3 72.1 69.7 71.9 73.2
ASEAN 22.9 18.6 19.9 25.4 21.7 22.2 23.1
ASEAN PFus Three na. 29.5 27.1 36.8 28.8 31.4 32.0
All East Asia n.a 33.8 40.4 50.4 43.0 44.8 46.3
European Union 59.5 60.8 65.9 61.4 57.0 63.3 62.1
NAFTA 36.0 33.6 41.4 47.6 51.7 54.6 55.7
NOTE: Table shows sum of exports by members of a group to other members of the group as a percentage of the groups total exports.
Service exports are excluded. Although data has been caicuiated back to 1970 or 1980 on the basis of current group membership, most of the
groups came Into eaxistence in later years and their membership may have changed over time. Intratrade in eartier years may not have been affected by the
same preferences as in recent years.
I All East Asia indudes ASEAN plus Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Taiwan not included in 1980 and 1990 data.
Source. For APEC, EU, and NAFTA used World Bank. World Development Indicators 2002; for all others: authors' calculation using IMF. DOTS
The first measure (Table 4.2) places a group's intraexports in the context of total
world exports reflecting the degree of importance of its intraregional trade in total world
trade. The second measure (Table 4.3) places a group's intraexports in the context of its
own total exports reflecting the degree of importance of its intraregional trade relative to
its extraregional trade.24
The patterns (both between regions and for each region over time) in Table 4.3
are similar to those in Table 4.2. First, since 1990, APEC has had the largest intraexport
share of world exports and of its own total exports, followed by the EU, NAFTA, "All
East Asia", ASEAN-Plus-Three and, finally, ASEAN.25 Second, the fluctuation patterns
in each group's intraexport share over time, or in other words, the increases and decreases
in the importance of each group's intratrade in world trade and in its own trade, have
generally followed the same pattern over the last two decades.
The increases in these measures for most regional groups, except the EU which
experienced a decline that is noteworthy considering it is the region that has become the
most integrated during that time, reflect members' intraexport growth relative to the
growth of world exports and of their own total exports.26 In other words, intratrade for
East Asian groups generally increased in importance relative to both world trade and their
own trade over the last 10 to 20 years. However, this does not indicate that a group's
trade is more biased in favor of group members.
Trade share as a measure of trade has certain shortcomings, primarily that the
share size of a trading group is a direct reflection of the number of countries in the group
and of the trading volume of those countries; i.e., shares are larger for large groups that
include high-volume-trade countries and smaller for small groups of low-volume-trade
countries. 7 Furthermore, the larger the group, the larger is a country's share in that
group.28 Thus, in order to accurately assess the level of East Asia's intraregional trade,
we need to know not only the magnitude of intratrade of the countries within the' region
(as shown above) but also whether members of the region trade more intensely with one
another than they do with those outside the region. A measure that has been developed to
adjust for the shortcomings of trade shares, and that comes closer to revealing the true
nature of intraregional trade, is the "trade intensity index".29
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Trade Intensity Index
The trade intensity index is used to determine the actual intensity of one group'
member's trade with another group member or, in other words, the bias within a group of
members to trade with one another.3 Tables 5 (1995-97) and 6 (1998-2000) show
merchandise trade intensities for East Asian countries. 3 '
Table 4.4
Trade Intenslty, East Asia, 1995.97- - - - -
AsiaI AUS CAM CHN I HK IDN JPN KOR LAO MYSI NZL PHL SCGP THA TWN VNM USA EU
AUS 3.21 0.7 1.51 0.9 4.0 2.9 2.1 0.6 1.61 22.3 2.4 1.1 1.5 2.3 1.2 0.3 0.3
CAM 2.61 0.2 - 2.01 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.1 - 2.7 0.0 0.0 5.5 17.1 0.8 - 0.7 1.3
CHN 1.71 0.9 1.7 - 15.9 1.2 2.8 1.8 25 06 0.5 1.1 0.9 0.7 1.0 2.8 1.1 0.4
H4K 1.71 0.9 1.5 10.51 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.9 1.8 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.4,
IDN 12.31 2.1 6.1 1.51 0.9 - 13.91 2.4 0.31 1.6 0.8 2.2, 3.7, 1.3 1.8, 3.7 0.9 0.4
JPN 1 1.91 1.5 0.6 1.81 1.5 2.71 - 12.4 0.9 2.3 1.3 2.8 1.9 3.2 3.1 1.3 1.6 0.4
KOR 12.01 1.2 0.6 3.31 2.0 3.1 1.91 - 0.5 1.8 0.6 2.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 6.2 1.1 0.3
LAO 1 1.71 0.1 1.11 0.1 0.2 1.6 0.2 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 14.2 1.9 - 0.4 1.1
MYS 12.21 1.4 4.2 0.91 1.4 .1.8 1.9 1.1 0.3 - 1.0 1.9 8.1 3.1 2.0 2.1. 1.2 0.4
NZL 12.41 16.4 0.4 1.0 0.8 2.0 2.4 1.9 0.1 1.6 - 2.0 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.4 0.6 0.4
PHL 1.31 0.7 0.3 0.5 1.2 0.8 2.7 0.9 0.1, 1.9, 0.4 - I2.4, 2.8 2.0, 1.81 2.3 0.5,
SGP 4.41 1.9 16.7 1.0 2.3 -I 1.2 1.1 3.91 12.1 1.1 2.9 - 4.2 2.1 7.2 1.1 0.4
THIA 6.91 1.3 16.3 1.2 1.4 2.3 2.6 0.7 53.8 2.7 0.7 1.6 5.1 - 1.4 3.1 1.2 0.4
TWN 1.81 1.3 1.0 1.8 4.9 1.8 1.7 0.8 0.3 1.8 0.9 2.4 1.6 2.0 - 3.1 1.5 0.4
VNM2 0 3.8 - 1.7, 0.8 2.7 4.1 1.1 - 1.4 0.7 3.4 2.6 0.9 1.4 - 0.3 1.0
UA 0.6 1.41 0.11 0.71 0.5 -0.7 1.4 1.3 0.1 0.9 0.9 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.3 0.3 - ,0.5
EU 0.3 0.51 0.21 0.31 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 04 03 03 31 0.3 0.41 -
NOTE: Table reads as trade intensity of a country in the left-hand column with a country in the top row.
The Asia trade intertsity is the unweighted average of trade intensities vith the rest of East Asia.
iSource: DeBrouwer 2002, Table 12.2, p. 291
Table 4.5
_________ 
~~~~~~~~~~~~Trade_ntenslty_Index. 1998.2000- -- -
13___ RUI CAM CHiNI HK IOIN JPN KOR LAO MYS MYN PHL SGP THKA TWN VNM ASEAN APT APEC EU NAFTA CER U.S.
BR-U - 0.21 0.01 3.685.0 5.9 2.4 0.0 0.2 3.8 11.9 0.3 0.1 4.2 4.91 2.0 0.1 0.5 2.6 0.7
CAM - 0.5 0.61 0.1 0.3 0.0 . 0.5 . 0.2 5.0 3.0 0.9 68.5 4.4 1.71 1.3 0.3 1.4 0.1 1.8
CNN _ 0.1 1.9 - 6.21 1.5 __2.8 1.7 0.8 0.7 5.0 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.8 2.0 i.e 1.9 i.e 0.4 1.0 1.2 1.3
HK o.e 3.1 11.1 - 10.8 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.8 1.2 1.0 i.e i.i 1.1 2.9 1.7 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.2
ION 2.7 4.0 1.6 0.91 -___ 3.8 3.0 0.0 2.5 7.4 2.4 5.7 2.0 2.0 2.9 3.7 3.2 1.8 0.4 0.7 2.4 0.8.
JPN 0.4 0.4 1.8 1.6 2.31 - 2.5 0.6. 2.2. 1.1 3.6. 2.0, 3.0 3.5. 1.7 2.3 2.2 1.7. 0.4 1.3, 1.6 1.6
KOR 0.4 2.0 3.2 1.9 3.21 1.9 - 0.5 2.1 3.1 3.9 1.5 1.3 2.3 4.3 2.1 2.3 1.51 0.4 0.9 1.5 1.1
LAO .I 0.5 0.0 0.0 7.9 0.1 - 0.0 - 0.5 9.6 0.5 0.0 1.7 3.4 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2
MYS 9.3 1.8 0.9 1.4 2.9 2.1 1.4 0.2 - . 7.6 2.9 8.9 3.7 2.3 2.0 5.9 2.8 1.7 0.4 1.0 2.0 1.2
MYN 1.6 2.0 0. 11 __ 12 0.5 3.2 0.4 3.5 - 0.9 - 2.1 1.6 1.1 0.4 0.9 0.2 1.0
PHL1 0.5 0.2 0.5 1.5 0.7 _ 2.6 -1.3 01.0 3.5 04 3.6 2.8 4.0 1.0 2.9 2.1 1.7 0.5 1.4 0.6. 1.8
SGP 15.1 12.1 1.2 1.8, 4.3 1.3 1.5, 2.2_ 14.0 9.1 4.4 . 4.8. 2.1 5.9 8.1, 3.0 1.6 0.4~ 0.8 2.21 1.0
THA 2.5 23.7 1.2 16 3.7 2.7, 0.81 61.51 3.2 0.0. 2.9 4.6 1.9 . ,4.9 4.1 ~ 2.6, 1.6 0.5 1.0. 1.91 1.2
TWN - 16.61 2.0. 1.81 1.01 . 1.91 . 3.6 1.71 - 2.01 4.7, 2.11 1.51 1.7, 0.41 1.11 1.21 1.4
vNm 0.2. 30.8 1.01 0.61 7.21 3.31 1.01 32.81 1.91 3.8 2.51 2.81 1.8 I 3.11 2.51 1.31 0.81 0.31 6.31 0.3
NOTE: Table reeds as trade Intensity of a country in the left-hand column vith a country in the top raw.
Somne 2000 Import and export data was estimfated, including ali countries' trade with Taiwan and some countries' trade vAith Vietnam. Singapore does not report Its tradea
with Indonesia to the IMF: therefore. Singapore's trade with Indonesia is estimated using Indonesia's data.
For calcutation of inidex see endnotes.
Souirce: Authore catcutations based on data from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
1 3
The above two tables reveal that most of the indices are above "one", indicating
that these countries trade with each other above the "normal" level of trade based on their
trade with the rest of the world. Singapore and Thailand have an intense trading
relationship with the largest number of countries in the region and some of these are at a
very high level, particularly with the newer ASEAN members.
Table 4.6 summarizes the data in the previous two tables indicating the top five
trading partners (with an index of 1 or above) for each East Asian country.
Table 4.6
Top Five Trading Partners for East Asian Economies
(Based on Trade Intensity Index)
1995-1997 1998-2000
Brunei N.A. THA JPN KOR SGP 3
- 11.9 8.. 59 38 36
Cambodia THA SGP MYS I CHN HK VNM SGP THA USA
17.11 5.5 2.7 2.0 14 68.5 5.0 30 18
China HK JPN VNM LAO KOR HK MYN JPN VNM CAM
5.9 2.8 2.8 2.5 1.8 6.2 5.0 28 20 1
Hong CHN PHL SGP TWN VNM CHN CAM PHL USA SGP
Indonesia CAM JPN |SGP VNM KOR MYN SGP CAM JPN KOR
61 39 37 3 2.4 74 57 40 388 30
Japan THA TWN PHL IDN KOR PHL TWN THA KOR ION_
32 3.1 28 27 2.41 36 35 301 25 23
South VNM CHN IDN I VPHL HK HL CHN IDN MYN
Korea 6.2 3.31 31 244 9 3.2 3 2 31
Lao PDR THA TWN JPN CHN EU THA JPN
142 19 1.6 11 11 96 79
Malaysia SGP CAM THA VNM TWN BRU SGP MYN THA PHL IDN
81 42~, 314 211 2C0 93 89 76 37 291 291
Myarnar N.A. SGP MYS CHN BRU JPN
35 32 20 1.6 1.2
Philippines THA JPN SGP USA TWN TWN SGP MYS THA JPN
1 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.3 20 1 4.0 36 3.5 2.8 2.
Singapore CAM MYS VNM THA LAO BRU MYS CAM MYN VNM
1 16.7 12.1 7.2 4.2 3.9 15.1 14.0 12.1 9.1 5.9
Taiwan HK VNM I PHL THA CHN IDN MYS HK VNM I PHL IDN THA
4.91 3.11 2.4 2.0 1 1 6.6 4.71 3.6 2.0 2.
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Top Five Trading Partners for East Asian Economies
(Based on Trade Intensity Index)
Thailand LAO CAM SGP VNM MYS LAO CAM VNM SGP IDN1 53.8 16.3 5.1 3.1 2.7 61 . 4.5 4.6 3.7
Vietnam JPN AUS PHL IDN SGP X AM IDN PHL JPN
4.1 3.8 3.4 2.7 2.6 _ 32.E 30.E 7.2 3.8 3.3
Note: Only trading relationships with an index of 1.0 or above are included in table.
1Source: Compiled by authors based on data in Tables S and 6.
The above analysis using trade share revealed that the trade of East Asian
countries with the U.S. and EU is quite significant. This conclusion is supported by the
intensity index in the case of the U.S., but not the EU. Although the U.S. appears among
the top five trading partners in 1998-2000 for only Cambodia and Hong Kong, there are
in fact 11 East Asian countries that have an intensity index of 1 or above with the U.S.
(see Table 4.5). On the other hand, the intensity indices with the EU are all well below 1
(in fact, most are below 0.5). Thus, the intensity index confirms an above-normal trading
relationship with the U.S., but not with the EU.
During 1998-2000, Japan was among the top five trading partners for seven East
Asian countries, including China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and most of the newer
ASEAN countries. It is interesting to note that the intensity indices of several of these
countries with Japan are nearly the same in 1998-2000 as in 1995-97, but Japan's
position among their top five partners has dropped indicating a relative weakening of
Japan's trade relationship with these countries relative to their other trading partners. 32
This indicates that Japan has declined slightly as a trading partner for some East Asian
countries, which is consistent with the findings in our earlier trade share analysis.3
Nevertheless, the indices of East Asian countries with Japan as a partner are all I or
above (except for Cambodia) and many are 2 or higher indicating a still strong trading
relationship.
The newer ASEAN countries, in 1998-2000, are more often among the top five
trading partners of the East Asian countries than they were in 1995-97. This could be
attributed to the effect on their trade of membership in ASEAN during the latter half of
the 1990s.
Figure 4.4 below compares trade intensity indices of selected regional groups in
Asia, Europe and North America.
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Figure 4.4
Trade Intensity Index - Selected Regions
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ElASEAN *ASEAN +3 DAJI East Asia 3 EU NAFTA|
See Endnotes for calculation of index.
All East Asia Includes ASEAN plus Japan, China, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. No Taiwan data for 1980 and 1990.
Source: IMF DOTS Yearbooks 1985, 1992, 2000 & 2001; IMF DOTS Quarterly Updates; and
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002.
Prominent in this figure is that ASEAN, in all years shown, had a higher intensity
index than any of the other groups. (See Table S.8 in appendix for intensity index data
table.) Its index of 4 to 6 between 1980 and 2000 was well above that of the EU, for
which the index was only between 1.7 and 1.9. Although NAFTA's index was higher
(about 3.0 in all years), this was still below that of ASEAN. This tells us that ASEAN
has had a higher degree of intraregional trade than the EU or NAFTA in 1980 and the
1 990s. This is the opposite of the findings based on the trade share analysis presented
earlier. (See Tables 3 and 4.)
If the ASEAN group is widened to include China, Japan, and South Korea
(ASEAN-Plus-Three), the intensity drops considerably; i.e., to about 2 or slightly above.
The reason for this could be the low level of trade between ASEAN and China relative to
China's large share of exports to the U.S. and EU. Whereas if the "All East Asia" group
is considered, the intensity goes up somewhat, probably because of the inclusion of Hong
Kong which trades heavily with China. Both of these groups (ASEAN-Plus-Three and
"All East Asia") have indices greater than that of the EU, but less than that of NAFTA.
Although these indices have not changed dramatically, there was an overall
decline in intensity with some fluctuation over the 20-year period for the East Asian
groups. However, for ASEAN most of the decline occurred between 1980 and 1990.
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The trade intensity indices of NAFTA and the EU moved in the opposite
direction. That of NAFTA rose between 1980 and 1996 but dropped off by 1998 and,
thereafter, remained virtually unchanged. The EU's index fluctuated a bit but generally
rose steadily between 1980 and 2000. 5
There are few clear regional trends that emerge in the foregoing discussion
although it does reinforce the argument that East Asia's trade continues to be open and
global but with a strong intraregional component. While the results based on two
different measures - trade share and trade intensity - are not always consistent, some
general observations can be made. Despite some decline, the U.S. remains a major
trading partner of most East Asian countries, including Japan. There is still a significant
share (although declining) of East Asia's trade that is conducted with the EU, although
the trade intensity index reveals no bias.36 It does not appear from the analysis that East
Asia's trade is necessarily becoming more intraregional, in fact, there is some indication
of the opposite based on trade intensity. However, within the region itself there are
shifts; for example, ASEAN's trade with Japan is declining while that with China and
South Korea is rising. Japan, on the other hand, is trading slightly less with extraregional
partners and more intraregionally. China is exporting much more to the U.S. and slightly
more to the EU but importing more from within the region.
Trade within the region will almost assuredly continue to change significantly
over the next decade and developing trends will be affected in no small way by further
progress in China's reforms, by developments in Japan's economy, as well as in the
global economy, and by the direction and extent of regional integration efforts within
East Asia. The region has the power to steer these changes in a direction that will be
advantageous to its growth and development but this will take some concerted effort and
a well-developed cooperative strategy. Some relevant suggestions in this area will be
made later in this paper.
Patterns of FDI Flows
Although there is some variability country to country, overall, FDI plays a critical
role in economic expansion for East Asian economies, as evidenced by the FDI share of
gross fixed capital formation shown in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7
Inward and Outward FDI Flows as Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(Percentage) l
1990-1995
(Annual
Region/Economy average) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Japan:
inward 0.1 - 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.7
outward 2.2 1.8 2.1 2.3 1.9 26
European Union:
inward 5.5 6.5 8.1 15.7 28.5 50.1
outward 7.7 10.8 14.0 24.8 41.8 60.0
U.S.:
inward 4.3 7.0 7.8 11.9 18.0 17.5
outward 6.1 7.0 7.2 8.9 11.1 9.6
South, East and South-East Asia: I
inward 6.7 9.1 10.0 10.5 11.5 14.0
outward 3.8 5.3 5.4 3.9 4.4 9.0
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002, Annex table B.5
The rise in FDI inflows to East Asia in the last decade has been remarkable. (See
Table S.9 in appendix.) The value of inflows has tripled from $45 billion in 1990-95
(annual average) to $136 billion in 2000. This level declined somewhat (by 29 percent to
$96.4 billion) in 2001 but still represents a doubling of inflows since the beginning of the
1990s. Among regional subgroups, inflows to ASEAN declined over that period while
those to ASEAN-Plus-Three rose by 80 percent, reflecting a sharp increase in flows to
China along with post-crisis disinvestment in Indonesia and a significant decline in flows
to Malaysia. The growth in FDI, as in trade, was spurred by significant liberalization in
these areas during the 1980s and early 1990s, although this growth was reversed by the
East Asian crisis of 1997-98.
In 2001, China attracted the largest share of inflows in the region, as well as in the
developing world, when the value of its inflows reached a high of $46.8 billion. After
doubling from $19 billion to $40 billion between 1990-95 (annual average) and 1996, its
flows remained close to that level until 2001 when they increased further. During the
first half of 2002, inflows rose by 19 percent over the same period in 2001, and this trend
is expected to continue.37
Sources of FDI
A look at the sources of these FDI flows will help in the assessment of FDI flow
patterns for East Asia. We will first look at ASEAN as a group (Figure 4.5) and then at
individual East Asian countries (Table 4.8).
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Figure 4.5
FDI In ASEAN by Country of Origin
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Source: Compiled from Statistics of Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN: Enhanced Data Set, 2001 Edition, Tables
3.1.2. - 3.1.7., pp24-35.
Figure 4.5 reveals which countries/regions are the primary investors in ASEAN
and how these relationships have changed over the last half decade. The bottom chart in
this figure, excluding Indonesia, is presented because of the distortion effect of
Indonesia's recent disinvestment on ASEAN as a whole.
The investor with the largest share of FDI in ASEAN is the EU which accounts
for 20 to 30 percent of investment between 1998 and 2000, compared to only 17-18
percent in 1995.38 This considerable rise in share may have been helped by the efforts of
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the transregional trade arrangement, ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), under its Investment
Promotion Action Plan (IPAP).3 9 The next largest investor is the U.S. with a share of 14
to 23 percent in 1998-2000. The intra-ASEAN share dropped precipitously after 1997,
which is understandable given the deterioration in the major ASEAN economies during
the crisis.
While all source countries/regions had a net withdrawal of investment from
Indonesia in 2000,40 the largest was that of Japan (i.e., US$1.7 billion, or 38 percent of
Indonesia's $4.5 billion of lost investment). But even without the effect of its
disinvestment in Indonesia, the share of ASEAN's FDI that comes from Japan dropped
significantly over this time period - from 19 percent in 1997 to only 10-11 percent in
1999-2000.
Table 4.8 gives an idea of the major sources of FDI for individual countries in
East Asia, but it covers different time periods, types of flows and is drawn from different
sources for each country. It is thus not comparable across countries.
Table 4.8
Distribution of FDI in Selected Developing Countries
Country and Data Year Top Three Sectors Top Three Originating
(% of total) Countries
.___________ ________ _________________ (% o f to tal)
China Manufacturing (46%) Hong Kong (4 1%/)
(1998-2000 accumulated Real estate management (16%) United States (10%)
flows) Utilities (6%) Virgin Islands (9%)
Hong Kong Investment holding/real estate (60%) Virgin Islands (32%)
(2000 year-end stock) Wholesale/retail (11%) Mainland China (31%)
Banking (9%) Bermuda (10%)
Indonesia Chemicals and pharmacy (30%) Japan (16%)
(cumulative 1967-mid 2000) Paper (11%) United Kingdom (9%)
Electronics, trading and other services (10%) Singapore (8%)
Malaysia Electrical and electronics (51%) United States (28%)
(flows 2000-01) Paper, printing, publishing (9%) Japan (16%)
Non-metallic mineral products (8%) Netherlands (11%)
Philippines Manufacturing (46%) United States (36%)
(flows 2000) Energy-related (32%) Japan (27%)
Service export (13%) Hong Kong (11%)
Singapore Electronic products and components (48%) United States (40%)
(2000 inflows) Chemicals and chemical products (30%) Japan (16%)
Transport equipment (5%) France (4%)
Taiwan Electronics and electrical (24%) United States (24%)
(total approved flows 1952- Banking and insurance (15%) Japan (21%)
2000) Services (11%) Hong Kong (8%)
Thailand Trade (25%) Japan (27%)
(total net inflows 1995-99) Machinery and transport (11%) United States (17%)
Electrical appliances (10%) Singapore (13%)
Vietnam Oil and gas (59%) United Kingdom (30%)
(flows 2000) Light industry (18%) India (25%)
_ Heavy industry (9%) . Taiwan (15%)
NOTE: Concentrations are not comparable across countries as they are defined differently by national govemments.
Source: Compiled from OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development, 2002, 56.
For most of the countries in this table inward FDI comes from only a few sources
i.e., around 60 to 70 percent from only three source countries. The lack of diversification
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in FDI sources, as well as in destination sectors, which lean heavily toward electrical and
electronic products is a risk factor for East Asian economies.
Source countries within East Asia that appear among the top three in this table are
Japan and Hong Kong, which may not be surprising, but the table also shows that some
of the NIEs (specifically Singapore and Taiwan) are among the top three investors in
some countries.41 From outside the region, the major source of irnvestment,
unsurprisingly, is the U.S. In Figure 4.5, the EU was shown to be the top investor in
ASEAN. Table 4.8 shows this investment comes primarily from only a few European
countries - the Netherlands (in Malaysia), France (in Singapore), and the U.K. (in
Indonesia and Vietnam).42
Although Japan appears as the number one or two investor in the ASEAN-543
countries in Table 4.8, according to Figure 4.5, its share of investment in ASEAN has
declined in recent years. Does this mean that Japan is investing less in ASEAN and more
in other countries? In fact, one-fifth of total Japanese FDI in 2001 went to East and
Southeast Asia, some of which was redirected from the U.S.44; however, 30 percent of
this amount went to China while ASEAN received less. Although Japan is not included
as a top-three investor in China in Table 4.8, the Japanese investnent gap between China
and the four ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand has
become almost nil since 1999. Prior to that, Japan invested more in the ASEAN-445 but
this began to decline sharply in 1997.46
Japanese transnationals began to increase their investment in China in the 1 990s.
A recent survey conducted by Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)47
revealed that Japanese companies with overseas manufacturing bases in China rose
rapidly from about 100 in 1993 to nearly 700 in 2001. Although the survey also revealed
the number of companies with bases in ASEAN-4 was higher than that (over 1,000 in
2001), it is possible the number in China will surpass that in the next few years. China
has been at the top of the list of promising destinations for manufacturing FDI by
Japanese companies over the medium term as reported in these annual surveys since
1996. Other ASEAN countries ranked below China but Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia
and Vietnam were among the top ten in all years.48 Nicholas Lardy4 9 points to the
relocation of Japanese electronics manufacturing to China as "emblematic" of the trend
of MNCs to redirect FDI from Southeast Asia to China.50
Figure 4.6 presents the shares of East Asia's FDI inflows for China and ASEAN
and gives a fairly clear indication that China is taking shares of FDI from ASEAN.
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Figure 4.6
Shares of FDI Flows to East Asia for ASEAN and China
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Over the course of this period, ASEAN's share of inflows to East Asia steadily
declined from 38 percent (annual average for 1990-95) to a low of 8 percent m 2000
Thls recovered slightly in 2001 to 14 percent On the other hand, China's share of East
Asian inflows rose from an average of 44 percent for 1990-95 to over half by 1998
Thereafter, it declined for two years, havmg lost share to Hong Kong (particularly m
2000), but rose to reach 49 percent mn 2001, close to its earlier peak
ASEAN countries were able to easily attract FDI in the 1980s because of their
relatively high degree of openness in a market comprismg fewer recipients than there are
today In the 1 990s, competition for EDI increased markedly 5I Furthernore, the cnsis
of 1997-98 had a severe impact on flows to the ASEAN economies, but not on flows to
China. Some countnes have been slow to recover from that shock The Philippines is the
only ASEAN country in which 2001 mflows reached the peak levels of the 1990s.
China's potential to attract large amounts of FDI has caused considerable concem
among the ASEAN countries Its accession to the WTO has made it more attractive to
TNCs worldwide and lower costs there have become a major reason for TNCs in
industnal countnes to move production to China Malaysia is one country that has
,reportedly lost electronics-related inflows to China 52 In 2001, Malaysia's tnflows
'dropped to only $554 million after two years of inflows of nearly $4 billion (See Table
S 10 in appendix ) This has been attributed to a loss of flows that have gone to China
instead, particularly in electronics production, which m the past has played an important
role in Malaysia's economy 53 Capital mvestment applications for electronmcs projects to
be located in Malaysia dropped from 18 6 billion rmggit in 2000 to 7 3 billion nnggtt in
2001.'54 For China, foreign affiliates' share of exports in technology-intensive industnes
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increased 22 percentage points between 1996 and 2000 (from 59 percent to 81 percent).
One example is the export of electronic circuits of which foreign affiliates' share grew
from 78 percent of total exports in 1996 to 93 percent in 2000 with Intel and Samnsung
being two major exporters. 5
On the positive side, there is also the potential for China to increase its own
outward investment in ASEAN. The possibilities for this are explored later in the
discussion of intraregional production networks.
Intraregional FDI
Compared to the EU and NAFTA, intra-ASEAN flows make up a smaller share of
total flows. Figure 4.7 below shows intra-EU investment increased from 51 percent in
1997 to over 60 percent in 1999. In 2001, the largest share of the EU's FDI flows went
to other EU members.56
Figure 4.7
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Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, Figure 1.8. p. 18.
In the first seven years of NAFTA (1994-2000), average FDI inflows to Canada
were US$21.4 billion and to Mexico were $11.7 billion, which were four times and three
times, respectively, the average annual amounts received in the seven years prior to
NAFTA. In order to take advantage of the enlarged market that Mexico's membership
in NAFTA provides, a number of TNCs have established or upgraded production in that
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country."8 Of the total U.S. direct investment outflows in 2001, 25 percent went to
Canada and Mexico. Mexico benefited as the host country of the third largest cross-
border M&A deal in the world in that year valued at US$12.5 billion and involving
Citigroup of the U.S."9
Intra-ASEAN flows are small having declined from around 20 percent of
ASEAN's inflows in 1997 to less than 10 percent in 1999 and 2000. (see Figure 4.5) On
an individual country basis, only the smaller ASEAN countries, e.g., Brunei Darussalam
and Lao PDR and Myanmar, rely heavily on investment from ASEAN and this has
actually declined for each of them, as well as for other countries in the region, between
1996 and 2000. (See Figure 4.8 and Table S. 11 in appendix.)
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Figure 4 8
GeograDhical Olcfbution of FDI in ASEAN
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LikQe the trade intensity index, the FDI intensity index60 can be used to show the
bias witin a group for members to invest in one another. In this case, the results are
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-broadly consistent with those of the above FDI share analysis. The index is shown in the
three graphs in Figure 4.9 for the regions of North America, the EU and Asia6' and their
respective partner regions in the years 1990 and 1999.
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Figure 4.9 FDI Intensity Index, 1990 and 1999
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NAFTA (North America) has the greatest FDI intensity among the three regions
shown; however, it is not intra-NAFTA but rather with Latin America, which is not
surprising given the current planning for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
(FTAA) 6 which is to be implemented in 2005. For the EU, the greatest intensity is
intraregional, as well as increasingly with Central and Eastern Europe, which indicates
expanded investment there by EU countries in anticipation of EU expansion. The high
index with North America reflects the importance of the EU's investment relationship
with the U.S.
Asia's intraregional intensity index (1.5) actually exceeded that of the EU (1.3) in
1999. (See above Figure 4.9.) Asia's highest FDI intensities are intraregional, as well as
with North America, although the former increased in the 1 990s as the latter declined.
This is consistent with the findings presented in Table 4.8 (top 3 source countries), which
show the U.S., Japan, Singapore and Taiwan as top investors in ASEAN and other East
Asian countries. Additionally, it is not inconsistent with Figure 4.5, which indicates a
decline in intra-ASEAN investment as TNCs in Singapore, which were very active in
1999 and 2000, have focused their investments in Northeast Asia.64 This trend has
apparently continued in 2001 when Singapore doubled its outward investment, surpassing
Hong Kong as the largest outward investor in the region, primarily through two major
M&A deals, one in Hong Kong and the other in Australia.
The Asian region has been at the forefront of a movement that began in the 1 980s
when TNCs located in developing countries began to increase their outward investment,
mostly to other developing countries. South, East and Southeast Asian firms have
accounted for the major portion of these outflows; i.e., 66 percent of developing country
outflows in 1997 and 84 percent in 2001. (See Table S.12 in appendix.) This can be
attributed to the export-oriented growth in these countries, which led to the growth of
their TNCs which then invested intraregionally as well as in developed countries.f 5
In summary, while FDI inflows to East Asia have risen markedly over the last
decade, there has been a noticeable shift in flows away from the ASEAN countries to
China. While the decline in investment in ASEAN is partly due to the effect of the Asian
crisis, from which some have yet to recover, recently it is caused more by the increase in
China's attractiveness as a host country, largely because of its highly skilled but lower-
cost labor, as well as its increasingly liberalized trade and FDI environment. Despite the
increase over the decade in the bias toward intraregional investment (FDI intensity
index), the region is still highly dependent on investment from the U.S. and a few
European countries, as these countries are home to the largest number of internationally
integrated TNCs. Focusing on the intraregional/extraregional investment scenario should
not deflect attention from the internal investment dynamics of the region, particularly
where China is concerned. Not only Japan, but also other major regional investors,
including Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, are focusing on Northeast Asia as well.
Trade and FDI in East Asia - Some Conclusions
Given the strong linkage between trade and FDI, it might be expected that
changes in their patterns would follow a similar trajectory over time. It is true that the
factors affecting one often also affect the other; e.g., the 1997-98 financial crisis, the
prolonged stagnation of Japan's economy, the opening up of China, the downturn in the
global (particularly the U.S.) economy beginning in 2000, and changes in the
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international production system. However, although broadly consistent, precise
similarities are not always evident. For example, while the bias, or intensity, in
intraregional trade has been at a fairly high level but declining over the last two decades,
intraregional FDI began at a fairly low level but has risen in recent years.
Some general observations, however, can be made concerning both trade and FDI
patterns in the region:
> East Asia still does a great deal of trade with, and receives a large amount of
direct investment from, the U.S. and some European countries.
> Although the U.S. and certain European countries are still Japan's primary
trade and investment partners, there are signs of a shift in both trade and FDI
from outside to inside the region (involving China particularly).
> While most countries have recovered well from the crisis in terms of trade and
FDI, some have not, particularly Indonesia, which is still experiencing
disinvestment.
> ASEAN's trade with Japan is declining while that with China and South
Korea is rising and ASEAN is receiving less investment from Japan as well.
> The rise of China is having a major impact on the region's trade and FDI
patterns as TNCs both inside and outside the region shift operations to that
country, often from other countries within the region.
From these observations we can discern the continuation of the highly liberalized
nature of East Asia's trade and direct investment and the importance of maintaining its
extraregional relationships. At the same time, intraregional relationships are
strengthening as individual countries struggle to find a way to prosper and grow in the
shadow of a rising China. In the next section we will consider a role for regionalism in
this dynamic environment.
A Role for Regionalism in Promoting Trade & FDI
We have so far made three observations: (1) East Asia's trade and FDI patterns
are global and, at the same time, intraregional, (2) the current trend in East Asia is to seek
regional solutions for shared issues, and (3) it is welfare-enhancing to coordinate the
formulation of trade and FDI policies. Consequently, it is worthwhile to explore possible
regional approaches to the promotion of trade and FDI in East Asia. Presented in this
section are two such approaches: regional agreements and regional production networks.
Regional Agreements
There are several types of cooperative arrangements designed to promote trade
and/or FDI. These can be narrow agreements, including only two countries and covering
either trade or FDI, or they can be very broad agreements, including more than two
countries and covering a wide range of activities. There are many cases where
investment issues are being included under free trade agreements or under regional
integration frameworks, such as NAFTA. In fact, these are the fastest growing in number
of all regional agreements that address investment issues.66
Both trade agreements and investment agreements have the common goal of
liberalization of trade/investment activities and non-discriminatory treatment of
participants in the agreement. Investment agreements vary in their provisions as related
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to performance requirements, breadth of investment promotional measures, inclusion of
protection standards, and range of investment issues covered, such as competition,
technology transfer, employment, environmental protection, incentives, illicit payments
67
and conflicting requirements. Trade agreements focus chiefly on the elimination of
tariffs on goods. However, it has been suggested that more recent regional trade
agreements may be notable more for their promotion of FDI than of trade and, for some,
this could be the motivation for their formulation.68
Table G.4 in the appendix includes a list of primary regional instruments dealing
with FDI (adopted between 1957 and 2002) and involving East Asian countries. The
number of agreements for East Asia is only 1 1, out of a total of 105 worldwide,
indicating the region as a newcomer to such arrangements.69 Furthermore, the number of
these that are also trade agreements (see Table G.3 in appendix), meaning they
encompass both trade and investment issues in one agreement, are only two: the
agreement between New Zealand and Singapore and that between Japan and Singapore
[aside from AFTA, which covers trade, while investment is covered under a separate
agreement, i.e., ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), and APEC which has its separate APEC
Non-Binding Investment Principles). 70
As trade agreements in general are concerned, these two are noteworthy in their
recognition of the complementarity of trade and FDI. For example, the Japan-Singapore
New-Age Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) includes trade-related elements,
such as the elimination of tariffs on goods and of non-tariff measures inconsistent with
WTO, and addresses trade-related issues including rules of origin, customs procedures,
paperless trading, and mutual recognition of tests and certifications. Important for
promoting investment, it covers the liberalization-of trade in services, 7 1 the facilitation of
investments through promotion and protection, and the movement of natural persons
between the two countries. Additionally it covers issues related to intellectual property,
government procurement and competition, and enhances economic cooperation in
financial services, information and commnunications technology, science and technology,
human resource developinent, and others. Finally, it includes provisions for the
settlement of disputes.
The major drawback to JSEPA is its avoidance of the agriculture issue, partly
because Singapore has virtually no agriculture but also because agriculture is a
particularly sensitive area for-Japan. This is why the agreerment may be limited'in its
versatility as a prototype for other Asian countries where agriculture is of considerable
importance. Aside from this, it is laudable in its broad coverage of elements important to
the promotion of both trade and FDI.
A number of other FTAs are currently being negotiated in East Asia. These
include a Japan-Korea FTA (in the study phase since 1998), which is expected to be quite
broad in its coverage. It 'would not aim merely at removing the tariffs and nontariff
measures that still exist between the two countries; it would aim at a comprehensive
framework encompassing an array of market-integration measures, such as investment
promotion, trade facilitation, and harmonized trade and investment rules and
standards."7 Japan and Korea both place a high priority on finalization of this FTA.
Korea would like to implement FTAs also with Singapore and Mexico in the short term.74
The FTA that has taken center stage in the region recently, however, is the
ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), for which a framework agreement was signed in
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Cambodia in November 2002, designating 2010 as the completion date for the FTA with
an extension to 2015 for the newer ASEAN members. The goal of this agreement is to
promote comprehensive economic cooperation through the elimination of tariff and non-
tariff barriers on goods, the liberalization of services trade, and the establishment of an
open, competitive investment regime. Cooperation would be strengthened in the areas of
agriculture, ICT, human resource development, investment and the Mekong Ri&er basin
development and extended to include the areas of banking and finance, transportation,
telecommunications, industrial cooperation, forestry and fisheries, energy, and others.
This framework agreement was accompanied by a so-called "early harvest" program
which reduces the tariffs on certain agricultural items (e.g., live animals, meat, fish, dairy
products, live trees, vegetables, fruits and nuts) within three years in an effort to
accelerate trade liberalization of these items. Provision for the establishment of a
dispute-settlement mechanism is included.
While some ASEAN members remain wary of China's motives and doubtful of
benefits accruing to ASEAN from the ACFTA, most in the region see this approach as
preferable to adopting a defensive, protectionist stance against the challenge of China.
From China's perspective, while it may have some desire for leadership in the region, it
can also benefit more from cooperation with, than alienation of, its neighbors as it needs
a large market for its vast array of goods and resources for its industrial production. This
FTA is indicative of the region's recognition of the importance of cooperation and
openness in a broad-based approach to the promotion of trade and investment.
Also in November 2002, Japan and ASEAN signed a joint declaration to draw up
a framework for an FTA to be established within ten years; however, in this case, Japan
may proceed by forming bilateral agreements with individual ASEAN countries first,
followed by an FTA with ASEAN as a group. The ultimate package is envisaged as
broad in coverage, including measures to promote and facilitate trade and investment in
the areas of financial services, information and communications technology, human
resource development, transportation, and others. At the same time, China, South Korea
and Japan reached agreement to initiate next year (2003) a joint study on the subject of
the economic effects of an FTA among those three nations.
As previously mentioned, ASEAN and APEC have separate trade and FDI
agreements. APEC has contributed to the reduction of tariffs in the region through its
Bogor Declaration and promotes free and open investment by encouraging its members to
eliminate restrictions through the framework of the WTO Agreement and the APEC Non-
Binding Investment Principles. AFTA has succeeded as a regional tariff reduction
program but has done little beyond that, especially in the area of non-tariff barriers.
APEC and AIA's achievements in the area of investment promotion consist mainly of
studies, training, dialogue, and the provision of information.75
There are a number of ways that trade and investment agreements can be mutually
promoting. The reduction in import tariffs has implications for the location of FDI in that
it lowers input costs for foreign affiliates making the host country more attractive for
investment. Trade agreements also lead to wider market access. Those agreements
covering a broader range of issues, for example incentives, can also lower production
costs and risks which would induce more, probably export-oriented, FDI.7
The literature on the issue of regional trade agreements (RTAs)77 and their
economic effects is extensive,7 8 although these do not encompass the implications of
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investment (nor of services trade) because of a lack of data and the limitations of current
modeling methodology.7 9 The general debate has been whether trade blocs are
"stumbling blocks" or "building blocks" to free trade.80 The consensus of this literature
overall is that multilateral arrangements, or free trade, as opposed to smaller regional or
subregional arrangements, are preferable. The most extensive recent study on this topic
(Scollay and Gilbert, 2001) concludes that RTAs (both bilateral and plurilateral) create a
"spaghetti bowl" effect and, thus, reduce the efficiency of regional trade.8 ' As a means of
avoiding the negative effects of this phenomenon, the authors recommend arrangements
of larger groupings, e.g., APEC. Most economists, including many who have specifically
addressed the issue of RTA proliferation, believe that free trade (through its primary
advocate, the WTO) is the best alternative for promoting international trade. 2 However,
in the "first comprehensive empirical study of the effect of the postwar multilateral
agreements on trade," Rose (2002)83 finds that "membership in the GATT/WTO is not
associated with enhanced trade, once standard factors (such as the effect of income on
trade) have been taken into account."84 On the other hand, he did find that trade is nearly
doubled by the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which is a type of developed-
country to developing-country preferential arrangement. 5 Other studies also attach some
importance to the developed/developing country relationship, as discussed below.
Most studies that cover the mutually promoting benefits of the combined
trade/FDI agreements focus on developed country regional integration agreements, such
as NAFTA and the EU, while few focus on agreements among developing countries,
such as MERCOSUR and AFTA/AIA. However, a study by Blomstrom and Kokko
(1997) examined developed and developing country agreements86 and found that,
theoretically, the capability of a regional integration agreement for attracting FDI both
internally and externally depends on a number of characteristics, including whether the
agreements are between developed countries, developing countries or a combination of
both, whether the countries are competitive or complementary, and the level of group
integration at the outset. Furtherrnore, there may be a different impact on participating
investors versus outside investors. For example, the implications of the findings in the
South-South arrangement of MERCOSUR, which is similar to ASEAN, are that it does
increase investment inflows but these are not likely to be equally distributed among the
various members. Also, macroeconomic stability of the countries involved may have
been a more important determinant than regional integration.
However, in the case of NAFTA (a North-South arrangement like ASEAN-Plus-
Three), they found a profound effect on inflows to Mexico due to NAFTA's enhancement
of domestic reforms, thus contributing to significant, positive, and even permanent
change in Mexico's investment environment. Also, given Mexico's locational
advantages in labor-intensive industries relative to the U.S. and Canada, regional
integration brought more commercial opportunities and increased investment to all three
NAFTA members, particularly from outside the region. There are some general
characteristics in NAFTA that could apply to other North-South agreements, particularly
relative to "the potential for improved policy creditability and gains from guaranteed
access to large northern markets."87
The automotive industry is an example of how preferential tariffs under regional
trade agreements among developing countries, such as AFTA, have led to an expansion
of intra-industry trade and increases in FDI in the member countries.88 This example
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spans both the "regional agreement" approach and the "regional production network"
approach that we are proposing in this chapter. It will therefore be explained in the next
section on regional production networks.
Admittedly, as many regional agreements are still in the early stages of
formulation, it is impossible to determine at this point whether the comprehensive nature
(encompassing both trade and FDI) of their initial frameworks will in fact be realized in
their final implementation. Nevertheless, the fact that this concept is incorporated in the
early stages, and that such frameworks are increasing in number, indicates a recognition
of the importance of linking trade and FDI in formulating agreements from which
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economic benefits are expected. It also indicates that policymakers in many countries
(both developed and developing) recognize that TNCs are moving away from the
traditional linear internationalization sequence, which begins with exporting before
progressing to FDI, to a more integrated approach to establishing an international
production network.90 Furthermore, policies liberalizing trade and investment often
precede or accompany regional integration arrangements. These can lead to increased
FDI flows.9'
While there is no template for regional agreements that guarantees an increase in
trade and FDI, it is evident that the selection of partners to the agreement, as well as the
structure of the agreement itself, are important in whether or not it is successful in
achieving this outcome. While larger groupings might be more welfare enhancing, a
bilateral approach could be an initial step to a broader multilateral arrangement. In any
event, the inclusion of both developed and developing countries in the agreement seems
advisable. Above all, the more comprehensive the agreement, the better the chance that it
will lead to the coordination of trade and FDI policies. Finally, the formation of
preferential agreements should be seen as a temporary measure leading eventually to a
multilateral approach.
Regional Production Networks
The establishment of regional production networks (RPNs) is another way in
which regionalism can play a role in promoting trade and FDI through their linkages.
The establishment of RPNs is broader in concept than regional trade and investment
agreements, and could be viewed as an extension of these. One of the host country
economic determinants of efficiency-seeking FDI indicated by UNCTAD is "membership
in a regional integration agreement conducive to the establishment of regional corporate
networks."92 Accepting that the formulation of regional agreements is a temporary
approach for the promotion of trade and FDI, regional production networks could be the
next step, or even a concurrent step, for East Asia as it moves toward the ultimate goal of
becoming a fully functioning member of the global production network. This is not to
imply that a regional network should operate outside the international network. Rather, it
should operate within it and as a part of it. Given that there is a multilateral aspect to
East Asia's trade and FDI, this could be considered essential for the region's continued
growth and development.
The EU and NAFTA play a major role in international production and are major
providers and recipients of global FDI. These regions comprise mostly developed
countries, and most large TNCs, which are central to the global production network, are
found in developed countries. In East Asia, on the other hand, there is only one
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developed country, plus four NIEs and ten developing economies. This raises the
question of whether or not the region has a sufficient number of TNCs capable of
contributing in a major way to production networks in the region. We will later examine
some trade and FDI indicators that will help answer this question.
The beginnings of a regional production network, in fact, already exist in East
Asia. Japan played the lead role in establishing this network through its "flying geese"
model.93 Japan's lead was followed by the Asian NIEs (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan
and South Korea) and then by the ASEAN-4 (Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and
Thailand), by China, and now Vietnam. All are currently at different stages of industrial
development, and the "flying geese" model is viewed by many to be no longer the
predominant growth model for Asia; however, it helped establish the beginnings of a
regional production network through the cross-border activities of TNCs, including trade,
FDI, licensing and sub-contracting, and it had the effect of increasing integration in the
region.
Currently, Japan is included in the "Triad" (along with the EU and the U.S.),
which accounts for the largest share of global inward and outward FDI.95 In addition,
among developing countries, South, East and Southeast Asian firms have accounted for
the major portion of FDI outflows (i.e., 84 percent in 2001) and these firms invest both in
developing countries within the region, as well as in developed countries around the
world. Figure 4.10 shows which East Asian countries are the major providers of outward
FDI.
34
Figure 4.10
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Unsurpnsingly, the largest share of the region's outward investment is from the
NIEs. Contranly, the ASEAN4 countries provide very little of these outflows.
However, China's share is significant - 6 percent, up from a share of only 1 percent in
2000.
On a global level, the region's (excluding Japan) share of FDI outflows was
nearly 5 percent in 2001 with that of Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan (around 1.0 to
1 5 percent each) being the largest among individual countnes (See Table S. 12 in
appendix.) Wiule this may not appear to be much compared to the EU's 59 percent, it is
very close indeed to Japan's 6 percent. Furthennore, while a small amount of FDI
poured into an economy the size of the U.S. would not have much effect, if the same
amount is invested in a country the size of Malaysia or Indonesia, it could have a
significant impact on the local economy
Given that TNCs play such an important role in the intemational production
network, a look at the number of East Asian TNCs and their share in total foreign assets
will give some indication of the region's firm-level capacity for contributing to regional
production networks. In addition, UNCTAD has developed an index called the
"transnationality index" (TNI),96 which gives some idea of the extent to which host
countries and TNCs (separately calculated indices for each) are involved in international
production. Table 4 9 shows these indicators for the largest 50 non-financial developing-
country TNCs, based on their foreign assets
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Table 4.9
Home Coun es/Regions of the Top S0 Non-financial TNCs from Developing E onomies
Average
Network
Spread Share In total foreign assets
Index Average TNI of top 50 (%) Number of entries
Reglon/Country 2000 2000 1999 2000 1999 1998 2000 1999 1998
West Asia 19.3 0.5 1 -
Latin America . 28.2 48.3 21.8 22.0 28.3 12 10 9
Africa . 41.4 46.0 4.4 5.9 6.3 4 4 3
South, East and Southeast Asia 32.4 39.1 73.3 72.0 65.7 33 36 38
China 2.9 28.5 . 3.9 - 8.8 3 3
Hong Kong 1.4 42.0 45.4 38.9, 26.4 22.0 11 11 10
India . 9.6 - 0.7 0.8 1 1
Korea 7.6 23.9 27.8 13.4 23.2 16.7 5 9 6
Malaysia 1.6 38.1 24.1 7.2 7.0 6.3 5 5 6
Philippines 5.0 28.1 25.0 1.1 1.1 1.5 1 1 1
Singapore 4.0 43.2 58.9 7.4 11.2 7.2 6 7 9
Taiwan 4.8 23.1 43.9 1.4 2.4 2.4 2 2 2
Average/total' 31.3 34.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 50 50 50
From Top 100 List for Comparison:
U.S. f 1 43.01 1 27.21 - I 1 231
EU 67.1 53.0 49
Japan 35.9 10.7 16
a Numbers may not add up exactly due to rounding.
Note: List does not include countries from Central nd Eastern Europe.
Source: Compiled from UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2002, Table tv.i6., 108 and Fiure IV.8., 109.
South, East and Southeast Asia have the greatest number of companies (33) on the
top 50 list and the largest share of total foreign assets (73 percent), as of 2000. Among
these countries, the positions of Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore are significant.
While Hong Kong has largely maintained the same number of firms on the list since 1998
(11), the number for Singapore has declined since then (from 9 to 6). South Korea also
lost some firms between 1999 and 2000, but this is reportedly due to a lack of data.
Furthermore, among the 11 newcomers to the top 50 list, seven were from East
Asia, three of which were from China. The foreign expansion of Chinese firms has
progressed rapidly. China's top 12 TNCs, which are mostly State-owned enterprises,
controlled over $30 billion in foreign assets, had over 20,000 foreign employees and
reported foreign sales of $33 billion in 2001. Non-State-owned enterprises, although
mostly small and medium-sized TNCs, are following the same path and have investments
in over 40 countries around the world, including Asia.97
These data indicate the prominence of East Asia's TNCs among those of
developing countries. However, it is possible to see the potential for East Asian firms to
become "global players" by looking at the top 100 "worldwide" list, which includes firms
from both developed and developing countries. In 2000, among a record five firms from
developing countries, three East Asian firms made it to this list: Hutchison Whampoa
(Hong Kong), LG Electronics (South Korea) and Petronas (Malaysia), the latter two for
the first time.
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The ranking of the top 100 firms is generally related to their degree of
participation in cross-border M&As98 as that is the primary mode of entry for firms
investing in developed countries. On the other hand, the mode of entry for developing
countries is primarily greenfield investment - two-thirds of FDI flows to developing
countries are greenfield investments and the share of developing countries in the value of
M&As was only 10 percent in early 2000. This, however, is gradually changing. In
Asia, for example, the share of FDI (inflows) that was in the form of M&As increased
from 8 percent in 1987-89 to 20 percent in 1998-2000.99 Furthermore, outward FDI from
developing Asia has also shifted over the last two years from greenfield investments to
M&As. °
The transnationality index (TNI) for host countries (country level, as opposed to
firm-level; not included in the above table) indicates Hong Kong as the most
transnational economy in the world, with Singapore being fourth and Malaysia, eighth.
This is based on the production potential and results of their inward FDI.10
As for firm-level TNI (see Table 4.9 above), developing Asia's average of 32.4
(in 2000) is above Latin America's 28.2 and compares favorably with Japan's 35.9. Even
more notable is Singapore's43.2 and Hong Kong's 42, which are virtually the same as
the United States' TNI of 43. Even for Malaysian firms, the average TNI is high at 38.1.
In fact, Hong Kong and Singapore have traditionally had the most "transnationalized"
companies among developing-countries.10 2
The Network Spread Index (also in Table 4.9 above) measures the number of
countries in which a firm has foreign affiliates, thus giving an indication of the "degree of
transnationalization of a company." 103 South Korean firms have the highest index on
average among the top 50 developing-country firms - close to 8 percent. The firms of
other countries have much lower indices on average with the next highest average index
being for firms of the Philippines and Taiwan - around 5 percent for each. The firms of
Singapore and Hong Kong have the lowest average index because their foreign
operations are only in a few locations, particularly in China.
As would be expected, though, the transnationality of developing Asia's firms is
below that of developed country firms. The average TNI for the top 100 firms in the
world, of which all but five are developed country firms, is 55.7 versus 32.4 for
developing Asia's firms, and the average Network Spread Index of the top 100 TNCs is
about 14 percent versus about 3.5 percent for the top 50 developing country firmns.104
Firms in developing economies are smaller and do not have as extensive a geographical
reach as do developed country TNCs, so it is difficult for them to explore developed
country markets. 0 However, it would be easier for them to explore markets in their own
region to which they are closer geographically and with which they have more
familiarity.
Structural shifts in production caused by a number of factors, including new
technologies, new demand patterns, and new production organization, are reflected in
changing trade patterns.'06 Table 4.10 shows the trade structure for developing countries
and gives an indication of how the region of East and Southeast Asia has progressed in
export competitiveness over the last 15 years (to 2000). (See Table G.5 in appendix for
description of product categories.) In fact, the region has made the greatest progress
(among developing regions) in the evolution from exporting primary commodities to
exporting manufactured goods and services.
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Table 4.10
Structure of World Trade In Major Product Categories, By RegIon, 1985 and 2000
(Percentage)
r _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Of which _ _ _ _ _ _
Developed Developing East & Southeast Latin America & Middle East & Sub-Saharan
Countrle a CEEb Countries' Aab Caribbean North Atrica Ahica
Product' 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000
Primary products 38.0 40.4 0.E 3.6 61.2 56.0 10.4 9.5 12.5 13.2 21.4 20.9 5.4 4.'
Manufactures based on
natural resouraes 68.7 68.2 1.4 5.2 29.8 26.6 8.4 11.7 7.0 6.5 4.9 3.9 1.7 1.3
Manufactures not based
on natural resources 81.9 66.8 0.6 2.4 17.5 30.8 10.8 226 2.6 4.6 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.2
Low-technology 66.4 49.7 1.2 3.6 32.4 46.6 22.9 334 3.2 5.3 1.6 2.7 0.5 0.4
Mecdium-technology 89.2 78.6 05, 2.6 10.4 18.8 4.7 11.7 2.5 5.0 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.3
High-technology 83.2 63.4 0.2 1.3 16.6 35.4 10.9 29.1 2.1 36 0.3 0 0.3 0.
Othertransartons 71.2 58.4 0.2 1.2 28.6 40.4 5.3 8.6 4.2 4.8 0.9 0.9 4.1 1.9
Totat 68.9 6853 0.8 2.9 30.3 33.6 10.1 18.7 5.8 6.0 8.3 4.0 1.9 1.0
Based on a 3-year average for 1985 (1984.1 986) and a 2-year average for 2000 (1999.2000).
These three regions add up to 100 percent for each export category.
IndILudes the ASEAN countries plus China. Hong Kong (China). Macau (China), Mongolia, North and South Korea, and Taiwan.
See Appendix for desalption of product categories.
The share of CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) in exports is understated for 1985 because data are laidrng in a number of countries. This aeio overstates the relatve gain
in the group's market shares over time.
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002. Table VI.I., p148.
A country/region that experiences an increase in market shares over time reveals
its dynamic comrnetitiveness and its ability "to keep up with changing technologies and
trade patterns."167 UNCTAD's list of economies that have raised their world market
shares by at least 0.1 percent (so-called "export winners") between 1985 and 2000 reveals
that China was at the top of the list (of developing countries) in all categories of exports,
except resource-based manufactures in which it was third. Hong Kong is on the list in
only resource-based manufactures while South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are in the
top 10 of several categories. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines are also prominent
in the list for all sectors.' 08
Three industrial sectors that have in recent years figured largely in international
production networks involving developing countries are clothing, electronics and
automobiles.' 09 In the clothing industry, production relocation has taken place largely
through subcontracting. In East Asia, the NIEs were the first to be involved in this
process. They began with the simple assembly of imported inputs and, after a short time,
came to concentrate on skill-intensive activities at home while outsourcing the labor-
intensive activities of production to lesser-developed East Asian countries having lower
wages. End products would then be exported from there back to the home country or to
third countries. In essence, there was a movement from "bilateral interregional trade
flows to a more fully developed intraregional division of labour incorporating all phases
of production and marketing." 10 There is reason to believe this type of regional
networking will continue in the future, except that the players may change somewhat as
competition increases from other East Asian countries, which will undoubtedly upgrade
from assembly to full-package manufacturing.
The electronics industry is more globalized than the clothing industry and is
driven by TNCs. Japan and the U.S. have played major roles as investors while East
38
Asian economies have been major host countries because of their low wages, highly
skilled labor, good physical infrastructure and fewer restrictions on exports relative to
Japan. Prior to the early 1 990s, Japanese TNCs tended to import components from Japan
rather than obtaining them from local suppliers.'l I Finished products would then be
exported back to Japan or, in many cases, directly to third markets. This traditional
pattern is beginning to change for higher level electronics, specifically computer
products, as a result of not only tougher competition and the increasing importance of
speed in getting products to market, but also because production capability is improving
in local economies.' 2
While this bodes well for the future of regional production networks, it does not
diminish the importance of the global element. In fact, this industry has come to be
characterized by the emergence of a "new pattern of regional production sharing" that has
given rise to "overlapping and competing international production networks." This has
both positive and negative implications for East Asian economies in that it allows them to
act as suppliers in a wide range of production networks, but it also gives buyers a wider
selection of suppliers to choose from.113
The automotive sector in East Asia is one where trade (through regional trade
agreements) and FDI linkages, as well as the global/regional element, are particularly
evident. Investment in this industry from Japan, the U.S. and the EU has been drawn to
ASEAN countries by AFTA's lowering of intraregional trade barriers and raising of
import tariffs for non-members, which has benefited Malaysia and Indonesia in
particular. In fact, intraregional trade in motor vehicles and their parts has risen
significantly in the AFTA countries. Table 4.11 shows the growth rate in imports from
member countries to be very high in the 1990-99 period (18.6 percent for motor vehicles
and 20.8 percent for parts). The negative growth for imports from non-members, is
primarily because of the Asian crisis, but also because of efforts by some countries to
develop national industries.'' 4
Table 4.1 1
Intrareglonal Imports of the Auto obile Industry
Growth rate in
Share In total Imports Growth rate extrareglonal Imports
$ million (Percent)
Region 1999 1990 1995 1999 1980-1989 | 1990-1999 1980-1989 1990-1999
AFTA _
Motor vehides 175 1.1 1.a 5.4 9.4 18.6 1.5 -0.7
Parts of molor vehicles 195 1.1 2.9 9.5 17.3 20.8 14.2 -5.6
Motor vehides 365.672 1 10.7 6.6 
Parts of motor vehicles 138.406 1 _ 10.2 6.41
Note: Data in this tab rebtes to SiTC 781,782. and 783 (motr vehicles), end to SITC 784 (parts f motr vehicles).
Source: Crnplled from UNCTAD, Tradeaand DeveloPment Report, 2002: Table 3A5, 108.
After the mid-i 980s, rapid economic growth in the region, plus the yen's
appreciation and the formulation of RTAs, helped the automobile industry to develop
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rapidly. Japanese automakers convinced their Japanese suppliers, whom they wanted to
use for their production networks, to establish plants in ASEAN countries. In these
countries there were preferential tariffs for companies having a minimum level of
national equity. This benefited the automakers and strengthened the competitiveness of
the auto industry, as well as improved the efficiency of the regional division of labor. 115
Thus, a regional production network in automobiles can allow, and has already allowed,
this industry to develop in the region, whereas on a national level its development is
constrained by the lack of necessary economies of scale.
From the foregoing discussion we see the potential for East Asian countries to
build further on the regional production network that was started by Japan in the post-war
period and that has evolved through the development of the region's clothing, electronics
and automotive industries. TNCs in East Asia, although not as numerous or as large as
developed-country TNCs, demonstrate an increasing level of transnationality and are
prominent among developing-country TNCs.
Chinese enterprises, especially, have great potential to become major investors in
the region. Since the mid-1980s, China has significantly expanded its FDI outward stock
from only US$131 million in 1985 to US$28 billion in 2001.116 In that year (2001),
Prime Minister Zhu Rongji proposed that China implement a "going outside" strategy.
While Chinese firms have been attracted to Latin America, North America and Europe,
there is increasing interest in investing within Asia." 7 If the ASEAN-China FTA is
successfully implemented as planned, China's share of investment in ASEAN could
increase significantly. Further regional integration that includes China could bring FDI
and trade-related benefits to both China and the countries of ASEAN.
It is not necessary for every firm to be a large TNC in order to participate in a
regional production network. The segmentation of the production process allows many
smaller firms to concentrate on a single component, or a few related components, that
may be used by larger firms in a final product, such as computer chips that are
components of a wide variety of products. Regional production sharing can bring
benefits over producing the whole product at the national level, as is common in East
Asia now. 118
This type of production can take place in other industries as well, for example, the
clothing industry, as described above. " 9 It allows specialization at the firm level and yet
allows firms to participate in a wider regional network. This may be easier as a starting
point than trying to compete from the outset in a global network.
There are, of course, potential problems in trying to establish regional production
networks. Large TNCs are able to locate the various stages of production anywhere in
the world in order to take advantage of differences in factor prices and technologies.
There is naturally a broader range of choices globally than regionally: Just as it is
unlikely that one country will have absolute advantage in all products, it is unlikely one
region will either. However, East Asia is highly diversified in its level of development,
the capability of its work force, and its resources. It is possible through regional
cooperation to take advantage of that diversification by bringing together the comparative
advantages of individual countries so as to maximize the comparative advantage of the
entire region.
Nonetheless, TNCs will always operate in their own self-interest and choose
locations from that perspective. Although it is impossible to control all factors that might
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influence that decision and equally impossible to force enterprises to choose
intraregionally as opposed to extraregionally, it is possible through coordinated
policymaking, technology sharing and capacity building to cultivate an environment
appealing to TNCs. This would take some sophistication and considerable cooperation,
particularly in the area of policymaking, but there are resources within the region, as well
as in the international community, that could be drawn upon for this purpose.
Certain policies may need to be eliminated or changed so as not to obstruct cross-
border production. Standardization of products and customs regulations could be needed
to reduce costs and facilitate the flow of goods. As stated in Arndt (2001), "This task is
clearly more complex than the traditional focus on the removal of trade barriers. The
objective is not simply to free up the flow of goods, but to create an integrated regional
production arena."112 Sometimes' there must be dramatic structural changes in the
economy of the countries involved and it can mean a decline in the importance of
manufacturing in a country's GDP or employment.'2 ' Ideally, a well developed regional
production network would not orily promote trade and investment intraregionally but also
would make the region more attractive to partners from outside the region, as has been
the case with the EU and NAFTA.122
A difficulty in East Asia is that individual countries, although cognizant of the
value of regional cooperation, still tend to protect their own sovereignty and carry out
policymaking, particularly for FDI, at the national level. A regional approach can be a
stage between a national and a global approach. "The basic idea is to think of the region
rather than the nation as the production base and to spread component production around
the region in accordance with comparative advantage."' 23
The appeal of regional production networks for East Asia is that they satisfy the
desire for dealing with issues through regional cooperation and yet are not entirely self-
contained in that there is still latitude for countries outside the region to invest in, and
trade with, countries of the region and vice versa. The goal is not to "keep out"
extraregional investment or limit regional countries investing externally, nor should it be
restricted to only imports from and exports to regional economies. It is merely a way of
optimizing the comparative advantages of the region as a means of promoting
complementarity in production and trade, as opposed to all countries focusing on the
same goods and services.
This process should be dynamic, rather than static. It should be flexible regarding
shifts of production within the region, as well as with other regions, remaining always
open to being a part of the global production network. For to act otherwise would be a
failure to acknowledge the current reality vis-A-vis globalization and, thus, potentially
self-destructive.
Concluding Remarks
The recognition of trade and FDI linkages has become more important in today's
global environment characterized by an increasingly integrated international production
network. TNCs, which are at the heart of this network, decide where to invest and from
where to trade in pursuit of the most efficient organization of their production activities.
Technology has facilitated this process through improved transportation and
communication at a reduced cost. As a result, TNCs can locate their production activities
anywhere in the world.
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Contributing to the economic growth and development in East Asia over the last
two decades has been a phenomenal rise in trade and FDI activity. This has been
attributed in large part to the region's liberalization in these two areas. Our analysis has
revealed the continued multilateral nature of the region's trade and FDI and the
importance of its extraregional relationships. Thus, the willingness to remain open is
essential for the region's continued development and the achievement of prosperity.
At the same time, we also see a very high level of intraregional trade and FDI
with some shifts in trading and investment patterns both from outside to inside the region
and within the region itself. East Asia is witnessing a shift in investment away from
Southeast Asia (ASEAN) to the north in search of lower costs, and there is a foreboding
of China eventually becoming the primary production center of the region with an
absolute advantage in many types of products.
Because of the recognized need to forestall such an eventuality, as well as the
desire for a strong regional identity and a lessening of dependency on the West, regional
cooperation efforts are gathering momentum in East Asia. One outcome of this is the
heightened interest in forming regional trade agreements (RTAs).
Trade and, particularly, FDI policies have traditionally been formulated at the
national level in East Asia and generally with little coordination between the two.
However, it is increasingly important that the development and implementation of these
policies be coordinated and mutually supporting. In light of the East Asia's rising
interest in pursuing regional solutions and the importance of policy coordination in the
promotion of trade and FDI, we have suggested two approaches that combine these two
elements: (1) the formulation of regional agreements and (2) the creation of regional
production networks.
The first of these, the formation of regional agreements, should specifically
encompass aspects of both trade and FDI with an appreciation of their interactive
characteristics. As this type of broad trade/FDI agreement is relatively new, there are few
empirical studies of its welfare-enhancing capabilities. Studies that do exist indicate that
the inclusion of developed, along with developing, countries in the agreement could lead
to potential advantages from improved policy credibility and guaranteed access to larger
markets. As with regional trade agreements (RTAs), it appears that a larger grouping of
countries is preferable. But Singapore is proceeding along the path of bilateral
agreements in anticipation that they will serve as a prototype for other economies in the
region. ASEAN and China are moving ahead with their plans for an ASEAN-China FTA
in ten years, while Japan is pursuing bilateral agreements at the same time it is studying a
broader agreement with ASEAN as a bloc.
There are those who are alarmed at the proliferation of bilateral and regional
FTAs and who believe they will only complicate the multilateral negotiations of the
WTO. It should be kept in mind, though, that most of these agreements are still under
negotiation and far from finalization. So while it appears that a "spaghetti bowl" is
indeed in the making in East Asia, it is conceivable that over the next ten years or so
these disparate dialogues and negotiations could come together and, if some
standardization and consistency is maintained, coalesce into a broader regional agreement
in the long term. Working out agreements in smaller groups, or even bilaterally, could be
easier and less daunting for the smaller, less developed countries of East Asia. There are,
of course, certain difficulties that would need to be ironed out, not least of which is the
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agriculture issue, but it is possible that resolving a troubling issue by one group can serve
as an incentive to others for resolution. For example, China's "early-harvest" offer to
open its agriculture sector is seen by some analysts as motivated by a desire to appear
more accommodating than Japan and South Korea.124 This could apply indirect pressure
to the latter two countries to act likewise. At least, the process of negotiating regional
agreements should lead to more interconnection and cooperation within the region.
A step beyond, and possible extension of, regional agreements is our proposal for
a regional production network. While this has the appeal of being broader in context, it is
a more complex approach which necessitates setting the stage for production networking
by the elimination of restrictive policies and the creation of an enabling environment for
cross-border transactions. The goal here is to maximize the comparative advantages of
the region as a whole, which would require a shift in focus on the part of East Asian
governments from the national to the regional. This approach would require a longer
timeframe than the implementation of regional agreements but could be an extension of
them, resulting in a broader approach that could involve the entire region as opposed to
only a few countries. It is possible through these two approaches for East Asia to reach
the ultimate goal of being a full-fledged participant in the global production network.
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Chapter V - Financial and Monetary Integration
Four areas of financial and monetary integration will be covered in this chapter.
The first of these, the East Asian crisis, is of particular importance because of its
detrimental.effect on the regional and global economies at the time, as well as its role as a
catalyst for the beginning of financial integration in the region. The second area deals
with financial development in East Asia, including a review of financial structure and the
development of financial markets. The last two areas deal with two related issues at the
forefront of post-crisis discussion: capital account liberalization.and a regional currency
regime.
East Asian Crisis: Implications for Regional Cooperation
The crisis of 1997-98 in East Asia was an event that captured worldwide attention
not only because of the severity of its impact on the region's economy but also because of
its far reaching effect on the global economy. Furthermore, the swiftness of its
progression, taking the region from the status of "miracle" to that of "crisis" in less than
a year, surprised all within the region, as well as those outside the region that were
economically connected to it, including governments, investors, rating agencies, and
international financial institutions.
While it is not the intent of this study to conduct an in-depth examination of the
crisis itself, its relevance to the topic of regional integration cannot be overlooked. We
will review the possible causes of this cataclysmic event in an effort to determine if, and
how, it has hindered or furthered progression of cooperation in the region. In so doing,
we will examine the causes of the crisis (and aggravating factors) as presented in the
extensive literature on the topic. Out of the crisis there has arisen a call for reforms to the
financial systems of these countries in an effort to promote growth and reduce the risk of
another crisis. We will look at how these reforms are being carried out with a view to
assessing the role of regionalism in the process.
The most notable aspect of the crisis was the sudden and swift reversal in 1997 of
private short-term capital flows that Asian countries had attracted in large volume during
the prior three years. Table 5.1 shows that net private capital flows into the five crisis
countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) increased nearly
two and a half times between 1993 and 1996 (from $30.8 billion to $74.3 billion). Then
in 1997, the flow suddenly reversed and $5.6 billion flowed out of these countries, with
additional outflows of $31.6 billion in 1998. In fact, these have continued with $13.9
billion in 1999, $15.7 billion in 2000, and $16.2 billion in 2001. IMF projections are that
outflows will continue through 2003 but gradually decline.
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Table 5.1
Nat Capital Flows'
(billions of US _)
-__________________________ 1993 1899 I995 1 t997 1998 19SS 2000 2001 2t 2003
Cials Counbcl_s_a' _ _ _
PrFs Cfif nl n e 308 353 5658 74 3 - a6 -31 5 .139 -157 -16 2 -a4 .39
Pt -et wImVn,nT. 67 7 5 t3 1 7 102 1l1. 146 14 3 8.3 103 ¶06
PulvipuWdlokrhh not 250 t3&3 18s 26 9 9 -9 0 118 70 3 2 51 Is
Ottar pfS ram nitS -08 15.6 279 35 24 7 1 -404 -36 9 -27 7 -219 -tO
OleW lund_ 32 07 88 -47 137 170 -221 6 oe ¶4 33
Chinswn' -200 4 171 _ .481 4061 -69 -381 -224 -11A 7 III -121
Cwrut ame - 2 -9S .531 .255 697 627 471 326 231 179
'NM od fiW l _t rnf a itS .dat in rt.rn dSpnlkro 9unt fal oarhs ri sllarrn rS imn m ta hLung dtieW arid pftbcwroa
wa. seda btld9w Star St tectnunr may inbtds sn odw fn
A rdfla in Indiezb m hncta
The asnm o the uTwt aooni biae natS pttve cw Sflu ndlows 3sl a1 nd ellAa in resea quade wvit ih. WcpSII algn
tu awn Ith casil un nld arms aid ondwasbt
chdi MtinLdau KXmas UMfqa Uhn Ptppo ad Th,a__d
Bcs IMF WcuWd Ecwned Outo AM 2002, TatI 1 5 29
So devastating and extensive was this reversal that the crisis came to be identified
as a "capital account crisis" This is in contrast to the more typical "current account
cnsis" which is characterized by poor macroeconomic fundamentals such as high
uiflation and large fiscal deficits The East Asian economies pnor to the cnsis did not
suffer in general from unsound macroeconomic policies as they had for the most part
high savings ratios, sound fiscal positions, low inflation and high growth It is widely
agreed that poor macroeconomic policy was not a pnmary factor in the crisis Frankel
(2000) pomts out that Thailand made some macro policy mistakes in 1997 and "excessive
expansion led to excessive current account deficits and excessive indebtedness " But he
goes on to say, "statistical evidence suggests that a large current account deficit or-a hugh
level of debt is not a hlghly significant predictor of crises ,125
More important is the fact that capital inflows compnsed primarily short-term
foreign currency loans, which led to the double mismatch of maturity and currency as
banks were lending long term and in local currency for nontradables (primanly real
estate) This in turn led to twin crises in currency (resulting in devaluations) and m
baning (resulting m banks becoming overburdened with non-performing loans causing
many to eventually fail) Lookmg again at Table 5 1 above, we see that of the three types
of capital flows, e , direct investment, portfolio investment, and other flows (which
mcludes borrowmg), the last of these had the largest inflows before the crisis and
outflows afterwards
Many regional and intemational observers have speculated at length on the cause
(or causes) of the crisis with no true consensus having been reached Some of these
causes/vulnerabilities are lIsted in Table 5 2
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Table 5.2
Source Causes/Vulnerabilities
Radelet and Sachs * Weaknesses in the Asian economies, especially poor financial,
(1999) industrial, and exchange rate policies.
* Overinvestment in dubious activities resulting from the moral hazard
of implicit guarantees, corruption, and anticipated bailouts.
* Financial panic - what began as moderately sized capital withdrawals
cascaded into a panic because of weaknesses in the structure of
intemational capital markets and early mismanagement of the crisis.
* Exchange rate devaluations in mid-1 997 in Thailand (and late in the
year in Korea) that may have plunged these countries into panic.
Eichengreen (1999) Three sources of vulnerability:
* Modest macroeconomic imbalances - appreciation of real exchange
rates and current-account deficits.
* Serious banking sector problems.
* Mismanagement of the maturity structure of debt.
Krugman (1998) * Crisis was only incidentally about currencies.
* Mainly about bad banking and its consequences.
* Some of the crisis is associated with unwise investments (office
towers, auto plants) rather than with excessive investment per se.
* "Herding" by investors plays some explanatory role as
overinvestment and overvaluation of assets was not only the fault of
domestic financial intermediaries but also private individuals and
foreign institutional investors who bought stocks and real estate in the
cnsis economies.
Kawai, Newfarmer * Burgeoning, global flow of private capital, esp. short term.
and Schmukler * Macroeconomic policies that allowed large inflows of short-term,
(2001) unhedged capital to fuel a domestic credit boom.
* Newly liberalized but insufficiently regulated domestic financial
markets with highly leveraged corporations.
* Mounting political uncertainty in Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia.
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Source Causes/Vulnerabilitles
Lindgren et al * Financial and corporate sector weaknesses combined with
(1999) macroeconomic vulnerabilities to spark the crisis.
* Formal and informal currency pegs, which discouraged lenders and
borrowers from hedging.
* Capital inflows had helped fuel rapid credit expansion, which lowered
the quality of credit and led to asset price inflation.
* Inflated asset prices encouraged further capital inflows and lending,
often by weakly supervised nonbank financial institutions.
* Highly leveraged corporate sectors, especially in Korea and Thailand,
and large unhedged short-term debt made the crisis countries
vulnerable to changes in market sentiment in general, and to changes
in exchange and interest rates in particular.
* Weaknesses in bank and,corporate governance and lack of market
discipline allowed excessive risk taking, as prudential regulations
were weak or poorly enforced.
* Close relationships between governments, financial institutions, and
borrowers worsened the problems, particularly in Indonesia and
Korea.
* Weak accounting standards, especially for loan valuation, and
disclosure practices helped hide the growing weaknesses from
policymakers, supervisors, market participants, and international
financial institutions.
* Inadequacies in assessing country risk on the part of the lenders.
ADBI * Massive inflows of short-term capital aided by unsophisticated
(Yoshitomi)'26 financial systems, financed excessive investments in real estate and
some manufacturing industries.
* Sudden reversal of capital flows coincided with cyclical downturn
resulting in twin crises: currency crisis (depreciation) and banking
crisis (credit contraction).
* Twin crises led to deterioration in balance sheets of financial
institutions and business enterprises.
47
It is readily apparent from the literature referenced in the above table that there is
no universal agreement as to the cause (or causes) of the crisis, although there is
consensus in certain areas. Furthermore, while some of these may not have actually
caused the crisis, they probably at least contributed to its worsening. What is important,
however, is that the East Asian crisis was multifaceted with roots deep in the fundamental
financial and economic (and in some cases even political) structure of the affected
countries. In fact, there is general consensus that the financial, economic, and legal
systems in these countries require reform and restructuring in order to prevent another
crisis of such magnitude.
These studies, as well as others not mentioned here, make specific
recommendations for reform perceived as necessary to prevent another crisis. Mishkin
(2001) presents 12 basic areas of financial reform (described below) that summarize
many of these recommendations. (Some of these reforms, and their implications for
regional cooperation, will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.)
Twelve Areas of Recommended Financial Reform:
I. Prudential supervision - A banking crisis, arising out of the deterioration of
banks' balance sheets, can increase the likelihood of a foreign exchange crisis and
lead eventually to a full-blown financial crisis. This necessitates the need for
governments to create and sustain a strong bank regulatory/supervisory system to
reduce excessive risk-taking in their financial systems associated with moral
hazard. These reforms take seven basic forms: prompt corrective action, risk
management, limiting too-big-to-fail policies, adequate resources and statutory
authority for prudential regulators/supervisors, independence of
regulatory/supervisory agencies, accountability of supervisors, and restrictions on
connected lending.
2. Accounting and disclosure requirements - These are often lacking for financial
institutions in emerging market and transition countries and this makes it difficult
for markets and supervisors to monitor institutions to deter excessive risk-taking.
3. Legal and judicial systems - These are needed to promote the efficient
functioning of the financial system. Unclear or hard to enforce property rights
can severely hamper the process of financial intermediation. An effective
efficient bankruptcy process (often lacking or cumbersome in developing
countries) can decrease asymmetric information in the marketplace.
4. Market-based discipline - Market discipline can discourage excessive risk taking
by financial institutions. Thus market discipline should be enhanced through (1)
disclosure requirements to provide more information to the markets so as to help
them monitor financial institutions, (2) the implementation of credit ratings for
financial institutions, and (3) the issuance of subordinated debt127 (particularly
with a ceiling on the spread between its interest rate and that of governrment
securities), which a bank would be unable to sell if it has become overexposed to
risk.
5. Entry offoreign banks - Entry of foreign banks can lead to a banking and
financial system that is less fragile and less prone to crisis because they help
insulate the banking system of an emerging market economy, which is often more
volatile than that of an industrialized country, from domestic shocks.
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6. Capital controls - Mishkin does not advocate the typical "exchange controls" that
were adopted by Malaysia during the crisis since they may have the undesirable
effect of blocking the entry of funds which would be used for productive
investment opportunities. He suggests instead a type of "prudential control" that
would, for example, restrict banks in how fast their borrowing could grow, which
could substantially limit capital inflows. This would focus on improving bank
regulation and supervision as a means of restricting capital inflows so they are
less likely to produce a lending boom and excessive risk taking by banks. The
issue of capital controls, however, is complex and has been the subject of many
studies by economic and financial experts in the field particularly since the East
Asian crisis. Therefore, the topic will be addressed in some depth later in this
chapter.
7. Reduction of the role ofstate-ownedfinancial institutions - This is proposed in
the interest of promoting economic growth since in many emerging market
countries the government intervenes through directed credit programs or state-
owned banks resulting in moral hazard problems and lending to borrowers who do
not have productive investment opportunities.
8. Restrictions on foreign-denominated debt - Emerging market countries tend to
have a debt structure with substantial foreign-denominated debt, which can make
the financial system more fragile and prone to financial .crises triggered by
currency crises and devaluations.
9. Elimination of too-big-to-fail in the corporate sector - Corporations that are
considered to be too-big-to-fail (or too politically influential) by the government
can lead to increased risk taking by lenders.
10. Sequencingfinancial liberalization - While deregulation and liberalization are
not per se undesirable objectives, if not managed properly with a bank
regulatory/supervisory structure, accounting and disclosure requirements, and
well-functioning legal and judicial systems in place at the time liberalization is
undertaken, there can be disastrous consequences.
11. Monetary policy and price stability - Monetary policy can play an important role
in promoting financial stability. Price stability can lead to the reduction of an
economy's dependence on foreign-denominated debt, thus enhancing financial
stability. Countries with a past history of high inflation tend to have debt
contracts denominated in foreign currencies which makes the financial system
more fragile due to the possibility of currency depreciation triggering a financial
cnsis.
12. Exchange rate regimes andforeign exchange reserves - The view here is that, in
general, a fixed or pegged exchange rate regime, while being one way to control
inflation, can be a dangerous strategy for an emerging market country with a large
amount of foreign-denominated debt. Also, low levels of international reserves
relative to short-term foreign liabilities can increase vulnerability to crises.
Exchange rate regimes and their suitability for East Asia are examined in detail
later in this chapter.
Given the complex and comprehensive nature of these recommended reforms, it is
clear that the task of carrying them out is daunting, particularly for emerging economies,
which often lack the needed expertise and economic resources necessary for such an
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undertaking. It is true that a number of the crisis-affected countries haye taken steps at
the national level and achieved some success in their reform efforts, but much remains to
be done, as can be seen in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3
Crisis-affected Country Progress at the National Level in Financial Sector
Restructuring' 2 8
Indonesia * Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) created to
resolve problem banks, provide guarantees of credit lines and
manage and dispose of frozen bank assets. Asset
Management Unit (AMU) created to focus on debt recovery.
64 banks and 2 joint venture banks closed between 1997 and
1999. 16 banks taken over between 1998 and 1999.
* No foreign or domestic equity capital markets.
* Has not recognized full extent of NPLs but performed
comprehensive system-wide portfolio reviews.
* New bankruptcy law, but not effective.
* In theory can foreclose nonviable NPLs but this is not yet
enforced in legal system.
* No secondary market for bank NPLs (sale to financial
investors).
Korea * Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO)
reestablished to manage and dispose of NPLs. Financial
Supervisory Commission (FSC) created to oversee financial
and corporate restructuring. Financial Supervisory Service
(FSS) established to supervise and regulate financial
institutions.
* Liquidated 16 of 30 merchant banks, 10 of 25 leasing
companies, 28 of 231 mutual savings companies and 128 of
1,666 credit unions. No commercial bank liquidations.
* W64 trillion allocated for recapitalization of viable banks of
which W60 trillion already used. Cost could rise due to
further corporate restructuring (Daewoo).
* 5 banks successful in 1998 in domestic equity capital market.
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Restructuring 12 8
* Partially recognized extent of NPLs. A new 'forward-looking'
system of loan classification introduced in 1999.
* KAMCO has used W20 trillion to purchase W56 trillion (face
value) of NPLs (7% of all bank loans).
Malaysia * Danamodal created to recapitalize banks and fincos.
Danaharta created to purchase, manage, and dispose of NPLs.
Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) created to
oversee voluntary corporate debt restructuring.
* No bank liquidations. Malaysia opted instead for industry
consolidation through mergers. 58 financial institutions in
process of being consolidated into 10 core banling groups.
* RM6.4 billion already injected into 10 financial institutions.
Recapitalization cost initially estimated to be RM16 billion
but injections eventually reduced to RM5.3 billion.
* No foreign or domestic equity capital markets; banks
encouraged to use Danarnodal if need capital.
* Recognition of full extent of NPLs in progress.
. Incentives for NPL restructuring in place in the form of
capital support and waiver of stamp duties.
* Good framework to facilitate foreclosure of non-viable NPLs.
Danaharta Act speeds foreclosures.
Philippines * Central Bank Monetary Board decides on bank closures.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp., established in 1963,
responsible for receivership and liquidation of banks.
* 1 commercial bank, 7 thrifts and 44 rural banks under
receivership since 1997.
. No viable banks recapitalized; incentives for mergers.
* No banks obtained foreign or domestic equity capital but
several commercial banks seeking additional capital via
private placements and equity markets.
* Recognized full extent of NPLs but for treatment of
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restructured loans.
* Favorable loan loss provisioning treatment for restructuring
NPLs.
* No secondary market for bank NPLs.
Thailand * Financial Restructuring Authority (FRA) and Asset
Management Corporation (AMC) established in 1997 for
resolution of 56 closed fmcos and sale of their assets.
* 57 out of 91 fmcos, 1 out of 15 banks liquidated.
* TB300 billion to recapitalize viable banks.
* At least 8 banks have foreign equity; 3 banks have issued
Tier-I capital through a domestic innovative capital
instrument (about TB80 billion).
* Recognized full extent of NPLs with implementation of new
loan classification rules in 1998.
* Market-based guidelines and incentives put in place for
restructuring of viable NPLs.
* New bankruptcy and foreclosure law passed in 1999.
Utilization low.
* Auction process for US$20 billion of shutdown fincos loans.
No centralized mechanism for banks NPLs (only private
sector-based).
Source: Compiled from Kawai (2000, Table A13.1)
While it is necessary that certain reforms be carried out at the national level, it is
often the case that when individual countries pursue strategies and formulate policy based
on their own self-interest, the benefits derived are often less than optimal for the country
concerned and may even be detrimental to its neighbors (so-called "beggar-thy-neighbor"
policies). On the other hand, benefits can often accrue to most countries in a region when
mutual interests are taken into account and policy is set on a cooperative basis.
It is also true that a country may have little difficulty carrying out reforms in one
area, but often policy changes or reforms in related areas are necessary to achieve the
desired overall effect or to prevent undesirable consequences. A case in point is Chile's
capital controls in the 1990s. Eichengreen (1999) points out in his discussion of Chile's
capital controls that taxes on capital inflows are effective only when supplemented by
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other policies to encourage hedging by banks and corporations and to strengthen the
domestic financial system, which is a time-consuming, laborious process'2 . Cooperative
efforts among countries in the establishment of standards and reform criteria can
considerably alleviate the burden of this process on individual countries.
Such cooperative efforts could occur on a global or regional basis. It could be
argued that an international approach is warranted because the causes of present-day
crises have global ingredients and spillover effects. An example is the elemental capital
inflows of the Asian crisis, which were largely from outside the region. Asian policies
that reduced restrictions on borrowing abroad coincided with structural and
macroeconomic changes elsewhere in the world (e.g., lower borrowing rates in the U.S.
encouraged foreign investment in Asia).' 30 The Asian crisis also provides an example of
spillover effects where repercussions of the crisis spread quickly to other regions of the
world (i.e., to Russia, Latin America and eventually even to the U.S. via the Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund which ended up being bailed out by the U.S.
Federal Reserve.)
In the. years immediately following the Asian crisis, there were innumerable calls
to reform the "international financial architecture" (i.e., the international monetary and
financial system). There were proposals by national governments, by international
financial institutions (IFIs) and other international organizations, and by the private
sector. They included the creation of a permanent Standing Committee for Global
Financial Regulation bringing together the IMF, the World Bank, the Basle Committee,
and other regulatory groups (Brown, 1998), creation of a public corporation to insure
investors against debt defaults (Soros, 1997 and 1998), and enactment of legislation by
countries receiving IMF assistance to impose an automatic reduction of the principal of
interbank deposits extended to banks in their countries (Litan et al, 1998). "' Some recent
initiatives for improving the intemational financial architecture are outlined in Table
5.4 132
Table 5.4
Global Initiatives to Improve the International Financial System
* Information and transparency: The World Bank and IvIF among others have been working on
new standards for disseminating data on reserves and extemal debt and on new codes of good
practices in fiscal, monetary, and financial disclosure.
* Banking and supervision: Work is ongoing to strengthen Basle core principles. The World
Bank and IMF are conducting joint assessments of financial systems to ascertain compliance
with new international norms and detect extant weaknesses.
* Securities markets: The Intemational Organization of Securities Commissions has prepared
principles and standards for disclosure.
* Accounting and auditing: The Intemational Accounting Standards Committee is reviewing
principles with the objective of having uniform standards by 2002.
* Bankruptcy and govemance: The U.N. Commission on Intemational Trade Law has
disseminated a new mode law of cross-border insolvency, and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Task Force is working on intemationally applicable principles
of corporate governance.
* Private sector involvement: The IMF and its Board, among others, have been working
on general principles to elicit greater private participation in financing packages, in
part because IMF resources are limited and in part to discourage the "moral hazard"
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Global Initiatives to Improve the International Financial System
that could be associated with bailouts.
Source: Kawai, Newfarner, and Schmukler (2001: Box 2, 48)
While most of the literature has been focused on restructuring the financial
architecture at the international level, some discussion and early-stage planning have
occurred at the regional level. Even before the crisis, there were some financial
arrangements in place although their accomplishments were few. (See Table 5.5.)
Table 5.5
Forum Year Number Purpose/Objectives
Originated of
Members
Inter-ASEAN 1977 Originally Purpose was to provide immediate
network of currency 5; now 10 short-term swap facilities to members
swap arrangements + 3 with temporary international liquidity
and repurchase problems. Initially set at US$100 mil.
agreements for 5 members with a maximum of
$40 mil. receivable per member. Total
raised to US$200 mil. in 1978 with a
receivable of $80 mil. per member.
Total raised to US$1 billion by Chiang
Mai Initiative in May 2000.
EMEAP (Executives' 1991 11 Members are the Southeast Asian and
Meeting of East Asia Australasian members of SEANZA.
and Pacific Central Objectives include enhanced regional
Banks) surveillance, exchange of views and
information, and financial market
development.
The Six Markets 1994 Originally Initially the four major Asian financial
Group (also called G- 4; now 6 centers (Australia, Hong Kong SAR,
6, or G-4 plus 2) Japan, Singapore). Recently, China
and the U.S. invited to attend
meetings. Objectives include stability
of the region's financial and foreign
exchange markets. Attended by vice
ministers of finance and deputy
governors of central banks.
APEC.Finance 1994 21 Members are APEC economies.
Ministers Process Provides a forum to exchange views
and information among members on
regional financial developments and to
pursue cooperative programs to
promote financial sector development
and liberalization.
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Forum Year Number Purpose/Objectives
Originated of
Members
SEACEN (South East 1980s 13 Initially a training and research
Asian Central Banks) organization; now substantive forum
for discussion of central banking
issues. Includes major Southeast Asian
economies, as well as some smaller
Asia-Pacific Countries.
SEANZA (South East 1956 17 Largest of the regional policy fora in
Asia, New Zealand, terms of membership. Forum for
Australia) exchange between central banks and a
vehicle for training in central banking.
Source: IMF, APEC and ASEAN
ASEAN's Response to the Crisis
Despite the fact that the ASEAN swap arrangement described above had been in
place for 20 years prior to the crisis for the purpose of providing liquidity in the event of
just such a crisis, ASEAN was surprised by the events of the crisis and failed to provide
any meaningful assistance. Soesastro (1998) provides a bleak assessment of ASEAN's
response to the crisis saying that the crisis-affected countries had to resort to the IMF or
resolve the problem on their own (as did Malaysia) because ASEAN was "not in a
position to do anything". '33 In fact, the ASEAN finance ministers met for the first time in
March 1997 and voiced their expectation that the positive outlook for Asia would
continue. Even after the crisis was in full swing, ASEAN's response was weak. The
existing ASEAN swap arrangement was woefully inadequate (US$200 million at the
time) and was reportedly never used. The ASEAN finance ministers met again in
December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the crisis and possible responses but
reportedly did not make any kind of financing arrangement to help ASEAN members.'3 4
The official view of ASEAN's role in response to the crisis was summarized in
1998 by Rodolfo Severino, ASEAN Secretar -General, who outlined four levels of
response by ASEAN members at that time:'3
* National Level - Individual countries affected by the crisis were undertaking
reforms, with varying degrees of success, related to closer supervision and tighter
discipline of banks, greater transparency in financial transactions, promotion of
more competition, enactment of bankruptcy laws and stronger commercial codes,
and strengthening of the rule of law and the judiciary. (Some of these are
described in detail in Table 5.3, "Progress at the National Level in Financial
Sector Restructuring".)
* Bilateral Level - ASEAN's government leaders offered one another material and
financial assistance and advice. For example, Thailand offered rice and the
Philippines offered medicine, Singapore guaranteed letters of credit issued by
Indonesian banks, and Malaysia extended to Indonesia a standby credit of
US$250 million with Singapore offering a similar facility.
55
* International Level - ASEAN called upon the developed countries to maintain
open markets to, and trade financing for, Southeast Asian countries, to honor
letters of credit issued by Indonesian banks, and to be accommodating in re-
negotiating Indonesia's debt. It also encouraged China not to devalue the
reninbi.
* ASEAN Organization Level - ASEAN reaffirmed its commitment to regional
economic integration and open regionalism. In their ASEAN Vision 2020
statement, government leaders pledged to maintain regional macroeconomic and
financial stability through closer cooperation, to promote liberalization of the
financial services sector, and to keep the ASEAN Free Trade Area on track and
on schedule.
In ASEAN's view, the origin of the crisis was global in nature. It therefore
believed the best response would be to work with the IMF and other international forums
in formulating a solution. Along this line, ASEAN called upon developing countries to
work toward a resolution. ASEAN's response was initially in the form of advice,
recommendations, and general pledges for further cooperation; however, more concrete
steps are being taken now. (This is discussed further under "Post-Crisis Initiatives".)
APEC's Response to the Crisis
APEC was no quicker or more effective in its response to the crisis than was
ASEAN, although in the case of APEC this was more understandable since its
membership was less cohesive than that of ASEAN. 13 6 Action taken by APEC in
response to the crisis primarily occurred after, rather than during, the crisis. Initially this
was in the form of somewhat vague resolutions by the economic leaders to work together
to support a sustained recovery and to strengthen their markets through greater
transparency, enhanced competition, and improved regulation. More recently, however,
the APEC Finance Ministers Process has reportedly led APEC's response to the Asian
financial crisis through the acceleration of its "collaborative initiatives to develop
regional financial and capital markets and support freer and stable capital flows in Asia-
Pacific."137 These initiatives are of a more concrete nature as evidenced by the list
below:
APEC Finance Ministers Process Collaborative Initiatives
* Strengthening financial market supervision through training of banking
supervisors and securities regulators;
* Assessing banking supervisory regimes;
* Reform of pension systems;
* Improving credit rating agencies' ability to channel timely and accurate
information to capital markets and strengthening financial disclosure
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standards;
* Developing domestic bond markets;
* Strengthening corporate governance;
* Designing a Voluntary Action Plan for Supporting Freer and Stable Capital
Flows; and
* Endorsing the inaugural meeting of the APEC Privatization Forum, part of an
initiative to support privatization efforts through institutional strengthening
and investment promotion.
Source: APEC Secretariat, Finance Ministers Process, updated December 13, 2001
The fulfillment of these initiatives is being carried out through the use of seminars
and training programs on such topics as pension fund reform, financial institution and
product regulation, risk management, and credit analysis. Some seminars were held in
2000 and 2001.
Post-Crisis Initiatives
The occurrence of the crisis strengthened appeals for regional cooperation in the
financial area. As a result, a number of financial arrangements and initiatives have
emerged since the crisis. These are described below.
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) - The idea for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF)
was proposed in September 1997 by Japan to bring stability to Asian currencies and
financial markets and work towards prevention of the recurrence of another crisis. In
furtherance of this goal, it planned to raise US$50-60 billion in contributions from
participating countries and another US$50 billion from the Japanese government.' 38 It
was to be independent of the IMF and function as a substitute for IMF activities such as
regional surveillance. The original membership was to be Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan
and Hong Kong.
The plan was abandoned, however, a few months later due to the opposition of the
IMF and the U.S. Some objections were that it enhanced the moral hazard problem,
created a double standard (RIF and AMF), and challenged IMF leadership. Another
factor was the general nonsupport of China for the idea. In its place the Manila
Framework Group was established in 1997, followed in 1998 by the implementation of
the New Miyazawa Initiative.
The AMF proposal is not dead, however, and resurfaces from time to time from
different quarters. Malaysia is one of the most frequent champions of this idea but others
are supportive of the idea, even some of those who were originally opposed to it. The
Chiang Mai Initiative (discussed below) is viewed by some as a precursor to an AMF.
Manila Framework Group (MFG) - In November 1997, finance and central
bank deputies from the Asia-Pacific region' 39 and high-level representatives from the
IMF, World Bank and ADB met in Manila to create a new framework for regional
cooperation to enhance the prospects for financial stability. The primary purpose of this
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group was regional surveillance and it included the following initiatives: (1) a mechanism
for regional surveillance to complement global surveillance by the IMF, (2) economic
and technical cooperation to strengthen financial systems and regulatory capacities, (3)
measures to strengthen the IMF's capacity to respond to financial crises, and (4) a
cooperative financing arrangement that would supplement IMF resources.' 40 Noteworthy
in this Framework, as evidenced by these initiatives, is the recognition that the IMF has
the central role in the international monetary system.
Although this group is still meeting today, it does not appear to be strongly
influential in the region. Its eighth meeting in Beijing in March 2001 was attended by
representatives from the original 14 countries and IFIs, plus the Bank for Intemational
Settlements (BIS). A summary of the discussions of that meeting reveal this group to be
somewhat slow moving and functioning primarily as a forum for the exchange of views
and experiences. Although the cooperative financing arrangement of the MFG was
briefly mentioned, the focus was on improvements in financing facilities in the region
through enhanced IMF facilities (e.g., Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), Contingency
Credit Line (CCL), etc.). In the end they agreed to avoid duplication of activities of other
regional groups. (The MFG reportedly met most recently in December 2001 to discuss
money laundering and prevention of financial crises, but little other information is
available about the meeting.)
New Miyazawa Initiative (NMI) - This arrangement, announced in October 1998,
was implemented by Japan as a bilateral support mechanism "to assist Asian countries
affected by the currency crisis in overcoming their economic difficulties and to contribute
to the stability of international financial markets."' 41 The support package consists of
US$30 billion, of which US$15 billion is available for Asian countries' medium- to long-
term financial needs for economic recovery provided either as official development
assistance (ODA) or untied loans. ' 42 The other US$15 billion is for countries' short-term
capital needs during the process of implementing economic reforms. Commitments
under this initiative, as of February 2000'43, totaled US$21 billion with US$13.5 billion
of that amount being medium- to long-term support. (See Table 5.6).
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Table 5.6
Now Mlyazawa Initiativo
(Financial support already indicated as of February 2000)
_________ ~~~~~~~~(in millions of USS ____
MedLium-to Long-term Fitnancaia Support Short-tenn Financial Support Total
JBIC (OOF1 account) JJBC (0DA2 account) __ .
Indonesia 1.500 1,430 2,930
Korea 3.350 S,000 8,350
MWaiysia 900 950 2,500 4,350
Philippines 1,.104 1,400 __ 2.500
Thailand 1.3501 1,520 _ 2,870
Subtotal 8,200 5,300 _
Total 13,500 7,500 21.000
'OOF = Other Official Flows
ODA = OfficAal Development Assistance
Soume Japan Minist of Finance (http llwww mof go jplenglishllf/aloe42a htm)
According to the Japanese Mimstry of Fmance (MOF), these are not grants but
mamly loans that wll be repaid. The objectives of the untiative are to support corporate
debt restructunng, strengthen the social safety net, stimulate the economy and facilitate
trade finance and assistance to small- and medium-sized enterpnses
In the "Second Stage" of the NMI, Japan pledged its readiness to assist in the
mobilization of up to 2 tnllion yen of domestic and foreign private-sector funds for Asia
through assistance in fundraising in international financial and capital markets (via JBIC
and ADB credit guarantees and interest subsidies), and through assistance in mvesting in
Asian pnvate-sector enterpnses via equity funds Through this mitiative Japan hopes to
utilize its abundant savings and promote active use of the Tokyo market.
Although the NMI was implemented shortly after Japan's unsuccessful attempt to
form an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in 1997, it differs from the onginally conceived
AMF, whlch was a multilateral scheme focused on the stabilization of currency as
opposed to a bilateral imtiative for recovery assistance Also, the NMI is an arrangement
separate from the Chiang Mal Iitiative (discussed below), but there are some similaiLties
m its short-tern facility in that it consists of short-term swap arrangements. Two of these
are currently m place (US$2 5 billion with Malaysia and US$5 billion with Korea).
These are not tied to the IMF and are annually renewable
ASEAN Surveillance Process - At the ASEAN Finance Mminsters' Meeting
(AFMM) m October 1998 in Washmgton, DC, the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP)
was officially established based on the pnnciples of peer review for all member states and
cormplementanty with the global surveillance undertaken by the IMP The objective of
the process is to strengthen cooperation through an exchange of information, a peer
review process, and recommendations for action at not only the regional, but also the
national level. It is the last of these (i e , recommendations by a regional body for action
to be taken by an individual country) that Soesastro (2000b) views as a departure from
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ASEAN's principle of non-intervention with the potential to transform the nature of
ASEAN, if in fact it is actually carried out. 44
As part of the ASP function, all ASEAN member states are. to provide the
ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit with baseline data like that provided to the IMF
under its Article IV consultation mission. Technical assistance and capacity building for
this process are to come primarily from the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
As for ASEAN's peer reviews, little information beyond their mention in official
meeting statements is available. In March 1999, at the Third AFMM in Hanoi, the
ministers stated that they had conducted a "peer review of each other's economic
situation"'45 and listed as positive results the stabilization of their economies, including a
return to stability in the foreign exchange markets, build-up of reserves, decline in
interest rates, recovery in stock markets, and others. The implication is that these results
were the outcome, at least in part, of ASEAN's Surveillance Process; however, this is
difficult to confirm. The Surveillance Process was not mentioned in the official
statement of the May 2000 AFMM, but was referred to in a general way in the official
statement of the April 2001 AFMM where it was stated that discussions of ways to
enhance the ASP would proceed with the plus-three countries of China, Japan and Korea.
There was only an oblique reference to the ASP in the Sixth AFMM in April 2002 related
to ADB's confirmation of continued support for the process.
The precise nature of the complementarity between ASEAN's Surveillance
Process and that of the IMF is unclear. As Soesastro (2000b) points out, one advantage
of a regional mechanism is that a country might be less reluctant to accept advice from
neighbors who can also be impacted by the economic condition of that country. This
close connection gives a country's neighbors a legitimate interest in its policies and
performance. 146
Eichengreen (2001) argues the need for coordination between ASEAN's
Surveillance Process and that of the IMF because of the potential for "inconsistent,
incompatible assessments of performance and recommendations for action," which could
undermine the credibility of each other's advice.' 47 This he sees as a distinct possibility
given there is no guarantee that both bodies will arrive at the same conclusion even if
they receive the same information.
AGRI- In November 1998, the United States and Japan announced the Asian
Growth and Recovery Initiative (AGRI) to stimulate economic recovery and growth. The
participants in this initiative include the APEC economies, as well as officials from the
ADB, IMF, and World Bank. The initiative has four key components: (1) accelerate
bank and corporate restructuring, (2) facilitate the provision of trade and working capital
finance, (3) mobilize the return of private sector capital, and (4) provide financial, legal,
and accounting assistance for restructuring and market-based reforms.
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) - The CMI was established by the ASEAN Plus
Three (ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea) Finance Ministers at Chiang Mai, Thailand
in May 2000 as a regional financing arrangement supplementary to existing international
facilities. It is probably the most concrete and currently active of the regional financial
arrangements to come out of the Asian crisis. The CMI has two parts:
ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) - This is the aforementioned swap
arrangement originated by ASEAN in 1977 in an amount of US$200
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million In November 2000, it was enlarged to US$ 1 billion and expanded
to include all ASEAN members
• Bilateral Swap Arrangement (BSA) and Repurchase Agreement - The
purpose of the Bilateral Swap Arrangement Is to provide short-term
financial assistance In the form of swaps to a country m need of balance-
of-payment support or short-term liquidity support 148 Up to 10 percent of
the maximum amount of drawing can be provided for a short-term penod
without linkage to the IMF The BSA essentially links the intenational
reserves of the 10-member ASEAN countries with those of China, Japan
and South Korea allowing the ASEAN countries to effectively borrow
U S dollars to bolster their own reserves Although not officially stated,
the likely creditor nations are Japan, Korea and China There can also be
bilateral swap arrangements between the "plus-three" countries, as
currently exists between Japan and China and between Japan and Korea
The timing of any disbursement would be tied to that of the imposition of
IMF conditions
* The purpose of the Repurchase Agreement is to provide temporary foreign
exchange liquidity via the sale and buyback of appropriate secunties to a
country that is in need of foreign exchange liquidity support
It would be nearly a year before any BSAs were put in place Japan took the
lead in the negotiation of agreements with ASEAN countries but Chma and South Korea
are now mcluded There are currently nine BSAs for a combined total of $18 5 billion
that have been signed and several more are under negotiation BSAs signed as of
November 2002 are shown in Table 5 7
Table 5 7
BSAs under the Chiang Mal Initiative
Amount
Countries Currencies (USS billions)
JaparnS Korea Dollar/Won _2.
Japan/Malaysia Dollar/Ringgit 1 0
Japan/Thailand Dollar/Baht 3 0
Japan/Philippines Dollar/Peso 3 0
JapanlChina Yen/Yuan 3 0
China/Thailand Dollar/Baht 2 0
China/Malaysta Dollar/Ringgit 1 5
S Korea/China DollarMWon/Yuan 2 0
S Korea/Thailand Dollar/Baht 1 0
____Japan_MOF | Total 18.5
Soure Japan MOF 'chittp JYW. mf go -p ouhoulkokkinrgp=l htnw and others
Initially Malaysia, disturbed by the IMF's handling of the Asian crisis, objected to
the linkage of the CMI with IMF conditionality and voiced a preference for monitonng
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by an Asian agency more familiar with regional economies. Malaysia wanted to be able
to draw on more than 10% of the line exclusive of IMF conditionality but was unable to
gain support in this from other ASEAN countries and eventually agreed to enter into a
BSA with Japan in the spring of 2001. The finance ministers' concession to Malaysia's
objections relative to the IMF was to agree to review the CMI in three years.
As for Indonesia, it has been concemed more with domestic problems and
working with the IMF since the crisis, but in May 2002, it began negotiations for a $3
billion BSA with Japan. This was originally scheduled to be signed this past summer but
has been delayed. The Philippines has been negotiating BSAs with China and South
Korea but these are not yet ready to be signed. The plan of Asian policymakers as of this
date is for all major BSAs to be signed by May 2003.149 Singapore has so far not signed
any BSAs although it has been in negotiations with Japan this past year. For the time
being, Brunei and the newer members of ASEAN are excluded, with the latter being
more interested in ODA than in short-term swap arrangements.
While the CMI swap arrangements themselves are bilateral in nature, there is a
multilateral aspect to the CMI in that the creditor nations will coordinate the provision of
funds when one or more of their partners are in need of short-term liquidity. This means,
of course, that the more swaps that are in place, the more effective the arrangement will
be. Major concerns relative to the CMI are its potential effectiveness and its risk. The
concerns are focused in three areas: (1) its indications for moral hazard, (2) the level of
risk for the countries involved, and (3) the amount of support available.
1. Moral Hazard - As revealed earlier in the review of the literature on causes of the
crisis, one concern often voiced was that of moral hazard. While most of the
discussion of this issue focused on the moral hazard engendered by the implied
guarantees of support by governments for domestic financial institutions (and for
some corporates as well), there were also suggestions that the IMF contributed to
.moral hazard by virtue of its emergency rescue packages. The same could be said
of the CMI because of its commitment to support in the event of a liquidity
crunch, the only difference being that in this case the support would be regional as
opposed to national or international. The problem of moral hazard could be
reduced by imposing conditionality and or by tying the financial support to some
predetermined standards of macroeconomic and financial stability of member
economies (Yoshitomi and Shirai, 2000).
2. Credit Risk - The BSA agreements being put in place provide U.S. dollars for
local currencies which means the hard-currency providers (probably Japan, China
and Korea) are taking real credit risk relative to their partner in the swap. By
linking the swap to IMF conditionality, the risk may be reduced to some extent, as
the country in difficulty would supposedly be required to take steps to correct
conditions that led to the emergency. 150 Of course, there is no guarantee that the
conditions imposed by the LvIF would improve the situation. For example, it is
widely contended that the IMF's requirements imposed on Thailand and other
countries during the 1997 crisis may have worsened the crisis. There is also the
concern that if IMF conditions need to be imposed, it may take some time to
actually put them in place and that the disbursement of funds could be delayed as
a result. This risk could be alleviated if predetermined standards are already in
place and qualification for support is based on regular assessments from regional
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surveillance (Yoshitomi and Shirai, 2000). Nonetheless, the potential creditor
nations have mdicated their preference for IMF lmkage perhaps bellevmg that
even uncertam protectton is better than none at all. The ratig agency, Standard
& Poor's, indicated that if the CMI does not involve IMF conditionality, credit
ratmgs in the region could be negatively impacted 151
3 Sufficiency of support - Given that the aggregate official foreign reserves of the
ASEAN-Plus-Three countnes was around US$900 billion in 2001 with US$700
billion of that amount held by the Plus-Three countnes (Cluna, Japan and Korea)
alone, the potential support amount seems enormous - over 10 times that of the
U S (around US$70 billion in 2001) t52 However, swap lmes to individual
countries are very small (US$1-3 billion), especially when compared to amounts
traded in the global currency market where daily volume can be as much as $1 3
tnillion 153 Even more revealmg is to look at the amount of emergency assistance
committed and disbursed to the cnsis-affected countries m response to the 1997-
98 crisis (See Table 5 8)
Table 5 8
Commitments and Disbursements of the International Community
in Response to the Asian Crisis
(in billions of U S dollars)
Commitments Disbursements
.T f Bilateral otal ~(as of 53h012 0DI
Countiy IMF Multilateral Bilateral -Tota IMF COther Total
Indonesia 15 0 10 0 24.7 49 7 11 6 10.3 21.9
Korea' 21 1 14 2 23 1 58 4 19 8 10 6 30.4
Thailand 4 0 2 7 10 5 17 2 3 4 10 9 14.3
Total 40.1 26.91_ 58.3 125.3 34.8 3L8 66.6
'World Bank and ADB
2 Indudes augmentataons since July 1998
3 Korea has repaid USS1 3 bililon of the financing provided by the IMF as of end-May 2000
' Combined mulilateral and bilateral disbursements
Source IMf (2000c Table 1)
Tis table shows that a total of US$125.3 billion was committed by IFIs and
individual countnes in support of the three countries most affected by the cnsis -
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand When compared to this amount, the CMI's
current US$18 5 billion in BSAs, the US$1 billion under its ASA, and the $7 5
billion under the NMI seem small mdeed The amount committed in response to
the cnsis was nearly five times this amount.
There are those who are of the opinion that the Chiang Mai Initiative is not what
Asia needs at this tune because circumstances have changed in the region since the 1997
cnsis For one thmg, most of the region's currencies are no longer pegged so there is no
target for central banks to defend and thus little mcentive for speculators to attack.154
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However, the CMI's bilateral swap arrangements themselves could trigger this event if
they involve a target exchange rate to be defended before swaps can be called upon.
It could also be argued that the focus and energy of the ASEAN countries might
be more effective in preventing another crisis if directed towards needed reforms in the
financial and corporate sectors rather than on short-term fixes. As revealed earlier in
Table 5.3, which shows progress in financial sector restructuring at the national level,
progress has been made in this area, but much remains to be done. As mentioned, the
ASEAN Surveillance Process and the initiatives of the APEC Finance Ministers Process
are making some moves in this direction as well, but more concrete efforts are needed.
The significance of the Chiang Mai Initiative is not really in its size, but rather in
its implications for regional cooperation. If the CMI attains its goal of forming a
financial network connecting the economies of East Asia, its value will be enhanced as it
becomes more than just a few bilateral arrangements for emergency purposes. In this
respect it takes on considerable importance as a potential vehicle for future monetary
cooperation. It can also be viewed as a statement intended to show the world that Asian
countries can work together and be self-reliant.
The IMF's view on the issue of regional monetary cooperation has' changed over
the last several years. Vehemently opposed 'to the possibility of an Asian Monetary Fund
(AMF) when the idea was first floated in 1997, the Fund has become more open to
possibilities in the area of monetary cooperation. In January 2001, Horst K6hler,
Managing Director of the IMF, commented on the implementation of the CMI saying that
he welcomed the initiative and encouraged the ASEAN+3 countries to make it operative.
He added, however, that he understood it to be a complement to the IMF's financial
assistance for members in the region.155 The U.S. as well has expressed its general
concurrence with the CMI and efforts towards monetary cooperation in general. More
significant, however, is the response of China, which was originally opposed to the idea
of an AMF, but has since become more accepting of the regional efforts towards
monetary cooperation and has even signed two BSAs, one with Thailand and one with
Japan.
Looking at the Chiang Mai Initiative as a step towards further integration rather
than an end in itself would seem to be appropriate at this time. While at the present time
it adds a degree of financial security to the region, its real significance lies in its
implications for future monetary cooperation in the region. Some even see a natural
progression from the Chiang Mai Initiative leading to the renewal of an old idea: an
Asian Monetary Fund (AME). While establishment of an AMF could be some time in
coming to fruition, the idea has not disappeared and suggestions for its implementation
resurface not infrequently.
National, Regional or Global Approach: Which is Best?
Opinions vary as to where the primary responsibility should lie for the prevention
and cure of crises although most promote a sharing of responsibility between the global
and regional with the actual reforms being carried out at the national level. Nellor (2000)
argues that the primary surveillance function must be a global activity as stipulated by an
integrated global economy. In support of this opinion, he refers to the many global
economic interactions; for example, the fact that developments in Latin American
64
financial markets affect financing costs of capital in Asian emerging markets. As for
surveillance, he claims that the part of surveillance related to the assessment of policy
interactions must be handled globally because of the integrated nature of the global
economy. However, the second aspect of surveillance (i.e., encouraging countries to
adopt desirable policies) could involve regional groups that can strengthen the process
through building mutual support and 'peer pressure.' He refers to the effect of shared
'culture' in a region as a further strengthening factor.156
Nobel and Ravenhill (2000) emphasize the globally integrated nature of the
financial system as a potential hindrance to the effectiveness of regional action. They
raise the issue of the most appropriate geographical definition of the region emphasizing
the imprudence of excluding Australia and New Zealand, as well as Taiwan, which they
see as a potential contributor of funds but which could not be included in a grouping of
which China is a member. On the issue of a regional monetary fund, they question the
enforceability of conditionality on a borrower by its neighbors because of the potential
for political embarrassment. Their conclusion is that the most feasible regional
collaboration on financial issues would be in the form of systematic monitoring of
conditions since neighbors are well placed to observe conditions across their borders and
have the incentive to apply peer pressure to reduce the risk of contagion.'57
Kawai, Newfarmer and Schmukler (2001) promote a sharing of responsibility for
policy reforms at all three levels (international, regional and national). One of their "nine
lessons from the East Asian crisis and contagion" is that improvements undertaken at the
regional level should be consistent with those in the global framework because economic
contagion begins with a geographical focus but spreads globally. Their framework for
regional financial coordination covers three areas: 158
1. Regional consultation and economic surveillance/monitoring for
crisis/contagion prevention - Exchanges of macroeconomic policies and
structural information such as fiscal positions, monetary and exchange rate
policies, capital flows, external debts, financial system conditions, and
corporate sector development. Peer pressure would provide the incentive to
pursue policies leading to stability of accounts and currencies.
2. A regional financing facility to augment international liquidity in times of
crisis - This should be consistent with, and complementary to, a global facility
to promote synergy, international coherence and involve private creditors who
are often financial institutions outside the region.
3. Programs to assist in the resolution of the systemic impact of the crisis and
accelerate recovery - Regionally concerted action to mobilize fiscal resources
from core regional countries is needed to recapitalize weak banks, facilitate
corporate debt restructuring and increase social safety net spending.
Given the region's already fairly high degree of financial openness but, at the
same time, its preference for noninterference in the domestic concerns of neighbors, it
could be argued that the most logical and workable approach for crisis prevention and
resolution in East Asia would be one that encompasses all three levels (national, regional
and global). The CMI is an example of this in the fact that it is made up of regional swap
arrangements but still linked to IMF conditionality. This issue will be addressed again
later in this chapter.
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Summary
The Asian crisis of 1997-98 was a turning point for the region. It brought an end
to the fantastic growth (particularly of the Asian Tigers) of the 1980s and early 1990s,
which few believe will ever return. However, it also brought an awareness of the need
for financial cooperation in the region. This is in part because of disappointment at what
is perceived as failures on the part of international financial institutions (i.e., the IMF)
and developed Westem countries (i.e., the U.S.) in resolving the crisis.
The primary focus in the region since the crisis has naturally been on their
prevention and resolution. As previously mentioned, this has led to a call for reform in a
number of areas, including financial regulation and supervision, information disclosure,
and legal system changes, as well as discussion of whether a national, regional or
intemational approach is best. In the following sections, we will take a closer look at
three areas that have in recent years become the focus of intense discussion because of
their potential role in crisis prevention: financial development, capital account
liberalization, and regional currency regimes.
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Financial Development in East Asia
Arising out of the Asian financial crisis is the consensus that restructuring and
strengthening East Asia's financial sector is one essential element of a program for
preventing another crisis. Beyond this, achieving a sound and stable financial sector is an
important step toward overall economic development.
In this section we will review the development of financial markets across the
region. In conjunction with this, financial structure will be examined in an effort to
determine its effect, if any, on this development. The importance to this process of the
legal, regulatory and macroeconomic environments will also be considered. Finally, we
will evaluate the various approaches under consideration for achieving the level of
financial development necessary to foster growth in the region.
There is ample literature' 59 dating back to the late 19th century that attests to the
importance of financial development for economic growth. Ross Levine (1997) in his
review of this body of literature' 6 0 points out that it is characterized by a wide variety of
often-conflicting opinions on the topic. However, the conclusion to his own analysis,
although "stated hesitantly and with ample qualifications," is that the "preponderance of
theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive, first-order relationship
between financial development and economic growth."' l Dominic Wilson in a more
recent paper states, "The past few years have seen more concerted attempts to argue that
these links [between financial development and growth] are both empirically valid and of
practical importance, a task that has probably become easier since the recent financial
crises."162 Recent research also shows that the poorer segments of society benefit directly
from financial development, and income distribution is also improved. 163
The importance of financial market structure to financial development has also
been debated but with more tentative conclusions. Financial structure is variously
defined, but the most common definition is that the financial structure of an economy is
the degree to which it has a bank-based or market-based financial system. In bank-based
systems, banks provide the major portion of credit to the economy, and in market-based
systems, firms obtain financing primarily in capital markets (bond and equity markets).
However, in most countries both sectors co-exist and have important roles to play in
financing within the economy. "There is no empirical support for policies that artificially
constrain one in favor of the other. Indeed, the development of each sector seems to
strengthen the performance of the other by maintaining the competitive edge of
individual financial firms."164
Ren6 Stulz (2001) defines financial structure more broadly than just bank-based
or market-based systems. In his words, it comprises "the institutions, financial
technology, and rules of the game that specify how financial activity is organized at a
point in time."'6 5 He acknowledges that bank-based economies and market-based
economies have different financial structures; however, he believes that other
characteristics matter a great deal in how the financial system performs its functions.
Both the narrow and broad definitions of financial structure will be relevant to our
discussion of financial development in East Asia.
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Financial Structure in East Asia
Before commencing a discussion of recent thiking on how best to promote
financial development in East Asia, we will look at the region's current financial
structure Developing economies are generally more dependent upon bank lending than
on capital markets for financing This is largely true for the developing economies of
East Asia as well
Figure 5 1 below shows the breakdown of total extemal finance by source (i e,
bank loans, equities and corporate bonds) for selected East Asian countries and the U S
for 1990 to 1999 It is obvious that among the lesser-developed economies bank loans
and equities are a much greater source of external financing than are corporate bonds. In
the case of Thailand, Indonesia and China, bank loans are the largest source while
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippunes are more reliant on the equities markets In
Korea, bank loans are the most important source although equities also play a sigmficant
role However, when compared with the U S , for which bank loans make up only about
13 percent of extemal financing, the heavy reliance on bank lending by the other
countnes shown (from around 30 percent for Singapore and Malaysia to over 80 percent
for China) becomes obvious
Flgure 5 1
Breakdown of External Financing 199O-1999 Average
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Source Adapted from Shirai (2001b Chart 2c, 15)
Table 5 9 presents a dtfferent perspective of financial structure (and includes
some countnes not shown above), but the implications are the essentially same.
Financing source as a percentage of GDP 166 (I998) for the developing countrnes similarly
reveals a heavy reliance on bank loans Among these countries Indonesia, Korea,
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Malaysia and Thailand have the highest level of reliance on bank lending. In Malaysia's
case, however, there is greater reliance on equities (137 percent of GDP, which is not
much below the percentages for the U.S. and some European countries.)
Corporate bond markets, on the other hand, are very poorly developed across the
region although Korea's market is considerably larger than that of the others (except for
Japan's). Japan's financing source profile (in terms of loans, equities and corporate
bonds) is more characteristic of other Asian countries and some European countries
(especially Germany) than it is of the U.S.167 In fact, there is a well-recognized
difference between the bank-centered model, of which Germany and Japan 168 are
representative, and the Anglo-Saxon model, of which the Great Britain and the United
States are representative.'69
Table 5.9
Financing Sources for Specified Countries
1998
(% of GDP)
Bank Claims
on Private
Country Sector1 Total Equities Total Bonds2 Govt. Bonds Corporate Bonds
Indonesia 68.9 24.0 1.8 0.0 1.1
Korea 82.5 35.7 86.5 55.6 30.9
Malaysia 104.1 136.9 52.5 27.4 21.0
Philippines 50.3 54.3 14.2 12.1 1.9
Thailand 127.8 30.9 18.6 8.6 3.1
Japan 133.3 65.9 137.7 97.7 40.0
France 77.1 68.1 83.2 50.3 32.9
Germany 125.9 51.5 94.5 40.8 53.7
Italy 62.4 48.0 133.2 102.5 30.7
The Netherlands 124.0 159.6 64.4 52.8 11.7
UK 120.8 169.7 61.0 33.2 27.8
USA 63.6 158.0 164.2 94.0 70.2
Bank daims are the closest available proxy for bank loans, although claims could also include other claims, such
as equity securities. Claims on the private sector, therefore, should approximate to loans to the private sector.
2 Bond figures for the developing countries include only debt securities with initial maturities of at least one year.
Bond figures for developed countries are debt securities of all maturities, not just bonds.
Source: Compiled from Endo (2001: Table 5, 245)
Financial structure in the region has changed over time as illustrated in the figures
below, which show bank loans and corporate bonds, respectively, as a percentage of total
external finance for eight selected countries for the years 1990 to 1999. With the decline
in bank lending after the crisis came a rise in corporate bond issuance in the crisis
countries from $68 billion in 1997 to $130 billion in 200017, mostly in Korea, but also to
a lesser extent in Malaysia and Thailand. 17 ' After the banking sector problems of the
crisis, capital markets grew in importance for most of the crisis-affected countries.
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Figure 5 2
Outstanding Bank Loans as Parcent of Total External Finance: 1990.1999 Time
Series
90 -
70 -- --
60 _
50 -
40-
30 -
20
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
---#- Korea -- Malaysia Thailand , Indonesia -i Philippines
100
90 -
80 - _ _- -
70 -
60 -
50
20-
1990 1991 1992 1993 199.4 1995 1998 1997 1998 1999
1--Ctt a-. -Singapom u_. U
Note External finance is defined as the sum of outsmnding bank loans, outstanding corporate bonds issued
and equity market capitalization
Source Shirmi (2001 b Chart Id, 9)
70
Figure 5.3
Outstanding Corporate Bonds Issued (Percent of Total External Finance): 1990-1999
Time Series
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The Asian Policy Forum (under the ADB Institute) labels the financial system in
Asia an "intermnediate financial market structure,,"17 2 which is between a bankc-centered
system and a full-fledged capital market; commercial banks not only provide traditional
banking services but also are active in the corporate bond market as major issuers,
investors, underwriters, dealers/brokers and guarantors.' 7
A somewhat different approach to the assessment of the fmnancial structure and
development of East Asian economies is presented in a recent study by DemirgidiyKunt
_ 
_~~~17
and Levine (200 la)'7 , where selected economies are classified according to their status
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as developed or underdeveloped and their structure as bank-based or market-based. (See
Table 5.1 0.)
Table 5. 1 0
Country Classification of Financial Structure
(Based on data collected in the 1990s)
Financially underdeveloped economies Financially developed economies
Country name Structure Index Country name Structure Index
Bank-based economies:. Bank-based economies:
Indonesia -0.50 Austria -0.73
Argentina -0.25 Belgium -0.66
India -0.14 Italy -0.57
Ireland -0.06 Finland -0.53
=___ _ _Norway -0.33
New Zealand -0.29
Market-based economies: Japan -0.19
Denmark 0.15 France -0.17
Chile 0.25 Germany -0.10
Philippines 0.71
Market-based economies:
Netherlands 0.11
Thailand 0.39
Canada 0.41
Australia 0.50
=____ _Korea 0.89
Sweden 0.91
___ __  Great Britain 0.92
Singapore 1.18
United States 1.96
Switzerland 2.03
I__ _ Hong Kong . 2.10
_ _ __ _ _ Malaysia 2.93
Notes:
(1) A country is defined as having an underdeveloped financial system if both of the'
following hold: (1) Claims of deposit money banks on the private sector/GDP is less than
the sample mean and (2) Total value traded as a share of GDP is less than the sample mean.
(See Table S.16 in Statistical Appendix.) Thus, a country's financial system is classified
as underdeveloped only if it has poorly developed banks and markets.
(2) Countries are ranked along the spectrum from bank-based to market-based, where higher values of
Structure indicate higher levels of stock market development relative to banking-sector development.
Countries that have above the mean values of Structure are then classified as market-based. Countries
that have below the mean values of Structure are classified as bank-based.
Source: Demirg() -Kunt and Levine (2001a: Table 3.12, 121)
Demirgii9-Kunt and Levine developed a conglomerate index of financial structure
that is based on measures of size, activity, and efficiency. These measures when
combined into a "Structure Index" (see above table) identify a country's place on a
market-based versus bank-based spectrum. Countries are also distinguished between
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those that have underdeveloped financial systems and those that have developed
systems. 175 This is done to avoid classifying two countries in the same bank-based (or
market-based) category if one has poorly developed banks (or capital markets) and the
other has highly developed banks (or capital markets) by international standards. (See
"Notes" at bottom of Table 5.10 above for classification criteria.)
According to this classification, there are more East Asian economies that are
market-based (i.e., the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong,
and Malaysia) than bank-based (i.e., Indonesia and Japan). In fact, Hong Kong and
Malaysia have higher Structure Indices (2.10 and 2.93, respectively) than that of the U.S.
and Switzerland (1.96 and 2.03, respectively). 176 The Hong Kong and Malaysian stock
markets are quite large and active; however, their high Structure Indices mean that their
stock market development is high relative to their own banking-sector development, but
not relative to the level of stock market development in other countries. In another
example, the Philippines is classified as market-based because its banks are small and
underdeveloped, not because its stock market is very well developed.
When viewed in this way, the classification for most countries (in Table 5. 10) is
consistent with the information provided in the prior tables where it was revealed that a
number of East Asian economies had a larger proportion of equity financing than bank
financing (e.g., Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines). On the other hand, Thailand
and Korea are shown in the earlier figure to have a larger proportion of bank-sector
financing whereas Demirgii'-Kunt and Levine classify them as market-based. The
Demirgii9-Kunt and Levine classification, however, adds another dimension through its
representation of the relationship between stock market and bank sector development
based on a number of ratios,177 as opposed to a simple proportionate breakdown of
financing sources.
In the case of Korea, the authors point out that although it is usually viewed as
large-bank dominated, it is classified in their study as having a market-based financial
system. They explain that this is not only because Korea has a very active and efficient
equity market (based on Turnover and Total value traded/GDP ratios - see Table S. 13 in
the Statistical Appendix) but also because nonbanks play a role as substantial as that of
banks in Korea and this is reflected in the ratios.'7 8
The Demirgiig-Kunt and Levine structure classifications incorporate data for
banks and stock markets but not for bond markets.'79 However, the charts appearing
earlier in this section reveal that the corporate bond markets in East Asian economies are
not at all well developed.
Developing Financial Markets in East Asia
Recommendations for the best course of action to reach the goal of "well-
developed financial markets" in East Asia have generally focused on two approaches.
One approach is to look at financial market structure and assess whether a bank-based
financial system or a market-based system is more advantageous for emerging
economies. Since the Asian crisis, discussion of this approach has intensified,
particularly surrounding the issue of developing local-currency corporate bond markets as
a means of lessening the chance of another crisis.
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The second approach advocates a focus on improving the legal and regulatory
environment in order to set the stage for the natural evolution of financial structure,
which is believed to change gradually through the process of economic development.
According to this approach attempts to quickly change financial structure directly,
without first having in place well-developed legal, information, and enforcement
mechanisms, are rarely successful.
In fact, both these approaches have essentially the same ultimate goal (i.e., sound
and stable financial markets) and recommend some of the same steps in the
accomplishment of this goal. Even those who advocate the approach of changing the
financial market structure do not suggest that this can be accomplished as merely a
technical infrastructure-building exercise with some regulations, an exchange, and a
clearing system. 180 In addition to an appropriate legal and regulatory system, there is the
need for an environment that will attract participants, and this environment requires legal,
information, and enforcement mechanisms. These two approaches to financial market
development in East Asia are discussed further below.
Financial Market Development Via Change in Financial Structure
With the banking sector having been the recipient of considerable blame for its
role in the Asian crisis, attention has shifted to the development of capital markets (equity
and bond markets) in Asia as an alternative to the heavy reliance on banks. Wilson
(2002) believes that post-crisis models' 81 show that with access to several sources of
financing, firms can balance debt and equity to maintain a manageable degree of leverage
and reduce the impact of shocks specific to a particular form of financing. Kawai (2002),
in his review of bank and corporate restructuring, places importance on the development
of local capital markets. He believes that an active corporate bond market can function as
a warning mechanism as well as an exit mechanism while equity financing can provide a
cushion against currency and interest rate shocks.
Corporate Bond Markets
The primary focus of financial structure change has recently been on improving
corporate bond markets as an effective and feasible way to minimize the chances of crisis
like that of 1997-98. The reason for this is that local-currency bonds lock in interest rates
and local-currency funding which can have a dampening effect on crises caused by
international capital flows.
Beyond crisis prevention, there are other reasons to encourage the development of
local-currency corporate bond markets. Some of these are (1) improvement of resource
allocation efficiency through market-determined interest rates, (2) provision of financing
for longer-term, larger-scale projects than banks are able to handle because of their focus
on quality improvement, (3) enhancement of financial institution transparency through
information disclosure, and (4) creation of competition with banks leading to lower
interest rates. 182
The difficulty in achieving well-developed corporate bond markets, however,
should not be underestimated. The process is complex and takes considerable time to
accomplish as evidenced by the list of requirements for a well-functioning corporate bond
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market that appears in Table G.6 in the General Appendix.' 83 It should also be realized
that for some developing countries, success might prove to be impossible.
This process is further complicated by the involvement of "attitudes, cultures, and
politics. Developing new attitudes and behavior is a main reason why developing
markets take so long. People need to learn new ways of thinking about how and with
whom they do business. New cultures need to be created - for taking and managing risk,
disclosinf information, and maintaining quality operations and accounts, among other
areas."' 8
The corporate bond markets in East Asian countries in general are not well
developed 85 as is revealed by the following description of their main characteristics. 186
1. Government bond markets are underdeveloped because (a) the size of issues is
small with diverse types of official bonds and the issuing time is irregular, (b)
secondary markets are highly illiquid, and (c) the maturity is narrowly spread.
2. Corporate bond markets are largely underdeveloped for a number of reasons:
a) Poorly developed government bond markets make it difficult to
establish benchmark yield'curves that are necessary for the pricing of
corporate bonds. Although some governments in Asia have been able
to establish benchmark yield curves as a result of their post-crisis
increase in bond issuance to finance expansionary policy, bank
recapitalization and social safety nets, there is uncertainty as to the
extent this will continue once fiscal deficits are no longer so large.
b) Some governments have adopted low interest rates and transaction
taxes that discourage investors from transacting bonds in the
secondary market.
c) The issuer base is narrow with few large, reputable non-financial firms
and the size of issues is small with maturities concentrated on the
short- to medium-term.
d) The investor base is narrow and limited with individual investors
preferring safe, liquid bank deposits. Corporations prefer stock
markets and bank loans to bond markets as the former two financing
sources are more convenient than bond issuance because of strict rules
and regulations for listing and issuing, as well as high fees.
e) Institutional investors are generally underdeveloped and concentrated.
f) Secondary markets are largely illiquid.
g) Corporate bonds are primarily guaranteed or privately placed
(especially before the crisis).
h) The market infrastructure in Asia is poor. Some countries still use
paper-based bookkeeping and lack systems for electronic clearing and
funds transfer while there is no regional clearinghouse for payment
and settlement transactions.
i) Some central banks in Asian countries are not in favor of developing
domestic bond markets because of the fear it will weaken their power
over monetary policy.
3. Commercial banks play a key role in the corporate bond market in that they
are at the same time major investors, guarantors, underwriters and issuers of
corporate bonds.
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A particular problem in Asian bond markets is the limited institutional investor
base. This is due to a number of factors, including low income per capita and poor
wealth accumulation in regional economies. In addition, there is a lack of investor
confidence because of inadequate information about issuing firms and poor legal and
judicial infrastructure, which if improved could serve to assure debt repayment, penalize
the dissemination of false information, and prohibit insider trading.' 87
In Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, the major institutional investors are financial
institutions. In Malaysia there is a single institutional investor (i.e., the Employees
Provident Fund) that dominates the investor base with the second major investor being
the banking sector. Financial institutions in some countries tend to hold their bonds until
maturity because of reserve and liquidity requirements that are imposed on them. This
buy-and-hold strategy not only reduces the liquidity of the secondary market but is also
one reason why financial institutions dominate the investor base since little is left over for
retail investors. An inactive and undiversified investor base leads to pricing
inefficiencies. 188
In recent years, particularly since the crisis, individual countries have taken steps
to develop their bond markets with varying degrees of success. Due to the constraints of
time and space, an in-depth assessment of the level of development of each country's
market will not be undertaken here but Park Yoon-Shik (2001) reports that Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand in particular have made progress in this area through the
strengthening of market infrastructure, the establishment of benchmark yield curves and
the opening of their markets to foreign participants. The result has been a gradual
diversification away from excessive reliance on the banking sector to an expanded use of
bonds. He cautions, however, that more needs to be done particularly in the areas of
corporate governance, bankruptcy and workout procedures, disclosure, and commercial
laws. Also, secondary market liquidity remains a problem. 189
Finally, not everyone agrees that bond market development is the answer to the
financial system problems in East Asia. In the words of Dr. Julia Turner, Managing
Director of Moody's Asia Pacific, "[.. .] bond market reforms alone are inadequate to
spur capital market development. [...] as long as borrowers have the option to borrow at
uneconomic rates from their bankers, without disclosing the true state of their financial
health, not even the most enlightened reform of capital market regulation will be
sufficient to motivate them to borrow in the public debt markets."'9 0 In view of the fact
that the banking sector still plays an essential role in the financial markets, Moody's
espouses the "Basel Committee's Proposal" for bank reform'9 ' as a key contributor to
capital market reform and development, provided it is "sensibly implemented."' 9 2
A regional forum that also believes the banking sector plays, and will continue to
play, an essential role in the region is the Asian Policy Forum/ADB Institute. Its
proposal for financial development targets both the banking sector and bond market in
combination as described in the following section.
Bank Involvement in Bond Market Development
In East Asia, the banking sector already plays a significant role in its
underdeveloped bond markets.' l Table 5.1 1 reveals the scope of this involvement for
four East Asian countries.
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Table 5.11
Role of the Banking Sector in Asia
Banks as: Thailand Indonesia Korea Malaysia
Issuers X X x
Underwriters X x
Investors X X X x
Guarantors X X X
(before the crisis) (before the crisis)
Note: Listed in the left-hand column are areas where the banking sector plays a crucial role.
Source: Shirai (200 lb: Table 3, 19)
The Asian Policy Forum (APF)/ADB Institute'94 views commercial bank
involvement in the development of bond markets (its so-called intermediate stage of
financial development) as logical and desirable as an interim step in the long-term
evolution of financial market development in Asia. The rationale for this view is related
to the particular difficulties that Asian countries face in their financial environment,
including severe information asymmetry between issuing companies and public investors,
the lack of companies sufficiently large, mature and reputable for their information to be
credible, and the necessity to establish the legal and regulatory framework needed for
sound capital markets. These difficulties hamper the development of bond markets in the
region. This group also expects the bank-based system to continue its dominance in Asia
and believes a sound capital market cannot be developed to replace it in a short period of
tinme.'19
The APF argues that banks already have certain advantages related to the nature
of their existing business that would make them natural intermediaries in underdeveloped
bond markets. They could serve as investors (relying on their previously collected
household savings and information on issuing companies) and as issuers (relying on their
large size and already established reputation). In addition, they can make use of
information they already possess on borrowers to underwrite bonds, which would lead to
lower costs relative to investment banks. In an intermediate financial market structure,
"commercial banks continue to provide traditional banking services while becoming
major issuers, investors, underwriters, dealers/brokers, and guarantors in the corporate
bond market. Thus, banks actively engage in securities and related business, such as
derivatives."196 [See Table G.7 in the General Appendix and Shirai (2001a: 34-46) for a
detailed assessment of the advantages of this structure.]
While the aforementioned concept may be logical, the risks inherent in bank
involvement in the securities business should not be underestimated. Some of these are
indicated in Table G.7. In a financial system, banks are the most fragile part because of
the "demandable" nature of their liabilities. Even a small triggering event can lead to a
run on a bank.'97
The APF does caution that certain disadvantages could arise in the intennediate
financial market structure. These include a higher default ratio on bank loans as the
more reputable firms would prefer lower cost bond issuance leaving less reputable firms
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to choose bank loans. Also, it could result in hindrances to the development of bond
markets if particularly powerful banks tend to substitute bank loans for bond finance or if
they emphasize cost-saving at the expense of product innovation. 1 98
The perceived complementarity between banks and bond markets leads the APF
to propose that the development of bond markets can be fostered through strengthening
the banking sector. To accomplish this, it makes nine proposals in two areas.' 9
A) Proposed steps for strengthening the banking sector:
1) Reducing government interference in banks' financing operations and
eliminating the abuses of connected lending.
2) Strengthening prudential and supervisory regulations on banks in a manner
suitable for local conditions. Not all countries have the same level of
institutional infrastructure and arrangements for universal prudential
regulations. Also, developed country soundness indicators are not always
effective for emerging economies.
3) Determining the appropriate corporate structure for banking organizations so
as to reduce the risks associated with banks engaging in securities activities.
This can be either separate banking and securities subsidiaries under one
holding company or different departments in one entity.
B) Proposed steps for the development of corporate bond markets:
4) Planning, prioritizing and pacing the sequenced development of bond markets
with governments assuming a primary role.
5) Regular issuance of government bonds with a well-spaced maturities mix (not
disregarding fiscal prudence) and adoption of a comprehensive market-based
pricing system.
6) Stimulating demand and supply of corporate bonds through the establishment
of legal, regulatory, and information infrastructure for bond markets and the
introduction of tax incentives in the early stage.
7) Establishing related financial markets, in particular, derivatives markets to
improve risk management and enhance liquidity.
8) Improving clearing and settlement systems.
9) Preparing for establishing an Asian regional bond market.
The weaknesses in the structure of the financial and-corporate sectors of East
Asian economies (particularly before the crisis) are by now well known. In his
examination of the financial and corporate sector issues related to the crisis, Kawai
(2002) describes them thus: "The list of fundamental structural deficiencies in East Asia's
financial and corporate sectors is long. It includes a lack of prudent risk management on
the part of commercial banks, ineffective banking regulation and supervision, poor
accounting, auditing and disclosure practices, and weak governance of corporations. The
close relationship between corporations and banks, coupled with their influence over
governments and legislatures, undermined even the weak prudential safeguards that did
exist. Ineffective legal and court systems contributed to inadequate protection of
minority shareholders." 200 As is apparent, these issues have implications not only for the
banking sector but also for the capital markets in these countries.
Since the crisis, efforts have been made to remedy many of these deficiencies
with varying degrees of progress in countries throughout the region. Details of this
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progress were provided earlier in this chapter and a very thorough review of bank and
corporate restructuring can be found in Kawai (2002).2 I
Accomplishing the APF's proposals (strengthening the banking sector and
developing corporate bond markets) would require strong political will and commitment
as well as financially sophisticated human resources with particular expertise in the credit
area. While prudential and supervisory regulations have been in place in developed
countries for a long time and would seemingly serve as examples for developing
economies, they may not always be appropriate or feasible for emerging markets.
A Regional Bond Market
In recent years, interest in the establishment of a regional bond market in Asia has
202surfaced. A regional bond market is seen as having the economies of scale to be more
cost-effective than local bond markets in numerous small economies. It could also
provide diversification for corporate financing and utilize abundant financial resources
(i.e., large pool of savings), which would be able to flow freely across borders.
The New Miyazawa Initiative (NMI)2 03 , of which the second stage places
particular priority on the development of bond markets, is perceived as the precursor to
the development of regional bond market activities in East Asia. The relevant measures
are: 2
* Acquisition of sovereign bonds issued by Asian countries by the JEXIM (now
Japan Bank for Intemational Cooperation - JBIC).
* Supporting Asian countries in raising funds from international financial
markets through the use of guarantee mechanisms and/or interest rate
subsidies.
* Possible establishment of an international guarantee institution with a prime
focus on Asian countries.
It is believed that Japan's decision to guarantee Asian sovereign debt issues
(under the NMI) has prompted improvement of bond markets in the region.205 However,
progress toward development of a regional bond market has been slow to proceed from
the momentum of the NMI. In fact, the major markets in the region (Hong Kong,
Singapore, Sydney and Tokyo) have reportedly gained no significant momentum from
the Nmi.206
In fact, the difficulties of developing an Asian bond market are not that different
from those of developing local bond markets. Requirements include the following:207
* A regional credit rating agency
* A regional clearing and settlement system
* Mechanism for cross-border borrowing and lending of securities
* Harmonization of tax treatment
* Regional trading mechanisms
* Fuller dissemination of information concerning creditworthy Asian companies
* Greater credit enhancement for potential bond issuers
* Increased communication between the public and private sectors
* A dominant Asian currency to serve as a key international currency
* A regional bond-trading center. The APF sees Tokyo as the most likely
candidate for this because of its developed economy and business activity but
perceives it to be hampered because of the insufficient internationalization of
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the yen and its weak institutional infrastructure for JGBs (Japanese
Government Bonds) and low presence of foreign institutions.
Individual countries would need to assess the costs and benefits to participation in
an Asian regional bond market. The benefits would include pricing advantages and
accessibility to regional financial resources while costs would be potential currency
mismatches and "internationalization" of local currencies associated with using a
"regional" currency. 208 There is also rivalry among certain financial centers (e.g., Hong
Kong, Singapore, Bangkok) that want to be regional hubs. This has resulted in only
sporadic cooperation when it comes to any kind of link-up209 of bond settlement systems
for cross-border transactions.2 10
Developing Equity Markets
The development of equity markets is also being propounded as part of capital
market development in the region. It is argued that developing equity markets can be less
complicated than developing bond markets. Among other things, bond markets require
supporting pricing infrastructure and bond issuers must be able to manage their cash flow
so as to service and repay their bonds. Also, bond markets cannot grow as fast as equity
markets.2 1 '
In Southeast Asia, there are equity markets in Bangkok,- Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur,
Manila and Singapore. The Northeast Asia equity markets are in Taipei, Seoul, Tokyo
and Hong Kong. The major markets in East Asia as a whole are Hong Kong, Singapore
and Tokyo.212
As has been the case for corporate bond markets, equity markets in the region
have also come under scrutiny since the Asian crisis. While the five Southeast Asian
markets performed largely in line with the Dow Jones Composite, NYSE Composite and
S&P 500 indices during the first half of the 1990s, they fell substantially behind the U.S.
markets in the period following the crisis.213 Although bank loans were the most affected
by the sharp flow reversals during the crisis, portfolio investments were also subject to
volatility and suffered outflows, albeit to a lesser degree.21 4 (See Table 5.12.)
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The abbve table shows that pnvate portfolio investment recovered quite
significantly in 1999 after the cnsis but not to anything near pre-crisis levels In fact,
Investment fell again in both 2000 and 2001 This could be attributed to the world
economic slowdown following the bursting of the dot-com bubble in the U.S. and the
September 11 th terrorst attack in the U S A small recovery is expected in 2002 as
recovery of the U.S. economy appears to be gaimng momentum.
The capitalization and trading volume of these equity markets is extremely small
compared to that of some major stock markets, particularly those in the U.S. (See Table
5 13 for some comparisons)
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Table 5.13
Stock Market Capitalizations
(US$ billion)
Market 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
New York (Dow Jones Industrial) 5,950 7,210 8,900 9,654 13,400 16,755
Tokyo (Nikkei) 3,440 3,150 2,285 2,375 3,560 3,795
London (FT100) 1,380 1,410 1,780 2,070 2,750 2,665
Hong Kong (Hang Seng) 301 428 384 353 509 515
Taipei (Weighted Price) 176 287 313 264 300 417
Seoul (Composite) 198 144 53 75 272 252
Singapore (STI Ind Index) 169 184 127 110 207 173
Kuala Lumpur (Composite) 214 302 97 92 140 159
Manila (Composite) 56 80 35 31 37 19
Bangkok (SET) 139 105 25 32 52 40
Jakarta (Composite) 66 93 36 17 29 41
Total Southeast Asia 644 764 320 282 465 432
SE Asia as percent of Dow Jones 10.8 10.6 3.6 2.9 3.5 2.6
SEAsia as percent of HKSE 214.0 178.5 83.3 79.9 91.4 83.9
Source: Freeman (2000: Table 1, 4)
The above table shows that as of June 2000, the aggregate capitalization of
Southeast Asia's five stock markets was US$432 billion, which was only about 3 percent
of the Dow Jones, 16 percent of the London Stock Exchange, and 3.6 percent larger than216the exchange in Taipei.
Table 5.14
Stock Market Capitalization
(percent of GDP)
| Jan. 1990 Jan. 1995 Jul. 2000
Indonesia n.a. 22.8 33.8
Malaysia n.a. 248.8 165.0
Thailand n.a. 85.6 40.3
Singapore 122.9 236.3 261.9
Korea 54.8 41.2 66.4
China n.a. n.a. 8.1
Taiwan 154.8 84.3 119.9
Hong Kong 110.1 218.1 336.7
Australia 45.9 61.8 35.6
U.S. 50.6 62.5 184.5
Source: Wilson (2002, Table 2.3, 26)
Table 5.14 puts the capitalization level into perspective (showing stock market
capitalization as a percent of GDP) and also shows changes over time. The degree of
capitalization has increased and Wilson (2002) attributes this to a greater degree of
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'equitisation' of (i.e., entry of new firms into) the economy as opposed to the result of a
rapid index growth.21 7 He suggests that the latter would be the explanation for the growth
of capitalization in the U.S., which is related to the stock market boom of the latter half of
the 1990s.
Table 5.15
Stock Market Liquidity*
Aerage Avrage
(1990-95) (1995-00)
Indonesia 3.7 3.7
Hong Kong 4.1 5.2
NYSE 4.1 5.8
Malaysia 3.8 4.1
Korea 0.6 1.5
China n.a. 6.7
Taiwan 25.1 23.8
Thailand 8.4 4.9
Singapore n.a. 3.1
* monthly market tumover as a percentage of
stock relative to market capitalization
Source: Wilson (2002: Table 2.4, 26)
Stock market liquidity (shown in Table 5.15) has increased in several countries of
the region in the latter half of the 1990s but in most cases remains lower than that in the
U.S. Taiwan, which has a high level of tuxnover,2'8 is a notable exception.
Freeman and Bartels (2000) assert that stock markets are of primary importance to
Southeast Asia's post-crisis recovery, which they view as primarily, although not
exclusively, involving corporate sector debt restructuring, particularly for Indonesia and
Thailand. With bank lending still constrained and development of a regional bond
market a long-term possibility, they see the equity markets of the region as important for
obtaining necessary capital, some of which must come from abroad.
In a review of the five Southeast Asian equity markets, Freeman (2000) identifies
several weaknesses in the region's equity markets including low capitalization and
trading volume, as well as sectoral bias. This bias refers to the overrepresentation in the
equity markets of banks and finance companies (with their high levels of non-perfomiing
loans) and property development companies (with their high leverage and vacant
buildings). On the other hand, high tech companies (electronics, computer-related,
telecommunications, media, etc.) are underrepresented - even though these are of more
interest to institutional investors.219 Singapore is an exception with only 19.6 percent
(April 2000) of total market capitalization in the finance sector compared to 42 percent
for Manila and 34 percent for Jakarta.220 There are also problems with the stocks
underlying the markets as the well-documented need for improved corporate govemance
attests.
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Yang and Siregar (2001) found, based on a review of the literature and their own
empirical work, that the financial liberalization of Asian economies in the 1980s and
early 1 990s enhanced interaction and integration among the stock markets in the Asia-
Pacific region. However, in the period following the crisis, there appeared to be no long-
run relationship among the returns of these markets, but a strong short-run relationship
was found, which suggests to the authors that the movement in these stock markets is
unrelated to changes in fundamental economic conditions. This implies that "stock
markets in the Asia-Pacific region do not satisfy the criteria for full information
efficiency and this may be evidence that Asia-Pacific stock markets are subject to
speculative bubbles." 2
Freeman (2000) acknowledges there are steps that could be taken on a national
basis to improve the functioning of individual markets and these include:222
> Improving the regulatory environment that pertains to the equity markets
Sk Ending the use of distinctions between foreign and local share, and/or ceilings
on cumulative foreign holdings of stocks
> Making strides to improve levels of corporate disclosure by listed firms
> Liberalizing the listing requirements
> 'Spring cleaning' the indices of stocks that have been unable to recover from
the impact of the Asian financial crisis.
However, he makes another, more comprehensive, proposal and that is the
formation of a regional equity market through the consolidation or merger of existing
major markets and involving interested ASEAN countries223
A Regional Equity Market
Freeman (2000) views the proposal for a regional equity market as the "portfolio
investment equivalent" of the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), which is designed to
attract FDI into the region. Although the combined capitalization level (see Table 5.13)
would still be small by global standards, it would be enough, in his opinion, to keep these
markets from being dismissed altogether by institutional investors. It would raise
liquidity levels that could lessen the chances of capital flows actually driving market
performance, which is now the case. It might also reduce the problem of sectoral
imbalance although would probably not eliminate it altogether. The presence of
Singapore's more balanced SGX in the aggregation could help to reduce sectoral
skewing.
He identifies several problems of a political and logistical nature in this proposal.
From a political perspective, there is the view that a country's equity market is a sign of
modernity and a strategic asset that should not be strongly influenced by foreigners.
There is also the issue that the larger markets (e.g., Singapore) might perceive a regional
market as potentially diluting to their existing strength. From a logistical perspective,
there would need to be consistency among the five markets in terms of trading systems,
settlement and payment systems, membership structure, listing requirements, fee
structure, et cetera.
In order to mitigate potential political issues, he suggests that the pan-regional
entity might be newly created, rather than being derived from an already existing equity
market. Although it would need to have a minimal physical presence somewhere in the
region (Singapore being the most likely location, in his opinion), it could function on a
virtual basis.
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Solving logistical issues would be somewhat more involved although his
examination of one area (i.e., listing requirements) across the five markets revealed that
despite many differences, there are broad consistencies for primary criteria. Furthermore,
he suggests that needed logistical changes could be carried out incrementally in a manner
similar to the process for AFTA and the AIA. He also sees the possibility of building a
regional corporate bond market in conjunction with a regional equity market.
Freeman sees the development of a regional equity market as part and parcel of
the move toward regional cooperation, which so far has been concentrated on trade and
FDI. In his view, it is essential to attract foreign institutional investors back to the
region's markets through improved corporate disclosure and more protection of the rights
of minority shareholders, among other things. He places the onus for accomplishing this
on regional authorities.
There is, however, considerable ambivalence in the region toward foreign
investors. Given the limited number of institutional investors in the region and the
tendency of individual investors to prefer less risky investments (e.g., bank deposits),
regional authorities can readily see the need to attract foreign investors. On the other
hand, because of their perceived negative role in the crisis, there is still considerable
distrust where foreign investors are concerned.224 Rajan and Siregar (2002) express this
dilemma as follows, "The challenge for regional policymakers is to facilitate the ongoing
recovery in foreign capital inflows while ensuring that the economies' vulnerabilities to
sudden reversals in capital flows do not increase in tandem."225 This, of course,
underlies much of the discussion on this issue. A definitive regional solution has not
been found, although certain countries have had some success with specific national
policies (e.g., Malaysia's capital controls).
Although well argued, it is uncertain whether formation of a regional equity
market would signal foreign investors that ASEAN is serious about creating a regional
environment conducive to business and generate a higher benchmark of performance
across Southeast Asia, as Freeman suggests. What cannot be disputed is that underlying
the creation of a regional equity (or corporate bond) market is the need for improved
corporate governance and financial market reform. Furthermore, there are those who
argue that focusing on financial reform will lead naturally to well-developed capital
markets and the appropriate financial structure will emerge at each stage of development.
Focusing on Financial Development Rather Than Financial
Structure
A slightly different perspective on the relationship between financial
development/financial structure and economic growth is presented in a recent volume of
work edited by Demirgiiu-Kunt and Levine. The studies and analyses in this volume
find, "Overall financial development matters for economic success, but financial structure
per se does not seem to matter much.,,226 The editors suggest that it would be more
beneficial if policymakers focused on legal, regulatory and policy reforms in order to
improve the functioning of both markets and banks rather than being concerned about the
extent to which their financial system is bank-based or market-based.
Demirgiuc-Kunt and Levine (2001 a) found in their own analysis that at higher
levels of income, financial sector development overall for bank-based and market-based
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institutions is greater. In other words, both banks and stock markets are larger, more
active and more efficient in richer countries. Also, stock markets (relative to banks)
become more active and efficient in higher-income countries. Finally, the authors
examined financial structure relative to legal, regulatory, tax, and macroeconomic
determinants and found that countries having a "Common Law tradition227, strong
protection for shareholder rights, good accounting standards, low levels of corruption,
and no explicit deposit insurance tend to be more market-based, even after controlling for
income. On the other hand, countries with a French Civil Law tradition, poor protection
of shareholder and creditor rights, poor contract enforcement, high levels of corruption,
poor accounting standards, heavily restricted banking systems, and high inflation tend to
have underdeveloped financial systems in general, even after controlling for income."228
Some of these findings are presented in Table 5.16 below for selected countries.
Table 5.16
Indicators of Financial Develo ment, Financial Structure and the Le al System across Countries
Country Finance-activity Structure-actvity AntI-director Creditor Rule of law Legal origin
India -4.35 -1.61 5 4 2.50 E
Japan -0.43 -1.00 4 2 5.39 G
Malaysia -1.08 -0.32 4 4 4.07 E
Philippines -4.17 -1.47 3 0 1.64 F
Thailand -1.98 -0.92 2 3 3.75 E
Australia -2.14 -1.18 4 1 6.00 E
New Zealand -3.14 -1.64 4 3 6.00 E
Denmark -3.63 -1.87 2 3 6.00 S
France -2.57 -2.28 3 0 5.39 F
Germany -1.76 -1.52 1 3 5.54 G
Italy -3.89 -2.52 1 2 5.00 F
Switzerland 0.55 -0.39 2 1 6.00 G
United Kingdom -1.33 -0.74 5 4 5.14 E
United States -0.80 -0.64 5 1 6.00 E
NOTES:
Finance-actvity = Indicator of financial development; a measure of overall activity of financial Intemiediaries and markets.
Structure-aclvlty = Indicator of financial structure; a measure of the actiMty of stock markets relative to the activty of banks.
Creditor = Index of degree to which legal codes of a country protect dalms of secured creditors In case of reorganzation or riquidaUon
d a company. Ranges from 0 to 4 with 0 being lowest
Ant-director = Index of degree to which legal codes of a country protect minority sharehdder rights. Ranges from.0 to 6 with 0 lowest.
Rule of law = Assessment of law and order tradition of a country. Ranges from 10 (strong law & order tradlUon) to 1 (weak tradition)
Legal origin: E = BitUsh, F = French, G = German, S = Scandinavlan
Source: Beck. Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Maksimovlc (2001: Table SAI, Appendr 5.1, 234-230)
In financial development22 9 (represented by the indicator 'Finance-activity' in the
above table), Switzerland has the highest value and India, the lowest. Although too few
countries are included to make an overall assessment of the Asian region, the results are
as might be expected in that Japan's financial development is highest among those listed
while India and the Philippines are at the low end with Malaysia and Thailand in
between.
'Structure-activity' gives an indication of a country's financial system being more
market-based or bank-based relative to other countries in the sample.230 The remaining
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indicators provide information regarding legal and regulatory differences with three
indicators ('Creditor', 'Anti-director', and 'Rule of law') reflecting the rights of outside
investors and the degree to which they areprotected while 'Legal Origin' refers to the
classification of a country's legal system.2 The protection of secured creditors
('Creditor') and minority shareholders ('Anti-director') are fairly strong in India and
Malaysia but weaker in the Philippines and Thailand with Japan being weak in the former
but strong in the latter.232 It is interesting to note that in terms of secured creditor
protection Japan is at about the same level as other countries with a Gernan-originated
legal system (e.g., Germany and Switzerland). 233 However, Japan's protection of
minority shareholders is considerably stronger than that of these two countries.234
The secondary importance of financial structure (bank-based or market-based) is
further supported by the findings of Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001) in their analysis of
cross-country microeconomic data. Their results suggest that for emerging markets,
whether they are bank-based or market-based is less important than the fact that they are
emerging markets. They also found that integration with world capital markets has
similar effects on firns whether they operate in a bank-based or market-based system.
They conclude, "[ ... ] the financial sector of emerging markets (either bank-based or
market-based) needs further development and can potentially benefit from integration
with international markets."235
The Demirgiiu-Kunt and Levine studies reveal that as a country undergoes the
development process its financial structure will tend to change "because banks and
markets have different requirements concerning information and contract enforcement in
order to function effectively."236 Thus, based on this research, it appears advisable for
policymakers to focus on financial development through the reformation of the legal and
regulatory environment allowing the financial structure to evolve naturally from that.
Again, we come back to financial market reform as the focus recommended for
policymakers.
Conclusion: How to Achieve the Goal
The goal, as stated at the beginning of this section, is to develop the region's
financial sector to a level of soundness and stability that would not only reduce the
chances of another crisis but also promote economic growth in the region. We have
presented basically two approaches for the achievement of this goal: (1) focusing on
changing financial structure so as to move away from the currently dominant bank-based
system to a more market-based system and (2) focusing on reforming the regulatory,
legal and macroeconomic environment which will lead naturally to a move away from a
bank-based to a market-based system. These approaches appear at first glance to be
opposites. However, upon closer examination it can be seen that the ultimate outcome is
the same - although approached from different directions.
In the first approach, developing corporate bond markets is proposed as an
altemative method of financing for firms that have traditionally relied on the banking
sector. However, corporate bond markets in the region are now significantly
underdeveloped with a narrow issuer base and limited investors (particularly institutional
investors), among other problems. While some progress in developing corporate bond
markets has been made in individual countries, a great deal of work remains to be done.
It will be. a costly and lengthy process requiring years, even decades, to complete.
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Because of this, as well as a sense of urgency since the Asian crisis, an interim
plan has been proposed whereby banks would play a major role in the development of
bond markets. Although banks already figure prominently as investors and issuers in the
region's bond markets and there are a number of advantages to pursuing this path, there
are also well-recognized risks associated with banks' involvement in the securities
business. Given the weaknesses that already exist in the region's banking sector, these
risks cannot be dismissed lightly. Thus, an important part of this proposal is the
strengthening of the banking sector. Preferably, this would be carried out prior to
increasing or formalizing its bond market activities. In conjunction with this, the need for
improving corporate governance cannot be overlooked.
Another path to bond market development has also been proposed. The creation
of a regional bond market is seen as potentially more cost effective than developing
individual country markets given the small size of the individual economies in the region.
Although the creation of a regional bond market would not necessarily require the
participation of every country in the region, there would need to be a high level of
cooperation and compromise among those that do choose to participate. The process
would be complex and also extremely time consuming to carry out. It would thus be a
long-term endeavor rather than a possibility for the near future.
A regional equity market, although less often mentioned in the discussion of
regional capital market development, has also been proposed. A number of individual
equity markets already exist in the region with some of these being fairly well capitalized
(e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore, Taipei and Tokyo). In addition, there is ample evidence
that some countries utilize a high level of equity financing. While some efforts have been
made to link exchanges in the region, the creation of a regional equity market (as for a
bond market) would entail a high level of cooperation and the need to overcome a
number of political and logistical problems.
Underlying the above-mentioned proposals is the necessity to restructure the
banking and corporate sectors of the region. Even though the development of bond and
equity markets is seen by many as an essential part of financial development in the
region, there is recognition that this must be accomplished in conjunction with
strengthening of these sectors. The second approach described in this section starts with
financial restructuring and allows the development process to bring about changes in
financial structure that are appropriate at each level of development.
Regardless which of the above approaches is chosen as the route to financial
development in the region, it is apparent that the process will be complex and lengthy.
This raises the question of how the process should be undertaken and at what level (or
levels) - national, regional or intemational - it should be pursued. Should it be
controlled, guided or overseen by regional institutions or through regional cooperation, or
should it be led by national governments. What, if any, should be the role of
international institutions?
Of course, a variety of opinions and recommendations abound. There are those
who believe the process should be handled entirely at the national level, those who think
that regional institutions can help, and those who believe that international institutions
and developed countries, who have extensive experience in this area, should be involved.
Most believe it cannot be accomplished without involvement of the private sector.
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Nam et al (2001) indicates that one obvious and desirable policy direction in the
post-crisis period (for those wanting to take best advantage of liberalized capital markets)
is to move away from the pre-crisis relationship-based system, accompanied by weak
corporate governance and inadequate financial supervision, towards a market-based
system with strengthened corporate govemance and supervisory institutions. In order to
successfully carry out this endeavor the authors believe a third party is required to change
the rules and to provide leadership in the move to this "new, better equilibrium". In their
opinion a "natural candidate" for this role is the national government, albeit in
cooperation with intemational organizations and other governments and with significant
involvement of the private sector. They reason that involvement at the national and
intemational levels is necessary because there is no incentive for any individual player to
take on the role unilaterally. 23
The aforementioned proposal of the Asian Policy Forum (APF) regarding the
strengthening of banks in conjunction with the development of bond markets comprises
both regional and national elements. Guidelines and suggestions are being made at the
regional level (through the APF, which includes participants from all over Asia) but this
entity has no enforcement power so that compliance would be up to each individual
country.
Eichengreen (2001) suggests that regional cooperation could be effective in the
promotion of financial stability and development in the region. Costs could be lower at
the regional level than at the international level and agreement could be facilitated by the
sharing of common problems by regional govermments. Specifically he recommends
establishment of a new forum, an "Asian Financial Institute" (AFI) based on the
ASEAN+3 platform.
He foresees the responsibilities and activities of such an institution including the
provision of technical assistance on prudential supervision and regulation to national
agencies, the administration of training programs for inspectors, supervisors and
accountants, the provision of central banking services (e.g., clearing and settlement) to
member central banks, and the negotiation of distinct financial standards for the region,
among others. He sees an AFI as accepting input from national regulators and authorities
but having considerable power in monitoring compliance and imposing penalties. A
major stipulation of this proposal (one that could very well mean its nonacceptance in the
region) is the abandonment of "ASEAN's consensual approach to surveillance and
presumption of nonintervention in national affairs for a more forceful approach."
Without this, "a meaningful regional arrangement to promote financial stability and
development [...] would not be possible."2 8 Eichengreen does not view an AFI working
in isolation but rather in cooperation with intemational fora so as to ensure consistency in
financial standards and financial development strategies.
At the international level, of course, standards for capital markets already exist
and could conceivably be adopted by developing countries. However, despite the
benefits that could be derived from their adoption, such as the reduction of information
problems and the improvement of access for developing countries to the international
financial system, these standards generally reflect conditions in developed countries so
that they may not in all cases be appropriate for developing countries. The setting and
implementation of international standards has to date been carried out primarily by
industrialized countries. Developing countries naturally want to be a part of the standard
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setting process if they are to adopt those standards into their national regulatory and
supervisory regimes.
There is also some disagreement regarding implementation of intemational
standards. Developed economies, represented by the G-7, are seeking rapid and complete
compliance even suggesting that it become part of IMF conditionality while developing
countries (represented by the G-24) prefer adoption to be voluntary and gradual.239
Haruhiko Kuroda, Vice Minister for Intemational Affairs for Japan, in referring to the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as the established intemational
organization for supervising banks whose members are all from industrialized countries
says, "If the IMF were to force emerging economies to abide by the rules decreed by the
Basel Committee, such a move might be resisted."240
Of course, developed countries and intemational institutions certainly have the
experience and knowledge to provide adequate advice in this area; however, while
cognizant of that, the current politico-economic mood in the region might limit the
extensive involvement of these entities. Since the Asian crisis, and its perceived
mishandling by the IMF and lack of assistance from the U.S., calls for regional solutions
have increased. Also, recent events (i.e., the collapse of energy trader Enron2 4' in the
U.S. and the heavy losses incurred by a forex trader at Allfirst, U.S. subsidiary of Allied
Irish Bank242) have cast serious doubts on the transparency and managerial competence
of the financial services industry in the U.S. and Europe. The claims of superiority in the
areas of corporate govemance by the developed countries might now be conceivably met
with skepticism in Asia.
Even setting standards at the regional level could be difficult. Differences in the
level of financial market development among the countries of the region imply different
needs in terns of markets and financing sources. For example, a bank-based system can
be advantageous in a country where legal and accounting systems are weak or contract
enforcement is poor since strong banks can apply pressure to firms to obtain information
and payment of debt.243 The standard-setting process would be complex and require a
high level of cooperation, communication and preparedness. It is not clear that currently
existing regional institutions in East Asia are at a stage where they could undertake such
an endeavor, and to establish new institutions to undertake the project (as suggested by
Eichengreen) seems redundant.
A look at the EU's experience puts into perspective how difficult it would be to
develop regional markets and standards. The EU has achieved a currency union but is
still in the early stages of creating a single market for financial services.244 "At present,
investors who want to trade in shares in more than one EU country have to contend with
such a baffling array of regulations, red tape and languages that few bother trying.',245 A
recent study by the European Financial Services Round Table, which is a forun of banks
and insurers, found that the creation of a Europewide market for financial products,
which at present does not exist, would increase competition and wider choice, and thus
save consumers and investors as much as El 5 billion a year.246
Given the realities of the politico-economic situation in East Asia, it is most likely
that the national authorities will have the primary role in directing the process. This
observation is bome out by the recent comments of Rodolfo Severino, secretary-general
of ASEAN, on the related topic of a common currency for the region. He said that
ASEAN members desire to control their own economic destinies and are reluctant to give
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up decisionnaking power where their own economies are concerned.247 Nonetheless, it
would be most likely that they would not operate in a vacuum but would be open to some
involvement by regional and international players as well.
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Capital Account Liberalization
It is widely acknowledged that the sudden withdrawal of capital from Asia played
a primary role in the 1997-98 crisis. This followed a huge inflow of capital into the
region in the years leading up to the crisis, resulting from a relatively significant degree
of capital account liberalization in the crisis-affected countries in the early 1990s. (See
Table 5.1 earlier in this chapter.) It was widely believed that financial liberalization in
general, and capital account liberalization in particular, were essential stepping stones on
the path to economic growth. It was thus recommended (some say by the Washington
Consensus) that developing countries open their capital accounts, and these countries
embraced the idea wholeheartedly. The East Asian crisis (and its aftermath) has altered
that thinking to a great extent. Wyplosz (2001 b) even declares, "A silver lining of the
recent crises is that the liberalization activism of the 1990s is nowpass."2 4 8
Nonetheless, financial liberalization as an ultimate goal is not dead and the way to
proceed towards its achievement has engendered considerable debate.
Academic studies over the last decade have found the relationship between capital
account liberalization and growth to be generally positive, but not strong. Ten of these
studies conducted between 1994 and 2001 were reviewed by IMF staff who found the
conclusions to be about evenly split between a finding of a "positive' relationship and
that of "no effect".249 Those studies with a finding of "positive" were conducted more
recently (2000-2001). One study was reported as having a "mixed" result. This study
was conducted by Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) who found "somewhat more
evidence of a correlation between capital account liberalization and growth when we
allow the effect to vary with other dimensions of openness." 250 The authors go on to
explain that sequencing of reforms plays a role in the effect of capital account
liberalization (although they found this to be more robust in the 1980s than in the 1970s
or 1990s), but macroeconomic imbalances are potentially more harmful than the lack of
trade openness under capital account liberalization.
The review of these studies (plus the results of the IMF's own study of 38
developing countries for the period 1980 to 1999) found that the channels through which
capital account liberalization can positively impact growth include the following:25'
> For developing countries, all forms of capital inflows can increase investment.
In the case of domestic investment specifically, liberalization does have a
positive effect in raising that as well.
> Capital account liberalization (particularly FDI) can bring technology
spillovers but primarily in countries that have a highly educated workforce,
which enables it to exploit such spillovers.
> Capital account liberalization can lead to a deepening of domestic financial
markets (more so in the case of portfolio flows than FDI); however, it can
also result in severe financial difficulties if the appropriate institutional
framework is not in place.
While most regions of the world have been opening their capital accounts
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there are differences in degree of opening within
developing countries across regions. The developing economies of Asia have been
trending toward openness since the 1970s - in FDI as well as in portfolio and barnk flows,
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which rose significantly in the early 1 990s. Among developing countries, Asian
countries are the largest users of FDI flows (average for 1970-2000), while Latin
American countries constitute the largest users of portfolio flows. This can be attributed
to a history of larger fiscal deficits in Latin America relative to Asia, which led to more
floating of government bonds and the earlier development of capital markets in some
Latin American countries.252
The events associated with the East Asian and other crises have clearly
demonstrated that the road to financial liberalization is fraught with risk. Wyplosz
(200 lb) studies the effect of domestic and external financial liberalization on both
developing and developed countries. Among his findings are the following: (1) capital
account liberalization is the "most sensitive step" of the financial liberalization process,
(2) the capital inflow problem associated with liberalization is greater for developing
countries than for developed countries, (3) while liberalization reduces foreign exchange
pressure in the long term, initially it causes instability that can last for several years, and
(4) immediately after capital account liberalization, developing countries experience a
boom (nearly 15 percent of GDP), but this is followed by a sharp contraction.
Capital controls have been used by some countries in response to the large
inflows that follow capital account liberalization or the large outflows associated with a
crisis. Controls on cross-border capital flows are generally of two types: (1)
administrative (direct controls), which are prohibitions, that are either outright or involve
an approval procedure, on capital account transactions and (2) market-based (indirect
controls), which discourage cross-border flows by making them more costly, e.g.,
through the use of taxes or other price-based measures.
Controls on inflows are more commonly used in the event of a speculative bubble
and are becoming increasingly accepted as a short-term prudential measure for
preventing the accumulation of short-term foreign liabilities, especially by lower-income
economies while improving their financial supervisory systems.253 Controls on outflows,
however, are often implemented during a currency crisis associated with a speculative
attack and are less widely endorsed although acknowledged to have been successful in
some cases where they were used. Controls are generally imposed on short-term flows
because of their potentially speculative nature and destabilizing effect. Short-term, rather
than long-term, flows were the core of the problem during the East Asian crisis.
Controls on short-term capital inflows were used on several occasions during the
1990s, specifically by Brazil (1993-97), Chile (1991-98), Colombia (1993-98), Malaysia
(1994), and Thailand (1995-97). In all five cases, the controls were put in place because
of concerns over the negative effects 'of large capital inflows into developing economies
in the 1 990s. The principle motivation in all cases was to maintain an interest rate
differential between domestic and foreign interest rates while at the same time reducing
pressure on the exchange rate. While initially effective, they did not result in the
achievement of both of these objectives. There is evidence that they were partly effective
in Malaysia and Thailand in controlling the level and maturity of inflows and allowing
the reduction in the use of sterilization operations. In Colombia, and possibly in Chile,
they were effective in maintaining a differential between domestic and foreign interest
rates. In the case of Brazil, the controls were largely ineffective.25 4
Instances where controls on capital outflows have been used include Malaysia
(1998-2001)"', Spain (1992), and Thailand (1997-98). In the case of Malaysia and
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Thailand, controls were imposed in response to the East Asian crisis to stop the flow of
capital out of the country and counteract downward pressure on their exchange rates. At
the time, Thailand had a pegged exchange rate regime and Malaysia had a managed float
but later fixed the ringgit to the U.S. dollar when it imposed its capital controls. The goal
of each was to curtail speculation and stabilize their currencies by restricting access to
domestic currencies by nonresidents.
The effectiveness of these controls was mixed. In Malaysia, capital outflows
were largely contained by the elimination of the offshore ringgit market (through the
restriction on access to the currency by nonresidents), by restrictions on the repatriation
of portfolio capital by nonresidents, and on the outward investments of residents. The
currency was stabilized and has remained so. In Thailand, the controls were initially
effective and speculative attacks temporarily halted. However, the offshore market was
still active and large return differentials and expectations that the baht would be
depreciated undermined the effectiveness of the controls. Thailand eventually floated the
baht.256
At the time Malaysia imposed its capital controls (September 1998) the
international prognosis was generally negative with predictions of loss of investor
confidence and a decline in investment (FDI inflows), which were particularly important
to Malaysia. This was despite the fact that Malaysian authorities took steps to exempt
FDI and current account transactions from the controls. While there is now widespread
agreement as to the success of Malaysia's controls (even by the IMF), there is less
agreement as to the reason for this. The conventional view is that timing played a
sigrnificant role and that Malaysia was about to recover from the crisis anyway
particularly in light of the recovery of Korea and Thailand at the same time with no
imposition of capital controls. Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) analyze the effectiveness of
Malaysia's capital controls in its recovery relative to the recovery of Korea and Thailand,
both of which utilized the IMF program. They conclude that the controls were effective
in stabilizing the financial markets, which allowed authorities greater monetary and fiscal
autonomy. They also conclude that the controls permitted a faster recovery than would
have been possible under the IMF program.257 In fact, the IMF has since indicated its
agreement with the former of these findings; i.e., that the capital controls "appear to have
provided some breathing space in which to implement more fundamental policy reforms
[. .. ]." However, it tempers this acknowledgement by stating that this was "at the cost of
weakening the confidence of international investors, thereby increasing the cost of
funding from abroad, weakening FDI flows somewhat, and producing large
administrative costs.",258 On the other hand, Malaysia was not left with high debt levels
to international lending institutions as were Korea and Thailand. In the IMF's view, the
effectiveness of Malaysia's controls was enhanced by factors such as "macroeconomic
and structural adjustments," as well as the "authorities' strong enforcement capacity and
favorable exchange rate developments." 25 9 In fact, the effectiveness of Malaysia's capital
controls, versus the long-term ineffectiveness of Thailand's controls, has been attributed
in part to the fact that they were so comprehensive and succeeded in effectively
eliminating the offshore ringgit market whereas leakages occurred in Thailand's case.
IMF staff, however, have hypothesized that the capital controls implemented by
Thailand earlier in the crisis (and which failed) may have worsened the situation in that
country by delaying its implementation of the structural reform and stabilization package.
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The previous discussion has focused on the use of capital controls (on outflows)
as a means to control international flows in a crisis situation. Capital controls, however,
can also be effective in risk management associated with international capital flows in
non-crisis situations. High risks are associated with capital account liberalization in the
absence of well-developed financial supervisory and regulatory systems. Prudential
policies applied to financial institutions can limit the vulnerability of the economy to the
risk of excessive international capital flows by strengthening the financial system, thus
enabling it to deal with market volatility and may even, in some cases, reduce the
volatility of flows through financial institutions.'61 Prudential regulation and supervision
could therefore be considered as an alternative to the imposition of capital controls.26 2
On the other hand, under circumstances where prudential policies are not well
developed (or where nonfinancial firms play a significant role), capital controls can be
useful in the management of some risks associated with international capital flows. It
should be emphasized, however, that no single type of capital control is appropriate for
every country in all situations, and they can be complex, difficult to administer and
generally require strong enforcement capability. Direct controls are generally easier to
administer than indirect controls but they can be distortionary in the prevention of sound,
as well as risky, flows. Nonetheless, capital controls may be useful particularly in
countries that lack well-functioning prudential policies; i.e., market discipline,
transparency and internal controls in financial institutions.263
Wyplosz (200 lb) recommends the following for minimizing the problems
associated with capital account liberalization for developing countries.
* Wait until 'a proper economic, and possibly political, infrastructure can be
built in order to reduce the possibility of pressure on exchange rates and
boom-bust cycles.
* Prepare in advance for liberalization by implementing adequate welfare
systems and build up public savings via fiscal policy so as to have financial
reserves on hand in the event of a bust.
* While acknowledging that the debate on "fixed versus floating" and "extremes
versus the soft middle" is ongoing, some form of exchange rate flexibility
(i.e., floating or the ability and willingness to realign pegs) is essential during
liberalization so that a temporary revaluation in the capital inflow stage and
devaluation in the event of outflows could prevent a speculative attack and
ensuing crisis.
* Sequence liberalization over several years starting with the domestic goods
market, then trade, then the domestic financial market, and finally the capital
account (long-term, then short-tern).
* Banking regulation and supervision should be developed and financial
institutions should function properly. Goods markets should be free and open.
Several of these recommendations are echoed by the IMF, including the
sequencing of policies relative to "country-specific circumstances." Emphasis is placed
on sound and sustainable macroeconomic policies and financial sector reform as two of
the most important for opening of the capital account. The former is designated as a
precondition to financial and capital account liberalization as a means of defusing its
linkage with instability. The latter is advised for implementation during liberalization (if
not preexisting). The IMF recommends early stage attention to domestic financial
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liberalization through market-based monetary arrangements and central bank reforms
with gradual phasing in of prudential regulation and supervision, and financial
restructuring policies. Transparency and data disclosure are also deemed important.
Social and regional considerations should be taken into account in determining the pace,
timing and sequencing of liberalization.2 "
An alternative to "sequencing" 265 is presented in Fan (2002) who describes
China's opening and reform process as "compatible opening." Although in this case it is
applied particularly to China, the concept is theoretical and could be applied to market
liberalization for emerging economies generally. In discussing the problems that China
faces in further financial market opening, Fan says, "these problems do not mean further
opening is not the right thing to do, but they do show that domestic reform should be the
main priority and that liberalization is helpful only when compatible with domestic
development."266 In fact, he proposes, "reform and market opening should go hand in
hand, progressing neither too fast nor too slow, so that they can promote and facilitate
each other."26 7 He faults the prevailing "sequencing" theory as not being politically
realistic because in reality, "policymakers just do what the situation allows." 268
Furthermore, developing countries are often pushed by those in favor of sequencing to
liberalize as fast as possible.269
Some may criticize the "compatible opening" theory as being a "half-way"
solution, but Fan responds that domestic reform itself is only half completed. "One of the
lessons of the East Asian crisis is not that closed markets create instability, but that the
crisis was caused by 'complete opening' before 'complete reform'."270 The downside to
this approach is that it is government managed which could lead to unfair competition
rent seeking. It could also be slower but does not necessarily need to be depending on the
pace of domestic reform, with which liberalization should coincide.
Since the 1997-98 crisis, Asian countries have, to varying degrees, taken major
steps towards restructuring their financial systems and strengthening their
macroeconomic policies. (Some of these are outlined in Table 5.3 earlier in this chapter.)
However, as is the case for China's domestic reform, East Asian countries still have
considerable work to do in order to attain the level of financial and structural
development that would minimize the risks associated with capital account liberalization.
It is obvious that a task of this magnitude can not be accomplished in the short, or even
medium, term and has been estimated to take decades.
In his assessment of globalization, Fan Gang points out that developing
economies are hampered in their ability to compete globally in part because of their
vulnerability to the risks associated with the international market. In order to prosper,
these countries must have more than the foreign capital and technology brought by
globalization or the cheap labor that is in plentiful supply at home. They further need
"competitive economic structures, strong institutions, the experience to manage markets
and basic education [... y].X27 In his view, globalization does not bring these to
developing countries, or at least not as completely or as quickly as it does capital and
technology. He points out that their acquisition or development requires considerable
time to complete - as much as 10, 20, or even 50 years, which is still not as long as it
took industrialized countries to develop their market systems.
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Summary
Capital account liberalization is desirable in the long run but is associated with
considerable risk in the process, particularly if macroeconomic policies are not sound and
financial supervision and regulation is weak. While sequencing of the opening of the
capital account is often recommended, there is no single formula for this process, just as
there is no simple rule for the use of capital controls. "Compatible opening" where the
progress of domestic reforms coincides with that of market liberalization is also an
altemative. Both "sequencing" and "compatible opening" can, if handled properly, be
geared toward the specific circumstances of financial development in individual
countries. Many factors related to an individual country's stage of development and
current level of involvement in global capital markets need to be considered in setting
realistic goals and objectives in this area.
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A Regional Currency Regime
Arising out of the Asian crisis and related to the issue of financial system
reforn, 272 is an ongoing debate on the appropriate currency regime for East Asian
economies, extending as far as a discussion of the suitability of a regional monetary
arrangement for East Asia.273 Prior to the crisis, currencies of the crisis-affected
countries were "effectively" pegged to the U.S. dollar.274 (See Table 5.17 below for
"official" pre-crisis exchange rate regimes for the crisis-affected countries.) 275 Large
capital inflows into these countries caused rapid appreciation of their exchange rates,
especially after 1994. When the dollar appreciated against the yen beginning in 1995, the
currencies became overvalued. The eventual reversal of capital flows in mid-1997 put
downward pressure on these currencies, which were vigorously defended by their
respective central banks. In the end, after their foreign exchange reserves were depleted
(Thailand and Korea), the currencies could no longer be defended and were allowed to
float and, thus, depreciate. This depreciation, combined with rising interest rates,
negatively impacted banks. Their nonperforming loans increased as borrowers
(particularly real estate developers) 276 went into bankruptcy, and they suffered direct
balance sheet losses (to the extent they were net dollar borrowers). The only exception
was Malaysia, which switched from a managed float to a conventional fixed peg and
imposed capital controls.
Table 5.17
Crisis Country Pre-Crisis Exchange Rate
Regime*
(12/31/91)
Indonesia Crawling Peg
Korea Managed float with no pre-
announced exchange rate path
Malaysia Pegged rate in horizontal band
Philippines Managed float with no pre-
announced exchange rate path
Thailand Other Conventional Fixed Peg
* See Appendix for description of exchange rate regimes.
Source: IMF Annual Report 2000 and Fischer (2001: Tables 2, 3, and 4)
Radelet and Sachs (1999) believe that if Thailand had switched to a float earlier in
1997 and moderately tightened monetary and fiscal policies, foreign exchange reserves
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would not have been exhausted and the crisis "could have been largely avoided".278 For
the same reason, Corden (2000) also suggests that Thailand could have resorted to an
earlier float but believes there might still have been a sudden depreciation as lenders and
the foreign exchange market realized that the boom was ending soon.
Bipolar or "Two-Corner Solution"
Because of their perceived negative role in the crisis, the pre-crisis "soft pegs" fell
out of favor as a prescribed regime for emerging market countries. As an alternative to
(and reaction against) this regime, many experts advocated a bipolar or two-corner
solution for East Asia. This solution involves a choice of either absolutely fixed
exchange rates (e.g., currency board, monetary union, dollarization), or freely floating
rates.27 9 The theory associated with this solution is that if countries have hard pegs or
free floats, then speculative attacks will no longer be a threat and currency crises will
cease to be a problem. 280
Advocates of the two-corner solution point to the so-called "impossible trinity" to
support their view. The essence of this principle is that the following three goals cannot
co-exist:
* Fixed exchange rate (i.e., exchange rate stability)
* Free flow of capital (i.e., financial market integration)
* Independence of monetary policy
Frankel, Fajnzylber, Schmukler and Serven (2000) suggest this does not mean
that a country must give up one of the three entirely but could instead choose a halfway
approach on two of the goals; e.g. half-stability and half-independence, such as would be
the case if a country adopted a "target zone of moderate width." They go on to explain
that a government could pursue "a managed float in which half of every fluctuation in
demand for its currency is accommodated by intervention and half is allowed to be
reflected in the exchange rate."28' McCauley (2001) points out a similar suggestion by
Yi Gang and Tang Xian (2001), which is that "an independent monetary policy (1) might
be combined with semi-fixity of the exchange rate (1/2) and a halfway open capital
account (1/2)."282
In an attempt to offer a possible theoretical rationale for the favored two-corner
proposition283 , Frankel, Fajnzylber, Schmukler and Serven (2000) examine ease of
verifiability of exchange rate regimes. Their reasoning is that verifiability (i.e., the
ability of the market to determine from available data that the official exchange rate
regime of a country is in fact in operation) contributes to "transparency," which has
become a major focus for post-crisis reform and figures prominently in discussions of the
new international financial architecture. They focus on exchange rate bands284 as one
type of "intermediate" (non-corner) regime and attempt to assess the degree to which it is
verifiable from observed data. They conclude that on the whole, a wider bandwidth,
multiple instead of simple basket pegs, and frequent parity realignments all make it more
difficult to statistically verify the announced regime. Credibility is an essential element
in maintaining foreign exchange stability and the ability to verify an announced regime
would understandably contribute to that credibility. They reason that if this is indeed the
case, then a more easily verifiable corner regime might be preferable to investors.
Credibility is a major goal of emerging market countries and a primary reason for their
pursuit of exchange rate stability.
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There are a number of reasons to question the suitability of the two-corner
solution for East Asian countries. A floating rate would adjust as needed to maintain
intemal and external balance but has drawbacks for the emerging economies of Asia. In
this case, there are two problems in particular with a freely floating regime.285
1) Short-term volatility - The narrow and shallow capital markets of Asian
economies make them vulnerable to the manipulations of a few large players
in the international capital market, which can result in extreme volatility that
can be magnified by the effects of "herding". This high volatility, and its
attendant high risk, can lead to an increase in interest rates, which in turn can
slow economic growth. The situation is worsened by the limited and costly
hedging opportunities in Asia. Another problem is that exchange rate
volatility causes fluctuation in the real value of domestic assets and this can
prompt domestic investors to seek stable investments abroad.
2) Medium-term exchange rate misalignment - Capital inflows will cause a
currency to appreciate, attract more inflows and further appreciate until a
persistent misalignment occurs in the medium term. This can result in the
distortion of domestic resource allocation between tradables and non-
tradables.
At the other corner is a fixed exchange rate, such as a currency board. A currency
board provides a high level of stability (and credibility, provided there is certainty the peg
will not be abandoned), but a country must give up monetary policy independence, which
few countries are willing to do. Also, the rate cannot be adjusted if the country wants to
attain certain targets of internal and external balance. If a real devaluation is needed, it
can only be brought about through declines in domestic prices and wages. In addition,
the lack of a lender of last resort can be problematic in an environment of liberalized
financial markets.
Larrain and Velasco (1999)286 have identified certain conditions they believe
necessary for a country planning to adopt an exchange rate anchored to another currency:
* Small, as opposed to large, countries and countries that have symnmetric
shocks with the anchor country are better candidates as there is less need for
such countries to have an independent monetary policy and flexible exchange
rate than if they had to deal with asymmetric shocks on their own.
* Most of an adopting country's trade should take place with the anchor country
to minimize the negative effects of exchange rate fluctuations on trade
competitiveness.
* An adopting country's inflation preferences must be broadly similar to those
of the anchor country. This is generally easier to accomplish for countries that
have a history of high inflation as they are often willing to endure
considerable hardship to achieve price stability.
* The adopting country should have flexible labor markets so as to reduce the
reliance on other policy measures, such as monetary policy, for dealing with
economic shocks.
* A strong, well-capitalized and well-regulated banking sector is needed to
reduce the need for a lender of last resort.
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* High-quality institutions and a rule of law should be in place as they make it
easier to adhere to the strict rules concerning monetary policy that come with
anchoring the currency.
Among Asian countries, only Hong Kong SAR has a currency board, which was
adopted in 1983 and has been highly successful. Eichengreen (1999) attributes this
success to its internationalized banking system, openness to trade, flexible labor markets
and the monetary authority's insulation from political pressures. These characteristics do
not come together in most other East Asian countries.
A Floating Regime or an Implicit Dollar Peg?
As previously noted, most of the crisis-affected countries switched to a floating
rate regime during the crisis. Current exchange rate regimes for East Asian countries
(along with their monetary policy frameworks) are listed in Table 5.18.287
Table 5.18
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Anchors of Monetary Policy
(As of December 31, 2000)
Country Exchange Rate Regime Monetary Policy Framework
Australia Independently floating Inflation targeting framework
Brunei Darussalam Currency board Exchange rate anchor
Cambodia Managed floating with no Fund-supported or other monetary program
preannounced path for
exchange rate
China De facto peg arrangement Two nominal anchors:
under a formally announced (1) Exchange rate anchor
policy of managed or (2) Monetary aggregate target
independent floating (against
dollar)
Hong Kong SAR Currency board (dollar) . Exchange rate anchor
Indonesia Independently floating Fund-supported or other monetary program
Japan Independently floating Has no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but
rather monitors various indicators in conducting
monetary policy.
Lao PDR Managed floating with no Has no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but
preannounced path for rather monitors various indicators in conducting
exchange rate monetary policy.
Malaysia Other conventional fixed peg Exchange rate anchor
arrangement (against dollar)
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Exchange Rate Arrangements and Anchors of Monetary Poilcy
(As of December 31, 2000)
Country Exchange Rate Regime Monetary Policy Framework
Myanmar Other conventional fixed peg Exchange rate anchor
arrangement (against a
composite)
New Zealand Independently floating Inflation targeting framework
Philippines Independently floating Two nominal anchors:
(1) Monetary aggregate target
(2) Fund-supported or other monetary
program
Singapore Managed floating with no Other (not specified)
preannounced path for
exchange rate
(Singapore describes its
regime as a basket, band, and
crawl (BBC) with undisclosed
parameters .)28 8
South Korea Independently floating Other (not specified)
Taiwan Managed floating"g N.A.
Thailand Independently floating Inflation targeting framework
Vietnam Pegged exchange rate within Exchange rate anchor
horizontal band (0.1% daily
movement, one-sided)
(De facto arrangement under a
formally announced policy of
managed or independent
floating.)
NOTE: Taiwan is not included in the IMF listing.
Source: [MF, Intemational Financial Statistics, July 2001
There is, however, some controversy about the true nature of these countries'
announced regimes, which for most are indicated as independently floating. Several
recent studies 90 are reviewed in Branson (2001). These studies examine variability in
exchange rates, intemational reserves and interest rates of certain "floater" countries
relative to the variability in these indicators for the U.S., Japan and Germany. They find
that, for the most part, countries are neither adopting a hard fix nor are they actually
freely floating but rather are managing their exchange rates against the dollar, yen or
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DM/euro, or against a basket. (These studies cover a number of "floater" countries
including some, but not all, East Asian countries that float.)
McKinnon (2001) is more specific in claiming that although having officially
switched to a floating rate regime during the crisis, many East Asian countries in fact
returned to pegging against the dollar after the crisis. McCauley (2001), on the other
hand, disputes this claim with his findings that in 1999-2000 (relative to 1995-1996)
"exchange rates have become more volatile not only absolutely but also in relation to
interest rates in Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. In addition,
exchange-rate volatility has risen relative to interest-rate volatility marginally in
Singapore and substantially in Taiwan."291 He does, however, acknowledge that
countries in East Asia have the capacity, in the form of international reserves, and the
willingness to intervene in order to support their currencies. He also finds a willingness
to limit exchange rate volatility by restricting financial transactions involving non-
residents. (See Table G. 1 1 in General Appendix.)
De Brouwer (2001) also questions the claims that East Asian floaters are
implicitly dollar pegging and goes further to say that even if there were stability against
the dollar for these currencies in the past few years, it could have been the result of the
efforts of the crisis-affected economies to build up their foreign exchange reserves.
Currency movement against the dollar would have been limited as these countries bought
dollars when cheap and refrained from buying when expensive, but he emphasizes this is
not implicit dollar targeting. He also points out that stability against the dollar could in
fact be stability against the yen since it is not clear whether these economies were
targeting the dollar or the yen. The exchange rate between the two has been stable in
recent years.292
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) argue that emerging market countries have a tendency
to stay away from a pure float because of a fear of large exchange rate swings - what
they call "fear of floating". The reasons the authors give for this fear (or conversely, why
exchange rate stability is highly sought after) are as follows:
• Exchange rate volatility can be an indication of the monetary authority's lack
of credibility,
• Exchange rate volatility can cause debt servicing difficulties and defaults
since liabilities are often foreign-currency denominated,
• Exchange rate volatility appears to be more damaging to trade in emerging
markets which may be because trade is predominantly invoiced in U.S. dollars
and hedging opportunities are more limited, and
• The passthrough from exchange rate swings to inflation is higher in emerging
markets than in developed economies.
Fof these reasons, the authors believe that although emerging market countries
might indicate an "intention" to float, they in fact do not allow their currencies to do so.
Branson (2001) concurs with the "fear of floating" theory and believes that developing
countries' fear of unstable financial markets is justified since these markets are not well
integrated into the international system, unlike those of large developed economies which
can float without concern. He concludes that developing countries do not, and should
not, adopt either of the corner solutions.
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"Intermediate" or "Middle" Regime Alternatives
If the two-corner solution is not the answer, what are the alternatives? There are a
number of options between the two extremes of a hard peg and a free float, often referred
to as "intermediate" or "middle" regimes. Kwan (2001) lists these in descending order of
commitment to maintain a fixed rate: "monetary union, currency board, adjustable pe
crawling peg, basket peg, target zone or band, managed floating, and free floating."'9P
The third through sixth of these are identified as intermediate regimes and the two on
each end as polar regimes. Some consider the intermediate regimes as reversions to the
soft pegs of the pre-crisis era; however, Frankel (1 999b) is of the opinion that the
recommendation to avoid middle regimes in favor of a hard fix or free float is not
appropriate because their rejection is no more than "a rejection of where most countries
have been, with no reasonable expectation that the sanctuaries of monetary union or free-
floating will, in fact, be any better."294 Kwan (2001) believes it is preferable "to improve
the intermediate regimes with explicit exchange rate targets so as to make them less
vulnerable to currency speculation." 295
The first question that must be asked is whether or not East Asia is ready for a
common currency arrangement. Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro (2000) assess the
level of preparedness of Asia (ASEAN in particular) for monetary union by looking at
trade patterns, economic shocks, factor mobility, and the monetary transmission
mechanism. They determine that "in terms of the economic prerequisites for monetary
integration, ASEAN is not in a significantly worse position than the EU was a few years
prior to its signing the Maastricht Treaty." 296 They emphasize, however, that ASEAN
lacks the political commitment to put economic integration ahead of loss of sovereignty,
which was instrumental in the EMU's success. In their estimation this lack of
commitment would make monetary integration very difficult for ASEAN to achieve in
the foreseeable future.
In fact, most agree that monetary union is a long-term prospect for East Asia.
However, there is an ongoing search for some type of common currency arrangement that
would benefit the region in the short- to medium-term. The determination of a common
currency regime for East Asia, however, is complicated by the heterogeneity of the
region's economic and financial characteristics. (Many of these were discussed earlier in
this study.) The extent and importance of this diversity as it relates to monetary
integration becomes evident in light of the IMF's list of "Considerations in the Choice of
Exchange Rate Regime" appearing in Table G. 12 in the General Appendix. This list
indicates the desired degree of exchange rate flexibility for particular economic
characteristics. Depending upon which countries are to be included in an optimal
currency area in East Asia, there is diversity among countries in potentially every area
included in this list.
A number of studies have been carried out in the 1990s to assess East Asia's
status as an optimal currency area (OCA). Kawai and Takagi (2000) review the
literature 297 on this topic and arrive at the conclusion that based on various economic
criteria (such as those in Table G. 12), "East Asia is no less ready for a regional monetary
arrangement than Europe was before EMU." They also acknowledge (due to the
endogenous nature of OCA criteria), "the very act of forming a regional monetary
arrangement will enhance the suitability of East Asia for such an arrangement."298
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There have been many efforts since the Asian crisis to define a common currency
arrangement that would be suitable for the region. The proposed arrangements have
tended to be in the form of intermediate regimes with a "common basket peg" being a
prominent feature. The recommendations have been that countries in the region peg their
currencies to a basket comprising the yen, dollar and euro, as these are the most reflective
of East Asia's trade and investment activities.299 Some proponents recommend that the
weights in the basket be based on the respective country's trade shares with Japan, the
U.S. and the EU, while others believe they should be based on an average of trade shares
with these three countries.
The common basket peg is recommended because it is viewed as one that will
provide exchange rate stability, which is generally believed to be essential for the
promotion of trade, FDI and economic growth in the region,300 and at the same time
allows for some flexibility against the three major currencies (yen, dollar, and euro).301
Including the yen in the basket, however, could be problematical if a currency union is
the eventual goal. It would in effect treat the yen asymmetrically whereas the yen, yuan
and won should be treated symmetrically as the yen becomes a non-special currency in
the region.
One often discussed type of common basket peg is the basket-band-crawl or
BBC.302 A band would be placed around a parity (center of the band) that would be
periodically adjusted in small steps so as to track the underlying fundamental equilibrium
exchange rate (FEER). The parity would be defined in terms of a basket of currencies
and would comprise trade-weighted currencies of a country's principal trading partners.
This is chosen over a single currency for countries with diversified trade (no dominant
trading partner) in that a basket would stabilize the effective exchange rate303. The band
would be publicly announced and would function as a guide to the equilibrium rate for
the market. Its function would be to stabilize market expectations, thus reducing the risks
of volatility and misalignment. The exchange rate would fluctuate within the band, but
the central bank would intervene at the edges of the band to keep the rate from moving
outside the band.304
The band is recommended to be wide in order to (1) eliminate the need to defend
a disequilibrium exchange rate, (2) allow adjustment of the parity, in line with
fundamentals, without causing expectations of discrete changes that would be
destabilizing, (3) allow for some monetary policy independence when a country's cycle is
out of sync with the world norm, and (4) to help cope with strong temporary capital
inflows. The crawl is part of the formula to neutralize differential inflation; however, the
goal is to do this in such a way as to maintain competitiveness. 305
Williamson (2001) believes it is rational to have an exchange rate policy rather
than leaving rates to the market in order to prevent rates from moving too far from the
rate that makes sense in terms of the fundamentals (i.e., the FEER). In his opinion, it is
rational to seek continuous internal balance, but acceptable to secure external balance in
the medium term. This is the exchange rate objective in the BBC regime. He suggests
that the use of monetary policy, sterilized intervention, and capital controls are three
options for preventing the exchange rate from becoming misaligned.
Williamson recommends weights of about one-third each on the dollar, the euro
and the yen, which could be created as an Asian currency unit (ACU). 306 He foresees a
imarket in the ACU being established and, once functioning, the ACU could be used as
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the "common reference point" for all exchange rates in the region, whether they be
pegged, managed or floating exchange rates. He notes several problems with this
scheme. Some countries may consider an ACU peg too complicated to be credible, at
least in comparison to a dollar peg. There could be resistance to disclosure of the
contents of the basket and the parity, which he views as important. Also, agreement on
reference rates for currencies that had been floating would require cooperation among
partners, as these could not be unilateral decisions.
Kawai and Takagi (2000) consider a common currency basket as preferable to
what they see as the "current de facto dollar peg policy" in that it would ensure exchange
rate stability in the region. They agree that the common basket could serve as the
reference anchor in conducting exchange rate policy but that each country could choose
its own formal exchange rate arrangement. It would be a "pragmatic policy option for
East Asia until greater political and institutional developments create an environment
conducive to a more robust framework of monetary and exchange rate cooperation." 307
In their opinion, more needs to be done to build institutions for surveillance and
consultation, which could be comparable to the European Monetary Cooperative Fund
(EMCF) and the European Monetary Institute (EMI), which were important in the
monetary integration of Europe.
Despite the significant support for the common basket peg regime, it does have its
detractors. De Brouwer (2002) does not dispute the importance of intraregional currency
stability given that nearly half of East Asian countries' trade is intraregional.308 Nor does
he disagree that Japan, the U.S. and the EU are important trading partners for countries
within the region, which implies that pegging to a single currency would not bring
stability to the effective exchange rate. Nonetheless, he argues several points against the
common basket peg as a common currency arrangement for East Asia. Some of his
arguments are as follows:
a) He suggests that it might be more appropriate to use a country's own trade
weights rather than common trade weights because trade patterns vary
significantly among countries within the region. He points to Cambodia,
Lao PDR and Vietnam in particular as being "outliers" in that they trade
more with other countries in the region than they do with the U.S., EU or
Japan.309 For this reason a basket based on common weights would be
less stabilizing than one with each country's own weights. Some countries
could become less competitive against others depending upon which
currencies in the basket move, and how they move.
b) Using an export similarity index, he determines that the region's export
structure is increasingly similar to that of industrialized countries so that
only the lesser developed countries in East Asia still have intraregional
trade that is more similar than extraregional trade. In view of this finding,
the common basket peg may not be appropriate for the region since it
implies that stabilizing intraregional exchange rates is more important than
stabilizing exchange rates with Japan, the U.S. and the EU.
c) Switching to a common basket peg would mean, for most countries in the
region, changing from a floating rate regime to which they have already
become adapted.
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d) A common basket peg presumes that exchange rate volatility adversely
affects trade and economic performance but he finds a lack of evidence for
this in East Asia.
e) Pegging forces changes in the real exchange rate through the price level
rather than the nominal exchange rate, which in a situation of persistent
inflation, is inefficient.
Wyplosz (200 la) sees the merit of a common basket peg in that it would stabilize
exchange rates within the region as well as with major trading partners outside the region.
He points out the disadvantage, however, that decisionmaking would be carried out by
individual countries without institutional support. He suggests that the Chiang Mai
Initiative (CMI) in association with common basket bands might serve the purpose as an
EMS-type arrangement. However, he identifies two problems with this: (1) whereas
support of the bilateral pegs of the ERM (exchange rate mechanism) of the EMS
(European Monetary System) was automatic and unlimited, the CMI amounts are limited
relative to what the markets could mobilize and (2) the dollar and euro would be included
in the basket but are not part of the CMI arrangement eliminating the possibility of
concerted intervention, which made the EMS arrangement so successful. Therefore, in
his opinion, this combination would not stand up to a speculative attack. He also
suggests the alternative of stabilizing bilateral rates and managing the common rate
against the dollar and euro but notes that an institution would be needed to provide a
coordinating mechanism in this case.
As an alternative to the common basket peg, Williamson (2001) suggests (and
later dismisses) a system of mutual pegging among currencies in the region similar to the
European snake 310 and ERM. However, he points to what he sees as obstacles to this
alternative. In his view there is no economic power dominant enough to anchor the
system and dismisses Japan in that role because of what he refers to as the "vagaries of
the yen." He also sees difficulties with Hong Kong switching from its currency board,
and political issues for China and Taiwan relative to their bilateral exchange rate.
Wyplosz (2001 a) believes that while there are many types of soft pegs, the
differences among them are less important than the implementation of procedures to
enforce and verify the arrangements. He emphasizes the importance of the support
provided by adequate institutions if the adoption of a peg is part of a regional
agreement. 31 Kawai and Akiyama (2000) emphasize the importance of coordinated
action by East Asian countries in any attempted move to a new exchange rate
arrangement where the relative weights are shifted away from the dollar toward the yen
and euro. In their opinion, such a move would be difficult for a country on a unilateral
basis if neighboring countries do not make a similar shift.
Concluding Remarks
During the crisis, most East Asian countries switched from their "effective" dollar
pegs to a floating rate regime (with some notable exceptions including Malaysia and
Hong Kong). Although it is still disputed as to whether or not these countries have since
returned to implicit dollar pegging, there is evidence of more volatility in Asian exchange
rates after the crisis than there was before. While the two-corner solution of a hard fix on
the one hand or a pure float on the other is recommended by some as the most
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appropriate exchange regime for East Asian economies, most in the region favor some
type of intermediate regime. A common basket peg has been widely discussed and has
many supporters, particularly in Japan; however, there is sufficient disagreement with
this suggestion in the region to allow for the consideration of alternatives in the area of
monetary cooperation. Most agree that a currency union is a long-term proposition for
East Asia, but there are possibilities short of this proposal that are feasible for Asia in the
short- or medium-term. This paper's recommendations in this area are presented in
Chapter VII.
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Chapter VI - Conclusion: Observations on Integration
We began this study of East Asian regional integration with a review of the
region's economic history extending back hundreds of years. During that time Asia was
the source of a wide variety of both primary and manufactured goods that were highly
desired throughout the world. This was made possible by the region's richness in
primary resources as well as its large and highly civilized population whose skills were
technologically sophisticated for that time. As a result, Asia enjoyed a very high level of
GDP and per capita income, which during some periods surpassed even that of Europe.
Historically, Asia played a central role in not only intraregional trade, but also in
global trade. Its complex pattern of trade covered a wide area encompassing East, West,
South and Southeast Asia as well as Europe, Africa and the Americas, throughout which
a wide variety of goods were exchanged, facilitated by the use of precious metals as
currency. The region weakened during the latter part of the millennium as the Industrial
Revolution gained momentum in Europe and colonialism expanded in Asia. The
negative effects of the latter event are still evident today as East Asia struggles to return
to its past strength and prominence.
Two historical factors will have a significant impact on the way East Asia
proceeds toward regional integration in the future. One is that Asia has been an open
region fully involved in the world economic system and has played a central role in
worldwide trade and the global division of labor. The second is that intraregional trade
has a long history in the region and was very well developed in the past.
Another characteristic of equal importance in its effect on East Asia's progress
toward integration is the diversity of its social, economic and political structures. East
Asia is expansive in terms of territory and number of countries, extending over 15 million
square kilometers and including as many as 15 nations with wide differences between the
largest and the smallest. By comparison, the EU is compact (3 million Km2 and 15
countries) and NAFTA is long and narrow (21 million Km2 but with only 3 countries, of
which two are of much larger size than the third.) In population (representing both a
market and source of labor), East Asia is enormous encompassing nearly 2 billion people
(again with wide differences between the largest and smallest countries) compared to
about 400,000 each for the EU and NAFTA.
The countries of East Asia are much more heterogeneous than are the countries of
the EU or NAFTA in terms of ethnicity, religion, culture, and political systems, both
within the individual countries themselves and between countries of the region. There is
also considerable diversity among East Asian countries in economic and financial
development with Japan at the high end as a developed country and the newer ASEAN
members at a lesser-developed stage. While the EU also has some economic diversity
(e.g., Germany and Greece) and differences will undoubtedly increase as the EU
enlarges, the gap is much narrower than that between, for example, Japan or Singapore
and Vietnam.
Differences exist not only in GDP but also in industrial development as well.
Japan, of course, is highly industrialized, and Singapore and Taiwan are leaders in high-
tech industries, but Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR export primarily low-tech
products. Also, the financial markets of Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan are very
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advanced whereas those of the newer ASEAN members are virtually undeveloped.
These differences have significant implications for both trade and monetary integration.
In view of this heterogeneity, we examined the characteristics of various regional
groupings (e.g., ASEAN and APEC) in an effort to determine if one or another of these
institutions brings greater benefit to the region and the economies therein. It can be
argued that a group comprising developmentally similar economies would be a more
workable arrangement in which smaller members would have more influence, but there is
a slightly more compelling argument in favor of agreements between industrial and
developing economies in that they can bring significant benefits to the developing
partners.
Regional institutions have been slow to develop in East Asia in part because that
was never a defined goal of regional cooperation in the region. This, however, is
beginning to change. As cooperation among the nations of the region becomes a higher
priority, attention is increasingly directed toward the formation of more dynamic,
effective regional institutions having greater capability for the promotion of trade,
investment, finance and security in the region. These efforts have been complicated by
the region's diversity, historical political tensions between certain countries, the desire to
protect national interests and specific industries, and the region's already established
openness in trade and FDI including its long-standing relationships with the U.S. and the
EU. The result has been the formation of a variety of regional groups encompassing a
wide range of member nations.
The most prominent among these are ASEAN (and its extension ASEAN-Plus-
Three) and APEC. The defining characteristic of ASEAN is its so-called "ASEAN
Way," which emphasizes consensus, non-intervention and minimal institutionalization.
As opposed to using treaties and binding obligations, ASEAN prefers non-binding plans
and guidelines. Its secretariat has few powers and limited authority and is thus
characterized as a "soft" secretariat. National interests, therefore, tend to take
precedence. These characteristics make regional decisionmaking difficult and slow. The
ASEAN way is often contrasted with the more formal and legalistic "Brussels way".
"Institution building" has been identified as the second ingredient (after pragmatism) of
Europe's successful integration progress.312 Unlike the EU, however, ASEAN has been
unwilling to move in the direction of establishing a supranational body and has instead
maintained its commitment to preserving national sovereignty.3 13 Whereas the EU is
structured and treaty-based, ASEAN is flexible and ambiguous.
APEC is primarily recognized for its policy of "open regionalism" or "concerted
voluntarism" of which the goal is the pursuit of free and open trade and investment and a
commitment to nondiscrimination toward nonmembers. This is contrary to the concept
of preferential treatment and discrimination against nonmembers, which is characteristic
of regionalism in the EU and NAFTA.314 There is some question, however, whether
"open regionalism" will continue to characterize regional cooperation in East Asia,
particularly in light of the increasing number of FTAs now being proposed and
formulated there.
Both ASEAN and APEC are viewed by many as weak and ineffective institutions
and are often criticized for the vague and noncommittal outcomes of their frequent
meetings. There is also the issue of membership. ASEAN is viewed as too small and not
fully representative of the entire region as certain major players (Japan, China and Korea,
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as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan) are not included. On the other hand, APEC is not
considered to be a "true" regional grouping because of the inclusion of countries on the
other side of the Pacific.
A third group that seems to hold more promise is ASEAN-Plus-Three which is
more representative of the region in terms of its membership, although it also does not
include Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, it is not an official or fully functioning
regional institution but operates on the sidelines of ASEAN. Furthermore, its focus until
recently has been primarily on the fmancial/monetary aspects of cooperation, with its
Chiang Mai Initiative, to the exclusion of trade and investment. The focus of this group,
however, seems to be changing now with progress being made in the formulation of the
ASEAN-China FTA and the interest this has sparked in the other two Plus-Three
countries of South Korea and Japan.
The liberalization of trade and FDI in East Asia has contributed significantly to
the region's at times phenomenal economic growth and development over the last two
decades. Our analysis reveals the continued multilateral nature of East Asia's trade and
FDI and the importance of its extraregional relationships. At the same time, there is a
very significant intraregional component with some recent shifts in trading and
investment patterns both from outside to inside the region and within the region itself.
One example of this is the apparent shift in investment away from Southeast Asia
(ASEAN) to the North (China) in search of lower costs, among other things.
In light of East Asia's rising interest in pursuing regional solutions to common
problems and the importance of policy coordination in the promotion of trade and FDI,
we propose two approaches that combine these two elements: (1) the formulation of
regional agreements and (2) the creation of regional production networks. In the case of
the former, agreements should encompass aspects of both trade and FDI with an
appreciation of their interactive characteristics. Additionally, including both developed
and developing countries as partners in the agreement has been shown to bring greater
benefits. While larger groupings may be more welfare enhancing, a bilateral approach
could be an initial step to a broader multilateral arrangement.
The second approach, the creation of regional production networks, is a step
beyond, and a possible extension of, regional agreements. East Asia has the potential to
build such networks on the foundation established by Japanese TNCs in the post-war
period. TNCs in East Asia, although not as numerous or as large as those of developed
*countries, demonstrate an increasing level of transnationality and have risen to the top
among developing country TNCs in this respect. The TNCs of the Asian NIEs have
already demonstrated their potential in this respect, and China's enterprises are likely to
catch up quickly. Regional production networks are appealing in that they satisfy the
desire for regional solutions and yet are not entirely self-contained as they are non-
discriminatory, thus allowing countries outside the region to invest in, and trade with,
countries of the region, and vice versa. This approach would require a longer timeframe
to implement than would the regional-agreement approach, but it would be broader in
context and could involve the entire region as opposed to only a few countries. Through
these two approaches East Asia could attain the ultimate goal of participating fully in the
global production network.
Prior to the 1997-98 crisis, regional integration efforts on the economic side in
East Asia tended to focus on trade and direct investment. The crisis aroused an
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awareness of the need for financial cooperation in the region to prevent another such
occurrence. Although a number of proposals for such cooperation were made at the time,
the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of bilateral swap arrangements has made the most
progress with six BSAs signed and eight under negotiation. Although many complain
that the CMI amounts are too small to be effective in a major crisis, the process itself is
important in its coordinating and cooperative effect on the economies of the region. At
the same time, it is not exclusively regional in that it includes a global element through its
link with IMF conditionality.
The crisis also brought calls for financial sector restructuring and reform but
efforts so far have been carried out primarily at the national level. Many observers,
however, believe that a coordinated effort at the national, regional and international levels
is necessary because of the regional and global nature of recent crises.
Discussions have focused on the best way to develop the region's financial sector
to a level of soundness and stability that would not only reduce the chances of another
crisis but also promote economic growth in the region. Many believe a move away from
a bank-based system to a market-based system is desirable. We have presented two
approaches currently under discussion for the achievement of this goal. One focuses on
changing financial structure so as to move away from the currently dominant bank-based
system to a more market-based system, and the second focuses on reforming the
regulatory, legal and macroeconomic environment, which should lead naturally to a move
away from a bank-based to a market-based system. The ultimate outcomes of these two
approaches are the same (i.e., a market-based system), but they are reached from different
directions.
Still, there are those who are of the opinion that a bank-based system is
appropriate for some economies under certain circumstances and others who believe that
developing capital markets is not the answer for East Asia. Some also expect that bank-
based systems will remain prominent in East Asia even with the eventual development of
capital markets. In any event, strengthening the banking system is essential. It is not
clear, however, whether this should be undertaken at the national, regional or
international level, or possibly at all three levels.
Another topic of debate that came out of the crisis is capital account liberalization
which, while desirable in the long run, is associated with considerable risk, particularly if
macroeconomic policies are not sound and financial supervision and regulation is weak.
While the issue of capital controls has been controversial, a "sequencing" or "compatible
opening" approach may be desirable for most emerging economies.
In the area of monetary integration, a currency union, although possibly desirable
for East Asia, would not really be feasible in the region for decades. In the interim, many
favor an intermediate currency regime that could be some type of adjustable peg or band,
with a basket peg (including the yen, euro and dollar) being the most often mentioned.
Some believe this to be appropriate for the region because of its trade and investment
patterns. Others, however, disagree, citing significant variation in trade patterns between
some countries in the region that can disadvantage them relative to other countries when
the yen or euro fluctuates against the dollar. Other possibilities for monetary cooperation
exist, including the recommendation of this paper which is for some type of foreign
exchange policy coordination that would lead eventually to monetary integration. This is
discussed in Chapter VII.
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This study has raised a number of issues for the regional integration process in
East Asia. In contrast to Europe and North America, East Asian countries have a
tendency to change politically and economically, sometimes quite dramatically. For
example, China until recently had been closed but is now opening up with the potential
for remarkable consequences, both negative and positive depending upon how this is
dealt with in the region. Also, Japan's economy rose to a high level after World War II
but in the last ten years has faltered and shows little sign of near-term recovery. This has
jeopardized the country's position and influence in the region. The ASEAN-5 countries
experienced astronomical growth in the 1980s and early 1990s, then suffered a nearly
complete turnaround in 1997-98 as a result of the crisis and will probably never return to
those heights again. Also before the crisis, Indonesia played a leadership role in regional
integration, but since then has been struggling simply to survive and has not been able to
resume this role.
These examples evidence the potential for great change in East Asia and provide
some understanding of the trial and error nature of regional integration in the region. In
fact, it is often implied that the process of European integration is a well-thought-out
strategy; however, it is rather characterized, in the words of Charles Wyplosz, as a
"process of muddling-through, two steps forward and one step backward, with deep and
lingering divergences as to what the end objective is."315 In this respect, Asia's own non-
strategic, somewhat sporadic progression towards integration is not dissimilar from that
of the EU. However, the EU's well-developed institutions have assumed the role of
transforming projects into reality when opportunities are presented.316 There is little
evidence that East Asia's institutions are capable of doing the same.
It could be said the motivation for regional cooperation was similar, yet different,
for ASEAN and the EU. Politics played the primary role in both cases. In Europe's case,
economic interdependence was thought to be the most effective force for promoting the
political cooperation that was considered to be highly desirable in the region in the post-
war period. This was the case in the formation of the European Coal and Steel
Community and the EEC. In ASEAN's case, political cooperation was also the
motivating factor with economic cooperation following from there. Thus, politics played
the main role in both regions but the approach was from different directions.317
In fact, there have been various motivators for East Asian integration. As just
mentioned, the initial motivation for ASEAN's formation in the 1960s was political.
Then in the early 1990s, progress in European and North American integration acted as a
catalyst for Asia's emphasis on economic integration with the formation of AFTA and
APEC's Bogor Declaration. The financial crisis of 1997-98 was the motivation in the
latter half of the 1 990s, this time in the area of financial cooperation. At the same time,
Japan's economic situation has been an indirect motivating factor as it has affected the
country's patterns of trade, investment and ODA in the region. The uncertainty
surrounding its economy makes it difficult to predict what will be Japan's future role in
East Asia. There is now a new motivating factor for cooperation emerging - and that is
the opening up of China. As China seeks cooperation with its neighbors in the region,
this will decrease suspicion and distrust and could lead to even higher levels of
integration in all areas - political, economic and financial/monetary.
East Asia's institutions are often criticized for being "talk shops". While
institutional effectiveness is certainly desirable, the importance of dialogue and
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discussion should not be underestimated. This is particularly true given the social and
cultural enviromnent in Asia where the emphasis is on consensus and noninterference.
Furthermore, bringing China into the dialogue is essential.
The general consensus is that regional integration in East Asia will not (and in
many respects, should not) proceed in the same way as has integration in Europe or North
America. That is not to say East Asian countries will never achieve a high level of
integration, but they will undoubtedly follow a different path to get there, and the end
result will most likely be different as well. In the final chapter we look ahead to the
future to see where this path might lead.
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Chapter VIl - Looking Ahead
There seems to be little doubt that Asia was the center of the world economy in
the pre-modern and early modem eras. Unlike Britain after the Industrial Revolution or
the United States after World War II, Asian countries, including India, China and some
Islamic empires, had not been hegemonic but had been dominant both in size and
influence. These Asian empires engaged in complex patterns of global trade involving
many routes. Their activities, however, were largely commercial and trade-centered and
did not involve much direct investment, as was the case for Britain. Global, as well as
intraregional, trade had thrived for centuries until the period of colonization by the West.
As Asia regained independence and started to engage in global economic
activities after World War II, the historical legacy of centuries of global trading were
quite important in that both hard and soft infrastructures, such as ports and a merchant
class, were well developed. Indeed, Asia, particularly East Asia, had benefited
significantly from a legacy of openness in trade. Its trade and economic transactions are
broadly spread over all the regions of the world, much more so than those of Europe and
the U.S. Given the level of development, Asia, particularly East Asia, is also quite open
in trade, FDI and finance. Its dynamism during most of the past decades has been the
result of this openness and the global nature of the region. East Asia has functioned as a
major manufacturing base for the globalized world economy. As such, East Asian
economies have had a very high export-GDP ratio, some of them even exceeding 100
percent.
Reflecting the open and global nature of trade and other economic transactions,
regional economic cooperation has been relatively weak in East Asia. ASEAN started as
a political organization and still espouses the "ASEAN way", emphasizing consensus,
non-intervention and minimal institutions. APEC's "open regionalism" is patterned after
ASEAN's "concerted voluntarism" and has served to supplement global liberalization
rounds by WTO-GATT very effectively.
It might be reasonable to say that Asian regional organizations have not been
regional in the true sense of the word but have been quite different from genuine regional
organizations like the European Union and NAFTA. Given the open and global nature of
the Asian region and given the enormous diversity that exists among the countries of the
region, this has been somewhat natural and has served the region well. Asia has been the
greatest beneficiary of global liberalization in trade and FDI, and an organization like
APEC has served the region well by effectively supporting global liberalization. So far
so good, and if we believe that global capitalism continues to evolve smoothly as in the
past, one would support "open regionalism", or the lack of genuine regional
organizations. Many economists trained in the neoclassical tradition support such
propositions and conclude that APEC or the WTO is the organization that should be
supported by Asian countries and that the formation of genuine regional organizations
should be avoided. If their assumption of perfect competition is satisfied or if global
institutions exist to rectify imperfections in the global market, their position is not
unreasonable.
However, the reality of the globalized world is far from ideal. There is no global
lender of last resort; neither do we have a global supervisory agency nor a global anti-
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trust agency. Referring to the lack of a global lender of last resort, Mervyn King (1999)
argued the two "purist" solutions to the problem; namely, the creation of a global lender
of last resort and reinstatement of permanent capital controls are neither feasible nor
desirable under the current intemational political regime. The middle way, or muddling
through, is the only politically feasible solution and King refers to the creation of a "do-
it-yourself' lender of last resort including establishing a regional lender of last resort as
one of the middle-way solutions.
The East Asian crisis of 1997-98 has given rise to the recognition of the
imperfections, or lack of governance, of globalized markets. The Asian miracle, to a
significant degree a result of the open and global nature of this region, suddenly turned
into the Asian crisis. Not only global institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, but
also regional institutions like ASEAN and APEC, were unable to perform any useful
function to stop the contagion of the crisis. Also, initial prescriptions by the IMF may
have aggravated the crisis rather than stopping it. It is not only the policy
recommendations made during the crisis, but also those made before the crisis, that need
to be reexamined. The strong pressure to deregulate, particularly in international finance,
without comparable strengthening of financial supervision had exposed many countries in
the region to a degree of risk unmanageable by national governments. International
organizations could not substitute for national governments in managing these new
market risks. What is necessary is not to substitute market for government but to
redefine the role of government in view of the rapidly changing international
environment. Joseph Stiglitz3 18 correctly points out what needs to be done in the future
as follows:
"Just as before they were misled by the chimera of deregulation - they should
have asked instead what is the right regulatory structure for their current situation - so
too in the future, they will have to resist accepting without question the current mantras
of the global marketplace of ideas. There will have to be strengthened regulation of
securities markets and an improved overall legal environment, especially in areas such as
corporate governance and bankruptcy. The legal structures will have to comport with
international standards, yet be adapted to their own special situations; wholesale
borrowing will not work."
Policy efforts have to be largely national. However, the question here, in relation
to regional cooperation, is whether genuine regional institutions like the EU would help
national governments to accelerate their efforts in the right direction. Or should we leave
these matters to intemational organizations such as the IMF and the WTO.
We endorse the establishment of a genuine regional institution in Asia, or at least
in East Asia, on several grounds. First, existing global institutions are strongly biased
toward market fundamentalism or the neoclassical paradigm, and their past records in
international capital and finance are very poor. The establishment of a genuine regional
institution could provide a countervailing force and would contribute to reforming
international institutions. Indeed, global institutions are necessary, but healthy
competition among global and regional institutions would help improve their
performance.
Second, international institutions, politically dominated by Westem countries and
staffed largely by Western economists, often lack sufficient knowledge of regional
values, culture and history and tend to impose their own views or try to "Westemize" the
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country in question. Indeed, international standards need to be adhered to but standards
should reflect existing cultural and institutional diversity. Regional organizations can
supplement global ones effectively in such areas.
Third, as in the case of the EU, necessary structural reforms such as the ones
mentioned by Stiglitz, can be more smoothly and willingly implemented if such reforms
are deemed essential for regional integration. There has been increasing resistance to
externally imposed reforms. Regional cooperation or integration (even slow integration)
is a more effective way to internalize these reforms.
Fourth, the lack of global govemance, such as the lack of a global lender of last
resort or global financial regulation, is expected to continue for the foreseeable future.
Rather than completely relying on national governance, there seems to be some room for
regional governance. In a region like Asia where the diversity is enormous, regional
governance is more difficult than in Europe, for example. However, more flexible and
softer cooperation could be developed.
Fifth, regional integration has been proceeding quickly in Europe and, to a lesser
degree, in the Americas although there are recent signs of increasing acceleration there as
well. Is it politically feasible or desirable for Asia to be as open and global as in the past?
Might not Asia be victimized by these two predatory empires in the future, as it was in
the 19 th and 20h centuries? This is a rather defensive position but has been a major
driving force for the recent moves toward more regional cooperation.
If we are to establish a genuine regional organization, what kind of organization
should it be and what kind of regional cooperation should be its focus? One obvious
question that needs to be answered in the context of regional cooperation is what new
type of division of labor is possible with the rapid emergence of China as a
manufacturing giant in the region? The division of labor that has existed in East Asia,
namely the "flying geese formation" led by Japan and the NIES, needs to adapt to this
new environment. In fact, it is currently under rapid transformation and will eventually
evolve into one that includes China as the key player. The precise characteristics of this
new division of labor are not yet certain but one thing is clear - China cannot be
dominant in every single manufacturing sector that currently exists in the rest of Asia.
Strategic concentration in key areas of technological or other areas of advantage for a
country should allow it to coexist with China and the rest of Asia. Japan, for one, can
climb higher on the technology ladder, developing its own technological skill base while
using China as its key manufacturing base. ASEAN countries could specialize in areas of
manufacturing where they possess a skill advantage.
In many countries industrial reorganization could become necessary and involve a
potentially large number of mergers and acquisitions. If an FTA between China and
ASEAN, or among the members of ASEAN-Plus-Three (APT), were to be concluded and
monitored by a genuine regional institution, Asia-wide industrial reorganization would
become a major policy initiative for the region. Although the process would, and should,
be essentially market driven, institutional involvement would be desirable since policy
coordination among the countries involved would be a key element of success.
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) within APT, nevertheless, can proceed
simultaneously with the Doha process. Positive feedback and sound competition between
the two processes should accelerate liberalization, thus benefiting all countries concerned.
By pursuing RTAs, Asian countries can gain a bargaining position vis-A-vis the U.S. and
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Europe to channel WTO discussions in their favor. There has been criticism, particularly
among developing countries, that the WTO process has benefited only developed
countries, the U.S. above all. A two-track strategy (RTAs and WTO) would give
leverage to Asian developing countries to counterbalance this bias.
China and the ASEAN countries have recently agreed to form an FTA by 2010,
with some allowance for preferential treatment for less developed ASEAN countries.
Korea and Japan could potentially join this arrangement to make it an APT FTA
agreement. Given the diverse nature of the participating countries, the FTA should have
initially some preferential treatment and exceptions for the less developed countries, but
in general the FTA will accelerate integration, eventually eliminating preferences and
exceptions. A pragmatic, rather than a purist, approach is required here. Parallel and
reciprocal FDI agreements should proceed simultaneously with trade liberalization.
In the area of international finance, various ideas concerning regional monetary
and financial cooperation have emerged since the financial crisis of 1997-98. The crisis,
it has been generally agreed, was capital-account driven, rather than current-account
driven as were many crises in the past. Furthermore, a dual mismatch in currencies and
maturities was one of the major causes of the crisis. Thus, it is only natural that
discussions and suggestions for crisis prevention are focused on the areas of exchange
rate regime and financial market regulation.
Reviewing these recent developments, Eichengreen (2001) argues, "Cooperation
to stabilize exchange rates would be a diversion at best and a costly mistake at worst."
He believes "cooperation in strengthening banking systems and promoting the
development of bond markets, on the other hand, would go a long way toward creating a
zone of economic and financial stability." 319 These are the grounds upon which he
advocates the creation of an "Asian Financial Institute" on the platform of ASEAN-Plus-
Three.
We think quite the opposite is the case for the following reasons. First, given the
major differences in the stage of development of financial markets among APT countries,
say between Japan and Laos, it is not at all realistic to come up with common guidelines
for the prudential supervision of banking systems or capital markets. Second, as he
himself admits, whether regional standards for prudential financial supervision apart from
global standards are necessary or not is quite doubtful. Each country can have its own
policy adhering to global prudential rule depending upon its stage of development or its
politico-economic system. However, there is no "Asian" or cultural commonality in
financial regulation around which to form regional standards as such. As has often been
pointed out, Asia is very diverse culturally, racially or ethnically. While there is some
common ground for the formation of a standard apart from the global standard, diversity
should be respected over and above any monolithic adherence to a uniform standard.
In contrast to cooperation in prudential financial supervision, exchange rate
cooperation or cooperation on forex/capital account policies can be effective among
countries of different developmental states. Just as less advanced countries in Central
and East Europe peg their rates to the Euro, late starters in ASEAN could fix their rates to
the currencies of advanced countries possibly with some capital controls. Also,
variations in the micro or structural aspects of financial systems can be maintained in
exchange rate cooperation as long as some coordination in macro policies is possible.
This distinction between macro and micro, or macro and structure, is very important if
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diversity is to be respected. Countries could coordinate exchange rate or monetary
policies while maintaining different political and economic systems.
The issue then is what kind of forex cooperation is possible among Asian
countries? Eichengreen (2001) reviews various types of foreign exchange regimes
including an EMS-type snake, a currency-board-type peg to the dollar, the yen or a
dollar-yen-euro basket, and a monetary union. However, he concludes that monetary
cooperation is either infeasible or premature. True, its ultimate success is a long shot as it
is in the case of FTAs. Difficulties in creating a currency union are at least as great as
those in forming FTAs. It is also true there is a strong fear of floating among Asian
countries, including Korea320, and the extent of currency management has not been
insignificant. Furthermore, Chinese- and Malaysian-type partial capital controls can be
implemented in countries where the IMF does not have a dominant role.
Indeed, cooperation needs to be pursued in a gradual and orderly manner but
setting the target of currency union, along with FTAs, in the distant future, say ten years
from now, is not inconsistent with gradualism. A common currency peg as advocated by
Kawai and Takagi (2000) or Williamson (1999, 2000, 2001) may be a step toward
currency union but inclusion of the yen in a basket is a problem if an eventual move to
currency union is desired. The formal adoption of a common currency peg with
appropriate weights is difficult enough politically. The more ambitious long-term goal of
forming a currency union along with FTAs would seem more likely to be successful if it
were combined with a pragmatic and feasible forex coordination policy in the short term.
Given the widespread fear of floating in Asia, it seems appropriate to coordinate
the management of floating rates among authorities. In other words, interventions in
forex markets by authorities and the asset allocation of foreign reserves can be
coordinated to avoid mutually inconsistent actions. Specific bands need not be agreed
upon but authorities can consult with one another and coordinate their policies, if
necessary, to stabilize intraregional exchange rates. Countries like Korea, China, Japan
and the advanced ASEAN countries can regularly meet and constantly communicate with
one another to exchange respective views on forex developments and to try to stabilize
their intraregional exchange rates by coordinating macro and intervention policies. There
is no need to have fornal agreements but an APT version of G7, so to speak, on macro
and forex policies alone would contribute a lot to stabilization.
Eventually, forex cooperation should develop into the formation of an Asian
curTency unit (ACU) with a flexible snake around the central value, as in the case of the
ECU and the snake. That is, the joint floating of Asian currencies vis-a-vis the U.S.
dollar and euro with a relatively wide band around the central rate. Although the creation
of a common currency a la the euro may not be feasible even in the long run, a soft and
flexible form of currency union with an ACU could be a long-termn possibility. It would
enhance and accelerate integration through trade and FDI, and vice versa.
Speculative attacks are realistic possibilities, but with a wide and flexible band
Asian countries should be able to fend off such speculation using their huge amount of
combined foreign reserves if effective coordination of macro policies accompanies joint
foreign exchange interventions. The need to jointly defend an ACU with a wide band
logically leads to the idea of extending the Chiang Mai Initiative to an Asian Monetary
Fund (ATF), which would pool a portion of the foreign reserves of the participating
countries and conduct macroeconomic surveillance. Participating countries could
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conduct joint intervention and coordination of macro policies with the AMF as the
secretariat. Articles of the AMF could provide the modality and modus operandi of
coordination and intervention.
In conclusion, let us emphasize that the concrete proposal outlined here is just one
example, and the process of formning a genuine regional organization should be gradual
and pragmatic. As in the case of Chinese national policy, structural reform needs to
proceed simultaneously with opening or liberalization. The moves also need to be
gradual and simultaneous on all fronts.
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204-205) for a detailed explanation of these systems.]
22 Demirguc,-Kunt and Levine (2001a: 132)
229 The authors define financial development as applied in this study as an assessment of the "efficiency
with which financial intermediaries and markets (1) assess new projects and firms, (2) exert corporate
control, (3) ease risk management and (4) mobilize savings. [Beck, Demirguic-Kunt, Levine and
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272 While this is the view of many in the region, there are those who disagree. Eichengreen (2001) views
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